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Part II -- General Abstract 
II. General Abstract 
“European banks are in worse condition than U.S.  
peers because capital regulation has been looser and 
banks more leveraged.” 
Sheila Bair, former chairman of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), during a speech in 2011. 
Triggered by the financial crisis in 2007, US opinion leaders in particular 
argued that the banking regulations of other countries were not strict 
enough to guide banks’ to hold sufficient amounts of capital. Motivated 
by these debates, this dissertation comprises three papers that question 
whether bank regulation has an effect on the capital ratios or the liquidity 
ratios of banks. In contrast to the US camp’s claims, the dissertation 
reveals that regulation is not the dominant factor when banks set their 
capital or liquidity structure. I do not find a measurable effect on the 
financing structure and only minor evidence of an effect on the capital 
structure. To conclude, bank regulations aiming for stronger capital and 
liquidity structures have not achieved the desired results with the old 
regulatory frameworks. The current discussion regarding the new Basel 
III framework shows that the topic is still controversial and it will be 
interesting to see if this new framework alters the results of my thesis. 
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IV. Introduction to the Thesis 
IV.1. General Framework, Aim, and Contribution 
There is a long-standing economic debate, between the USA and the 
European political camps in particular, over the correct level of severity 
of bank regulation. Prompted by this debate, this dissertation comprises 
three papers that question whether bank regulation has an effect on the 
capital ratios or the liquidity ratios of banks. The first paper applies a 
partial adjustment model using the generalised method of moments 
regression technique in order to find explanatory variables for the capital 
ratios of banks around the world. These variables include various 
regulatory factors, which cover different aspects of regulation severity. 
The second paper applies a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to 
investigate whether the announcement of an early-comprehensive 
introduction of the new Basel II regulatory framework in 2004 for 
European countries led the capital ratios of these banks developing 
differently compared to banks from late-partial adopting countries. The 
third paper uses the same model and similar variables as the first paper, 
but examines the impact of these variables on the liquidity ratio instead 
of the capital ratio. 
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IV.2. The Influence of Regulation on the Capital Ratios of 
Banks 
In my first paper, I find that bank regulation appears to be at best only a 
partial explanation for the size of banks’ capital ratios. Only greater 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities seem to lead to higher capital 
ratios and there are indications that stricter private monitoring leads to 
even lower ratios. On the other hand, I find evidence that capital ratios 
strongly and persistently depend on their past levels. Additionally, larger 
banks appear to have lower ratios, whereas dividend payers, systemically 
relevant banks and banks in countries with systemically relevant bank 
sectors seem to have higher ratios. Consequently, a larger number of 
banks sharing the country’s risk apparently leads to lower capital ratios. 
The study also finds evidence that banks in former crisis countries have 
higher capital ratios than banks in non-crisis countries; this unexpected 
result might somehow also call into question the accuracy of the 
disclosure of the capital ratios.  
In the second paper, there is evidence of a positive treatment effect. That 
is, at first glance it seems that the introduction of the new regulation led 
to higher capital ratios in affected banks. However, going into detail, the 
study reveals that changes in the accounting standards and not the 
regulation change might have been the main trigger for this effect. In 
other words, book values changed and therefore the capital ratios went 
up because of a change in the measurement method. The “real” effect 
might have been much smaller than it appears at first. As in the first 
paper, bank size seems to have a negative effect on banks’ capital ratios 
and the importance of the banking sector appears to have a positive 
effect. Additionally, there is strong support for the finding that the ratio 
increases with the profitability of a bank and the economic health of its 
environment. Further, the study finds some evidence that bank ratios are 
lower in the case of riskier banks and higher growth rates of the gross 
domestic product, while the ratios seem to be higher in the presence of 
higher inflation rates. The only results that contradict those of the first 
paper relate to the possible influence of dividend payers (I find a negative 
effect in the second paper). 
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IV.3. The Influence of Regulation on the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio of Banks 
The third paper reveals that the influence of regulation on liquidity 
structure also appears to be limited. As stricter capital regulation actually 
seems to lead to lower (i.e. “worse”) liquidity ratios, it would appear that 
banks only aim to comply with the capital ratio standards and not the 
liquidity structure ratios (for which binding standards were not yet 
implemented during the observation horizon). Regarding the other 
regulatory variables, the paper finds that greater private monitoring 
appears to cause lower ratios. Further, there is evidence that the 
importance – and therefore the risk – of a country’s banking sector as a 
whole and higher growth rates of the annual domestic product lead to 
higher liquidity ratios in the banks of these countries. The results do not 
reveal any significant bank-specific explanatory factors and the highly 
significant and robust coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
relatively low. This implies that banks change their liquidity ratios to the 
desired ratio relatively quickly, but the desired ratio is particular to every 
single bank. 
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Part V -- Paper 1: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Capital Adequacy 
V. Paper 1: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Capital 
Adequacy – A Dynamic Panel Data Study 
V.1. Abstract 
Triggered by the financial crisis in 2007, US opinion leaders in particular 
argued that the banking regulations of other countries were not strict 
enough to guide banks’ to hold sufficient amounts of capital. Motivated 
by these debates, I examine explanatory factors for the capital ratio levels 
of banks from 43 developed countries for the years 2000 to 2011. Besides 
bank-specific and country-specific factors, my paper includes six time-
variant regulatory factors that cover various aspects of regulatory 
severity. The goal of the paper is to answer the question of whether bank 
regulation determines capital ratios, that is, whether the US accusations 
are legitimate. The applied partial adjustment model uses the generalised 
method of moments regression technique. 
In contrast to the US camp’s claims, I find that regulation is not the 
dominant factor when banks set their capital ratios. In fact, only greater 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities seem to lead to higher capital 
ratios and there are indications that stricter private monitoring may even 
lead to lower ratios. Instead, I find evidence that capital ratios strongly 
and persistently depend on their past levels. Additionally, larger banks 
appear to have lower ratios, whereas dividend payers, systemically 
relevant banks and banks in countries with systemically relevant banking 
sectors seem to have higher ratios. Consequently, a greater number of 
banks sharing the country risk apparently leads to lower capital ratios. 
However, my study also finds evidence that banks in former crisis 
countries had higher capital ratios than banks in non-crisis countries. 
Although this might not directly cast doubt on regulatory severity, it does 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the disclosure of capital ratios.  
 
 
Keywords: Banks, Capital ratios, Bank regulation  
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G28 
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V.2. Introduction and Background 
“European banks are in worse condition than US peers because capital 
regulation has been looser and banks more leveraged” (Onaran, 2011, no 
pagination). This statement from Sheila Bair (the former chairman of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) made in 2011, highlights a long 
existing economic discussion between the USA and the European 
political camp in particular regarding the correct severity of bank 
regulation. The financial crisis in 2007 rekindled this discussion; 
although the events in the USA strongly influenced the crisis, the US 
camp accuses the European camp of enabling banks to hold – from a risk-
based view – too little capital because its regulation is not sufficiently 
tight (e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 2013, Braithwaite and Jenkins, 2011 or 
Osman, 2010). 
Inspired by this intercontinental debate my paper tries empirically to 
answer the question of whether bank regulation determines bank capital. 
My assumption is that more severe regulation should lead to higher levels 
of capital.  
My capital measure is based on the framework submitted by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), which is known as “Basel 
I”, to regulate the capital adequacy of banks. The idea is that the extent 
of equity required by a bank depends on the bank’s risk, that is, the 
eligible capital in relation to the risk-weighted assets has to exceed a 
defined threshold (see formula (V.1)): 
Eligible Capital
Risk Weighted Assets
 ≥ Threshold (V.1) 
The most commonly used measure for eligible capital is Tier 1 capital 
and, accordingly, the ratio of interest is the Tier 1 ratio (TIER1R)1. The 
Basel 1 framework has been refined and improved several times since its 
first introduction; however, the general principle has remained the same 
                                            
1  The Tier 1 ratio divides shareholder funds plus perpetual non-cumulative preference 
shares (the Tier 1 capital) by risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks according to 
the Basel rules. Refer to section V.8.1 for a detailed explanation and the origin of all 
variables used in the study.  
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right up to the present day and is the basis for the new Basel III rules 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). 
Although the Basel regulations give general rules for the capital 
adequacy of banks, there is room for interpretation by banks. This is 
caused by the way the regulation bodies of the particular country 
concerned implemented the rules. The definitions for eligible capital or 
the risk-weighted assets are not necessarily the same from country to 
country and this discretion has become a breeding ground for the 
intercontinental debate.  
Shortly after the financial crisis, with the promulgation of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,2 US politicians 
introduced new rules to further strengthen bank regulation. Politicians 
from the rest of the world quickly followed suit in attempting to enforce 
new regulations.3 By enhancing regulatory power, setting higher activity 
restrictions and influencing banks’ capital structure, most of these 
regulations directly or indirectly aimed at banks’ capital ratios.    
However, consistent with previous work (for instance Berger, DeYoung, 
Flannery, Lee & Öztekin, 2008; Brewer, Kaufman & Wall, 2008; or 
Barth, Caprio Jr. & Levine, 2006), my study shows that banks have 
higher average capital ratios than stipulated by the regulation (refer to 
section V.4). Therefore the question is, does bank regulation really 
matter? Or do banks set their Tier 1 ratio (only) on the basis of other, 
bank-specific or country-specific factors? Or is the nature of the Tier 1 
ratio-setting process different for every bank?    
To answer these questions, I construct six regulatory index variables 
based on several regulatory surveys from Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine 
(2001). Additionally, I implement further bank-specific and country-
specific factors as possible explanatory variables. My study applies a 
partial adjustment model and uses advanced dynamic panel data 
regression methods based on cross-country bank figures for 43 countries 
and 12 years (from 2000 to 2011, i.e. covering the period before and after 
the financial crisis).  
                                            
2  Refer e.g. to McGrane (2010). 
3  Refer e.g. to Clark and Treanor (2010). 
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Similar to non-banking firms, a lot of empirical work on the banking 
sector has already been conducted. However, most of the studies are 
nationally based and therefore do not consider the diverging regulations 
of various countries. Berger et al. (2008) find explanatory factors for 
capital ratios by using an adjustment model for the period from 1992 to 
2006. Their conclusion is that banks actively manage their capital ratios 
and set target capital levels substantially above regulatory minimum 
levels. Moreover, they find that rates adjust rapidly to the target capital 
levels. Their study only covers US banks and only uses explanatory 
variables other than regulatory factors.  
A cross-country study by Gropp and Heider (2010) investigates the 
determinants of the capital structure of (large and publicly traded) banks 
in the years between 1991 and 2004. Among others, Gropp and Heider 
(2010) also use an adjustment model. However, they apply only 
rudimentary dynamic panel data regression methods. Although they do 
not directly implement explanatory regulatory variables, their conclusion 
is that “[…] capital regulation and buffers may only be of second order 
importance in determining the capital structure of most banks” (Gropp & 
Heider, 2010, p. 590). Therefore, most banks seem to set their capital 
structure in a similar way to non-banking firms. This is an interesting 
conclusion in relation to the question raised above, that is, whether bank 
regulation really matters. Similarly, using slightly older data from 1986 
to 2001, Flannery and Rangan (2008) conclude that the most important 
explanation for the capital build-up of the largest US banks during this 
time is related to market forces. That is, increased capital requirements 
by the regulator only explain a small part of the build-up. To obtain their 
results, they also use an adjustment model and implement advanced 
regression procedures. Again, they do not include bank regulation in the 
same way as in my study.  
In contrast, Brewer et al. (2008) use similar explanatory variables 
(including variables to measure bank regulation) as my paper and apply 
a partial adjustment model. However, their model only uses basic 
regression methods to cover possible biases in dynamic panel data 
studies. Additionally, it focuses on large banking institutions only, 
resulting in a much smaller sample size than in my study. The period 
covered ranges from 1992 to 2005, that is, it does not include the 
financial crisis. Further, in contrast to my paper, Brewer et al. (2008) 
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consider the bank regulation variables as time-invariant during the 
observed period. 
The last two facts also apply to Schaeck and Cihák (2009). Their work 
examines the impact of bank competition on the capital ratio. They use a 
couple of control variables, including regulatory variables, in their panel 
data regression. They do not, however, implement target adjustment 
considerations. Nevertheless, the last two mentioned studies are 
promising, since they find several significant explanatory bank-specific, 
country-specific and regulatory variables.  
My study extends the previous research by using cross-national data and 
therefore analyses differences across countries; by considering measures 
of regulatory severity and contemplating the idea that this regulation 
severity might change during the observation period; by applying 
advanced methodological dynamic panel data regressions; and lastly, by 
also covering a time period that includes the financial crisis.  
My paper is of interest for regulators, policy makers, academics and other 
stakeholders for several reasons: it gives insight in the banks’ capital 
ratio setting and discovers important factors in this setting process; it 
performs an informative function when analysing banks and their capital 
ratios; it exposes the extent and direction of regulatory influence on 
capital ratios; and gives guidance for decision-making when discussing 
new banking regulations or capital rules.   
In contrast to the US camp’s claims, I find that regulation is not the 
dominant factor when banks set their capital ratios.4 Only greater 
regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks seem to lead to higher 
capital ratios and there are indications that stronger private monitoring 
even leads to lower ratios. Instead, I find evidence that capital ratios 
strongly and persistently depend on their past levels. Additionally, larger 
banks appear to hold lower ratios, whereas dividend payers, systemically 
relevant banks and banks in countries with systemically relevant banking 
sectors seem to have higher ratios. Consequently, a higher number of 
banks sharing the country risk apparently leads to lower capital ratios. 
However, my study also finds evidence that banks in former crisis 
                                            
4  Note that robustness checks do not show substantial changes in the results of all other 
variables when I drop the regulatory components from the calculations (refer to section 
V.8.4 for details).  
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countries had higher capital ratios than banks in non-crisis countries. 
Although this might not directly cast doubt on regulatory severity, it does 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the disclosure of capital ratios.     
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section V.3 explains the data 
and methodology used; section V.4 illustrates descriptive statistics for 
the dataset before section V.5 reveals the results of the regression, and 
section V.6 concludes the paper.  
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V.3. Data and Methodology 
V.3.1. Dataset 
My study considers only developed countries, since the focus is on 
countries with expected banking sector importance and with expected 
regulation influence over banking behaviour.  Consequently, the country 
population consists of all countries belonging to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)5, countries with 
important (i.e. “global”) financial centres according to „The Global 
Financial Centres Index 10“6 and the additional European Union (EU) 
countries not included above7. The original total population is therefore 
45 countries.  
Regulatory data for the paper is based on the bank regulatory survey in 
Barth et al. (2001). They conducted the survey for the years 2000, 2003, 
2008 and 2011. Accordingly, the year population consists of the 12 years 
from 2000 to 2011 (however, owing to the regression methodology 
described below, the first year drops out and is just used for lagging and 
differencing). Missing years between the four survey observation points 
adopt the value of the nearest observation point (e.g. year 2001 adopts 
the survey data of 2000 and year 2002 adopts that of 2003). Thus, the 
paper assumes that changes in the severity of bank regulation occur 
immediately and not slowly. This appears obvious, since the possible 
answers to the survey questions are mostly binary (“yes” or “no”).8 Since 
my study uses yearly bank data, the financial year-end date is rounded to 
                                            
5  These are Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), 
Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel 
(ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Republic of Korea (KOR), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg 
(LUX), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), 
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden 
(SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States 
of America (USA). 
6  See Yeandle and von Gunten (2013). The additional countries to consider are China 
(CHN), Hong Kong (HKG), Russian Federation (RUS), Singapore (SGP) and the United 
Arab Emirates (ARE).  
7  These are Bulgaria (BGR), Latvia (LVA), Malta (MLT), Republic of Cyprus (CYP) and 
Romania (ROU).  
8  However, a robustness check which considers slow changes by interpolating the values 
does not materially change the regression results, except that the dividend dummy (DIV) 
loses its significance (refer to details in section V.8.4).   
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the next year-end if a bank does not have 31 December as its financial 
year-end.9 
My study includes all banks (regardless of their size) from the 
Bankscope10 database with consolidation code C1, C2 and C*.11 That is, 
it only considers consolidated figures, since the regulatory requirements 
usually refer to the consolidated level. I apply the following rules to 
eliminated bank double entries: 
 Entries for which a Tier 1 ratio is available are preferred to other 
entries. 
 If there is equality regarding Tier 1 ratio availability, entries for 
which more relevant other variables are available are preferred to 
entries with fewer variables.  
 If there is equality regarding the availability of other variables, C1 
and C2 consolidation codes are preferred to C*. 
The population of a specific year does not include banks with missing 
data for the variables of interest in that particular year12, but it does 
include these banks in the years in which all the necessary data is 
available (refer to section V.3.2 for a description of the various data). 
Therefore, the study uses unbalanced panel data according to Wooldridge 
(2010).  
All values (except for ratios) are translated into million USD (United 
States dollars) using the corresponding year-end foreign exchange rate 
according to Bankscope.  
                                            
9  E.g. observations of banks with financial year-end 31 March 2008 are included in the 
population of 31 December 2008.  
10  “Bankscope – World banking information source” from Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing BV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.  
11  Refer to section V.8.3 for a detailed explanation of the consolidation codes.  
12  However, the banks not included in the population for the regression of a particular year 
are nevertheless included in the calculation of the country-specific variables of interest for 
these years (such as e.g. the ratio of banks per one million capita per country).   
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V.3.2. Model 
The paper assumes that bank i (ranging from 1 to N) sets its target Tier 
1 ratio (TIER1R*i,t)13 in year t (ranging from 1 to T) according to a 
number of K+1 (ranging from 0 to K)14 explanatory variables Dk,i,t and 
their corresponding coefficients βk to be estimated (see formula (V.2)):15 
TIER1Ri,t
∗  =  ∑ β
k
Dk,i,t
K
k=0
+ vi,t (V.2) 
Some of the variables Dk,i,t, presented below are country specific 
(meaning that they are the same for all banks i in a country j at time t or 
they are the same for all banks i in a country j for all time periods T). 
The target Tier 1 ratio is unobservable. However, a partial adjustment 
model estimates the coefficients by applying the idea that a bank’s Tier 
1 ratio does not normally equal its target value and that a bank therefore 
tries to adjust the actual value toward its target.16 This means that the 
difference between the ratio for the current year and the ratio for the 
previous year should equal the difference between the target ratio and 
the ratio of the previous year times all banks’ invariant17 speed of 
adjustment λ, as shown in formula (V.3): 
                                            
13  Using total capital ratio (TCR) instead of the Tier 1 ratio shows no changes at all compared 
to the basis set-up (refer to details in section V.8.4). 
 Further, the new Basel III rules stipulate an additional leverage ratio to be fulfilled, which 
is said to be less easy for banks to control themselves. To put it simply, it is a ratio that 
compares book equity to total book assets, without risk weighting the figures (refer to the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Again, using such a ratio instead of the 
capital ratios mentioned above leads to substantially similar results (with the difference 
that some additional coefficients become significant and the test diagnostics are not all 
satisfied possibly because of a changed number of observations). 
14  D0,i,t equals 1, which means that k = 0 represents the constant.  
15  The formula includes a disturbance term vi,t.  
16  Refer for example to Lintner (1956), who introduced such as model in the area of 
dividend-setting decisions or Flannery and Rangan (2006), who used it in to explain a 
firm’s market debt ratio.  
17  My model assumes that the speed of adjustment is the same for all banks, since the 
coefficient on the variable does not substantially change when performing separate 
regression in regard to various bank categories (e.g. small banks vs large banks, European 
Banks vs non-European banks, dividend-payers vs non-payers etc.).   
22 Data and Methodology 
 
Part V -- Paper 1: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Capital Adequacy 
TIER1Ri,t- TIER1Ri,t-1=  λ (TIER1Ri,t
* - TIER1Ri,t-1) (V.3) 
By substituting formula (V.2) into formula (V.3) and rearranging them, 
I obtain the dynamic regression model to be estimated according to 
formula (V.4):18 
TIER1Ri,t  =   ∑ λβkDk,i,t
K
k=0
+ (1 − λ) TIER1Ri,t−1 + ui,t (V.4) 
Note that a speed of adjustment λ converging to 0 means that the 
adjustment process is persistent, that is, only a small gap between the 
Tier 1 ratio and the target Tier 1 ratio closes every year and the other 
explanatory variables are of only minor importance. On the other hand, 
a speed of adjustment λ converging to 1 means that the adjustment 
process is immediate, that is, the past ratio is only of minor importance 
and the other explanatory variables have more influence.  
The explanatory variables19 are divided into regulatory variables, bank-
specific variables and further country-specific variables.  
I construct six variables, which measure various direct or indirect 
regulatory components: 
 Restriction (REST): This is an index measuring regulatory 
restrictions on the activities of banks, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum 
value of 14 and is composed of several questions. These questions 
deal with the topic of whether banks are allowed to engage in 
various activities. A higher value of the variable is related to greater 
restrictions and therefore to more severe regulation and is assumed 
to be followed by a higher Tier 1 ratio.  
 Regulatory body power (RBP): This is an index measuring the 
direct power of the regulatory body, following the survey explained 
                                            
18  As in Baltagi (2008), I consider the regression disturbance term as a one-way error 
component model λvi,t = ui,t = μi + εi,t, whereas μi denotes the unobservable individual 
specific effect and εi,t denotes the remainder disturbance.  
19  Refer to section V.8.1 for more detailed definitions of and explanations for the sources of 
the variables used. 
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in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum value of 
13. A higher regulatory power index is related to more severe 
regulation and is therefore expected to lead to a higher Tier 1 ratio.  
 Capital regulation (CAPR): This is an index measuring the 
regulatory oversight of bank capital, following the survey explained 
in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum value of 5. 
A higher value is related to stricter capital regulations and therefore 
to more severe regulation and is assumed to lead to a higher Tier 1 
ratio. 
 Entry requirements (ERQ): This is an index measuring the difficulty 
of operating as a bank in a specific country, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum 
value of 8. A higher value indicates greater difficulties for banks in 
entering the country’s market and is therefore related to more severe 
regulation that is expected to lead to a higher Tier 1 ratio. 
 Private monitoring (PRM): This is an index measuring the degree 
to which the private sector is empowered, facilitated and 
encouraged to monitor banks, following the survey explained in 
Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum value of 12. 
The expectation for the influence of this variable is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, one could assume that a higher private monitoring 
index is related to more severe regulation and therefore leads to a 
higher Tier 1 ratio. On the other hand, a higher private monitoring 
index could be associated with more outside or self-regulation, and 
therefore less severe bank regulation, and consequently leads to a 
lower Tier 1 ratio.    
 Ownership (OWN): This index measures the degree to which 
regulations control for ownership in banks, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum 
value of 3. I expect that a higher ownership index is related to more 
severe regulation and therefore leads to a higher Tier 1 ratio.  
The bank-specific variables for my model are as follows: 
 Log of total assets (LTA): This is a measure of the size of the bank 
calculated as a natural logarithm of the sum of all assets of the bank 
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according to Bankscope.20 The expectation is that larger banks have 
lower capital ratios, as shown by Berger et al. (2008). Possible 
explanations for this could be that bigger banks are more diversified 
and less risky or have lower cost of raising new capital (i.e. they 
can adapt quicker to changing circumstances, allowing them to have 
lower capital cushions) or might even enjoy government guarantees 
since they are “too big to fail”.21  
 Ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLRGL): This is a 
measure of the bank’s credit risk calculated as a ratio of the part of 
the loans for which the bank expects losses (but does not charge off) 
to the total loan portfolio according to Bankscope. The higher the 
value, the higher a bank’s credit risk. I assume that higher credit 
risk results in banks having higher Tier 1 ratios, since affected 
banks need greater capital cushions to absorb higher credit risk.   
 Return on average assets (ROAA): This is a measure for the 
profitability of a bank; it is the ratio of the net income to the total 
assets (calculated as an average of the previous and the subsequent 
year-end) of a bank taken from Bankscope. Previous studies have 
found profitability to have a positive influence on the capital ratio 
(e.g. Flannery & Rangan, 2008 for banks or Öztekin & Flannery, 
2012 for non-banks). This sounds intuitive considering that net 
income increases the capital and therefore the numerator of the Tier 
1 ratio. However, in my study, the prediction of the sign for this 
coefficient is ambiguous: a more profitable bank could be related to 
lower riskiness of the bank and therefore to a lower Tier 1 ratio.  
 Dividend dummy (DIV): As shown, for example, in some results of 
Gropp and Heider (2010), dividend-paying banks might have higher 
                                            
20  Since the Tier 1 ratio and the sum of assets are both balance sheet based figures, I also 
performed my regression with non-balance sheet based but income statement based 
variables to measure bank size (the net interest revenue, other operating income and 
overhead expense) in order to test for a possible correlation bias. My results do not change 
when I use these variables. Because total assets is the more commonly known variable for 
measuring firm size, I continue with this variable only in my study. 
21  According to Stern and Feldman (2004), the term “too big to fail” was originally 
associated with a statement by Stewart B. McKinney made during congressional hearings 
related to the bailout of Continental Illinois (a relatively large bank at that time, which 
had been declared insolvent). The term is used for banks that have such a large systemic 
risk that their failure would have substantial negative macroeconomic impacts and 
therefore have to be supported by the government or another superior body.   
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capital ratios. Based on data from Bankscope, I therefore include a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has paid out a 
dividend in the specific year and 0 otherwise. The relationship of 
this variable is also ambiguous: on one hand, the possibility of 
paying out a dividend might indicate a bank that is already in good 
financial condition and therefore a higher Tier 1 ratio could be 
assumed, as found by Gropp and Heider (2010); on the other hand, 
the pay-out of a dividend directly decreases capital and lowers the 
Tier 1 ratio. Moreover, dividend-paying banks could have lower 
cost of raising new capital and therefore have lower Tier 1 ratios.  
 Bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country 
(BASA): This is a measure for the relative importance (and 
therefore the system relevance) of a bank in its country. BASA is 
the ratio of the bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks’ total 
assets of the country for a specific year according to data from 
Bankscope. As mentioned, an important (“too big to fail”) bank 
could experience different treatment from an unimportant bank, 
thus affecting its Tier 1 ratio. However, the prediction of the sign 
for this variable is again ambiguous: higher system relevance might 
increase a bank’s power over the regulator and therefore lower the 
bank’s Tier 1 ratio. Additionally, a bank that is more important in a 
country could target a lower Tier 1 ratio, since it knows that its 
country would help out in case of failure. Alternatively, the fact that 
a bank is system relevant might cause the regulator to be stricter on 
the bank and therefore lead to a higher Tier 1 ratio (refer e.g. to the 
arguments of Mishkin, 1999). Apart from the possibility of 
measuring system relevance as a relative measure, the basis 
regression additionally includes a more stringent dummy variable 
“SYS”: This dummy variable is 1 if the BASA value of a bank is 
higher than 10% in its country in a specific year.22 The argument 
for the sign prediction is the same as for BASA. Both variables, 
                                            
22  There is no exact numeric definition for regulators to rate a bank as system relevant; 
therefore, the 10% threshold is a discretionary value. The regression results do not 
materially change when using other thresholds.  
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BASA and SYS, are simultaneously used in the basis regression 
measuring “systemic relevance”.23  
The further country-specific variables are as follows:  
 Bank concentration (CON): This is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 if the banking industry in a country is highly concentrated and 
0 otherwise. An industry is highly concentrated if the sum of total 
assets of the three largest banks is more than 50% of all banks’ total 
assets of the country for a specific year.24 The data basis for the 
calculation is Bankscope. The variable is comparable to the variable 
SYS above, but it measures the relative importance of several banks 
together instead of one alone. Therefore, the ambiguous sign 
prediction is explained in the same way: The more concentrated the 
banking industry is, the higher the banks’ power over the regulator; 
elevated by the assumption that there might be an implicit survival 
guarantee, this would lead to lower Tier 1 ratios. On the other hand, 
a more concentrated banking industry might lead the regulator to be 
more severe and therefore to stipulate the banks to have more Tier 
1 capital.  
 Banks per million capita (BMC): This variable measures the size of 
the banking sector in a country in relation to its population. The 
calculation of the variable is based on data from the database 
described in The World Bank (2012). Again, the sign projection is 
ambiguous: a higher number of banks per population could on the 
one hand indicate a higher importance of the banking sector 
(causing similar predictability difficulties as for above variable 
CON), while on the other hand, it could indicate a better distribution 
of risk among multiple banks and therefore could lead to lower Tier 
1 ratios.  
 Bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP): This variable 
measures the importance of the banking system relative to the 
economy of the country in a specific year. It is calculated as 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share 
                                            
23  Note that the regression results do not change when using either of the two variables only 
or both together.  
24  Again, there is no material change in the regression results when using other thresholds.  
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of GDP from the financial development and structure dataset (as 
explained in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2000). The 
ambiguous sign expectation results from similar explanations as for 
the above variables CON or BMC.  
 Gross domestic product per capita in USD (GDPC): This is a 
measure of the health of a country’s economy in a specific year, 
implementing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on bank 
capital. The variable comes from the database described in The 
World Bank (2012). Again, the prediction of the sign for this (and 
the following) coefficient is ambiguous: a healthier economy could 
be related to banks being less risky and therefore having a lower 
Tier 1 ratio. Then again, a healthier country could be related to 
banks being more profitable and, as discussed before, profitability 
itself has an ambiguous sign prediction.   
 Annual gross domestic product growth (GGDP): This variable 
measures the increase in the health of a country’s economy. The 
variable is based on the database described in The World Bank 
(2012). 
 Bank z-score (BZS): This variable captures the probability of 
default of a country's banking system, taken from the financial 
development and structure dataset (as explained in Beck et al. , 
2000). It is calculated as the weighted average of the z-scores of a 
country's individual banks (the weights are based on the individual 
banks' total assets). The z-score divides a bank’s buffers 
(capitalisation and returns) by the volatility of those returns, that is, 
a lower z-score indicates a higher probability of default. At first 
glance, one expects that a banking system with a higher probability 
of default should per se be related to a lower Tier 1 ratio, since the 
ratio measures the capital puffer of banks. This would imply a 
positive sign for the coefficient. However, one could also argue that 
banks in a banking system with lower default probability (i.e. being 
in a more “comfortable” environment) do not need the same amount 
of regulatory capital or can have more risk-weighted assets than 
banks in banking systems with higher default probabilities. This 
argument would lead to a negative sign for the estimated 
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coefficient. Because of this ambiguity, there is no clear sign 
prediction for this variable.  
 Inflation (INF): This is an additional macroeconomic variable 
measuring the influence of the price level on the capital ratios. The 
variable is based on the database described in The World Bank 
(2012). Hortlund (2005) finds inflation to have a negative impact 
on the capital ratios of Swedish banks. The explanation is that 
inflation automatically increases bank debt. Therefore, the 
prediction for the sign for this coefficient is negative.  
 Crisis country (CRC): Since the data period of my study also covers 
the financial crisis, it might be of interest to implement an ex-post 
crisis variable. The dummy variable CRC takes the value 1 if a 
country suffered a bank crisis during the financial crisis and 0 
otherwise. Bank crisis countries are the “systemic cases” according 
to Laeven and Valencia (2010). Presumably, the country 
experienced such a crisis because the banks were not sufficiently 
stable, that is, there is an expected negative relation to the Tier 1 
ratio. 
V.3.3. Regression Methodology  
The application of panel data combined with the dynamic form of the 
regression, as shown in formula (V.4), is known as a dynamic panel data 
(DPD) model (see e.g. Baum, 2006). In applying such a model, one has 
to pay special attention to several challenges. Conventional estimation 
methods might lead to serious biases, as shown e.g. by Nickell (1981), 
in regard to the standard within-group estimator with fixed effects. These 
biases arise from various special features of DPD models:  
 Problem related to autocorrelation caused by a lagged dependent 
variable: As formula (V.4) shows, the current Tier 1 ratio 
(TIER1Ri,t) is a function of the unobservable and time-invariant 
individual specific effect μi (assuming that ui,t = μi + εi,t,). μi could 
be correlated with other explanatory variables; in any case it follows 
that the previous year’s Tier 1 ratio (TIER1Ri,t-1) is a function of μi 
(refer e.g. to Baltagi, 2008). That is, TIER1Ri,t-1 is correlated with 
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the error term ui,t = μi + εi,t.25 Even with the assumption of a non-
autocorrelated error process – meaning that the process is i.i.d. 
(independently, identically distributed) – this might cause serious 
biases in the coefficient estimates. The problem is even more severe 
in the case of an autocorrelated process (Baum, 2006). As Hsiao 
(2007) states, the magnitude of possible biases in particular cannot 
be ignored in “large N, small T” studies; in other words, studies 
with a large number of individuals and a small number of time 
periods like the one used in my paper. For conventional estimation 
methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS), there are possibilities 
to correct for possible correlations between the error term and the 
other regressors (e.g. by eliminating the individual specific effect μi 
when using the within transformation). But, as Bond (2002) 
demonstrates, the correlation with the lagged dependent variable 
remains. 
 Problem related to not strictly exogenous explanatory variables: I 
assume that the Tier 1 ratio is set based on various possible 
influence factors. It is a residual figure that results from various 
decisions made and circumstances given. From an economic point 
of view, it does not on the other hand make sense to assume that the 
ratio impacts vice versa on the explanatory variables. It is, for 
example, unlikely that the Tier 1 ratio in time t affects bank size in 
the same or in past periods. Therefore, one of the central 
assumptions of my paper is the exogeneity of the regressors.26 Also 
from a methodological point of view, the use of not strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables would violate the necessary 
assumptions of the conventional estimation methods (see e.g. 
Greene, 2008). However, one could argue that some of the variables 
are predetermined, that is, shocks in the Tier 1 ratio in time t could 
have an impact on these variables in time t+1, t+2 etc. I assume that 
this might be the case for the bank-specific and the regulatory 
variables. For example, a positive shock to the Tier 1 ratios in a 
country could lead to less severe regulation in subsequent periods, 
                                            
25  Note that in terms of this assumption there would also be autocorrelation in formula (V.2), 
since vi,t =  
μi
λ
+
εi,t
λ
. 
26  Apart from the economic logic, the various specification tests as discussed below do not 
show any evidence of endogeneity problems in my model.   
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since the higher ratios lead to less risk that has to be regulated. In 
any case, predetermination does not seem to make sense for the 
country-specific variables, since they are macroeconomically 
related – in most countries in the study, the banking sector is not of 
such importance that one could assume that a bank’s Tier 1 ratio 
influences macroeconomic conditions.  
There are two established methods for dealing with DPD models: the 
first method is the application of the bias-corrected least square dummy 
variables (LSDVC) presented by Kiviet (1995) for balanced panels and 
by Bruno (2005a) for unbalanced panels. This method corrects the bias 
caused by the presence of the explanatory lagged dependent variable. 
According to, for example, Judson and Owen (1999), the method seems 
to have some advantages in the case of a small population of individuals 
N. However, the advantages disappear in the case of a big population 
(Baltagi, 2008) and in the case of not strictly exogenous regressors (see 
Bruno, 2005b). Therefore, I found this method to be inadequate for my 
study, considering my dataset and the assumptions discussed above. The 
second method for dealing with DPD models is the use of generalised 
method of moments (GMM) estimators. They exist in the form of the 
“difference GMM” estimator as introduced by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), and in form of the “system GMM” estimator presented by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), as well as Blundell and Bond (1998).  
The idea of the GMM estimators is based on the use of instrumental 
variables (iv, often simply called instruments). As Greene (2008) 
explains, instruments are variables that correlate with the explanatory 
variables, but not with the error term. Their appropriate integration into 
the regression leads to unbiased estimation results, even if the 
explanatory variables correlate with the error term. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose this method for DPD 
models via a first differencing approach. Applied to my formula (V.4), 
the following expression (V.5) results: 
TIER1Ri,t − TIER1Ri,t−1 =   λ ∑ βk(Dk,i,t − Dk,i,t−1) 
K
k=0
+ (1 − λ) (TIER1Ri,t−1 − TIER1Ri,t−2) + εi,t − εi,t−1 
(V.5) 
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As formula (V.5) shows, the individual specific effect μi in the error term 
ui,t = μi + εi,t disappears and TIER1Ri,t-2 can be used as an instrument for 
(TIER1Ri,t-1 – TIER1Ri,t-2); the term is highly correlated with  
(TIER1Ri,t-1 – TIER1Ri,t-2) but not correlated with (εi,t – εi,t-1) (see 
Baltagi, 2008). Briefly stated, differencing opens the possibility for 
constructing an instrument in the form of the lagged dependent variable, 
even if the error term process is not i.i.d. This leads to consistent 
parameter estimates (see Baum, 2006). In order to further increase 
efficiency, the GMM method uses additional information available by 
expanding the instrument set to include all the possible time periods (e.g. 
also using TIER1Ri,t-3 and further lags as instruments) and all the other 
endogenous, predetermined or exogenous variables (i.e. also using the 
various variables Dk,i,t as instruments). The difference GMM method 
uses lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments for 
equations in first differences, while the system GMM also uses lagged 
differences of the explanatory variables for equations in levels, which 
again increases the number of possible utilisable instruments (Blundell 
& Bond, 1998).  
My study applies the GMM method, since it allows for handling the 
potential autocorrelation and predetermination issues discussed above. 
However, GMM estimators also have limitations and it is important to 
pay attention to these. As is evident from the explanations above, the 
instrument count (i.e. the number of instrumental variables used in the 
regression) relative to the sample size can be quite high when using 
GMM. This might lead to problems related to the use of too many 
instruments (refer to the discussion in Roodman, 2009a); in short, GMM 
estimators could “generate results that at once are invalid and appear 
valid because of weakened specification tests” (Roodman, 2009a, 
p. 139). Further, although the residuals of the difference equation might 
possess first-order serial correlation by construction, GMM methods 
assume the absence of second-order serial correlation (see the discussion 
in Flannery & Hankins, 2013).  
As discussed above, the GMM method requires a decision as to whether 
to use the difference GMM or the system GMM. My study uses the latter 
for its regressions, since it might improve precision and reduce finite 
sample bias better than to the former (see Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, 
in contrast to the system GMM, the difference GMM has the weakness 
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that it increases gaps in unbalanced panels27 and eliminates time 
invariant explanatory variables (Roodman, 2009b). Consequently, the 
system GMM estimator seems to outperform the difference GMM 
estimator in numerous studies, as for example in Flannery and Hankins 
(2013). Yet one has to consider the additional constraints explained 
below when using the system GMM. Whatever the case, it is important 
to note that the results of the various variables discussed in section V.5 
do not change substantially if I use the difference GMM instead of the 
system GMM; the difference is that, depending on the robustness 
regression applied, some coefficients become insignificant. This result 
can be expected, considering that the difference GMM is less precise 
than the system GMM as discussed above. However, it also indicates 
(together with the outcome of the specification tests) that there is no 
evidence that the use of the system GMM is not appropriate in my study.  
Finally, GMM methods use either the one-step or the two-step estimator. 
Generally, the two-step estimator comes with efficiency gains (at least 
in the robust version according to Bond, 2002). However, my study 
applies the one-step estimator, as the regressions show no such efficiency 
gains when switching to the two-step version.    
In order to address the various possible issues mentioned above, my 
study implements several specification tests and robustness checks: 
 First, the Hansen tests for over-identification, as explained in 
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) and Baum (2006), controls the 
problem of too many instruments: “The test […] has a null 
hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying 
restrictions. A rejection calls either or both of those hypotheses into 
question” (Baum, 2006, pp. 200-201). However, as Roodman 
(2009a) points out, it is important to consider that instrument 
                                            
27  As Roodmann (2009b) notes, a further common transformation can avoid the gap 
problems caused by missing data in some years: the “forward orthogonal deviations” or 
“orthogonal deviations” as implemented by Arellano and Bover (1995). While the 
difference transformation subtracts the previous observation of a variable from the current 
one, the orthogonal deviation subtracts the average of all future observations. When 
applying this method as a robustness check (refer to section V.8.4), the only difference to 
the basis regression is that the coefficient on private monitoring (PRM) loses its 
significance, whereas the coefficient on the USD gross domestic product per capita 
(GDPC) becomes significantly positive.  
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proliferation violates the Hansen test.28  Too many instruments 
could even lead to implausibly perfect p-values (probability-values) 
of 1.00. According to Roodman (2009b), there are no clear rules on 
what is a relatively safe number of instruments and the arbitrary 
rule of thumb to keep the number of instruments below the number 
of individuals appears quite generous. Therefore, I apply good 
practice in reporting and assessing the instrument count compared 
to the population. Moreover, I perform robustness checks in order 
to observe the changes in the results and in the test statistics when 
the instrument count changes. Finally, I use techniques for reducing 
the instrument count as described in Roodman (2009a).   
 To observe the correlation process of the error term, my paper 
applies the serial correlation test according to Arellano and Bond 
(1991). The test analyses the first and second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals (“Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences” and “Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences” 
respectively). The null hypothesis states that there is no serial 
correlation of first order or second order respectively. The GMM 
estimator requires that the null hypothesis for second-order serial 
correlation must not be rejected.  
 As mentioned above, the system GMM comes with an additional 
assumption: Roodman (2009b) describes that changes in the 
instrumenting variables are required to be uncorrelated with the 
individual fixed effects. Applied to a simple autoregressive process 
of order 1 (AR(1) process) in the example of Roodman (2009a), this 
requirement holds when the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable (1 – λ) is smaller than 1 and the dependent variable 
converges to steady-state levels. Therefore, I will examine the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable regarding its 
persistence. Additionally, as recommended by Bond (2002), I will 
examine the validity of the additional moment conditions by means 
                                            
28  Hansen’s (1982) statistic is similar to the Sargan statistic (Sargan, 1958). The latter is not 
weakened by too many instruments, but it requires homoscedastic errors. Since this cannot 
necessarily be assumed in the context of my paper, I do not use the Sargan statistic.  
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of the difference-in-Hansen test.29 According to Baum (2006), this 
test allows for subsets of instruments to be checked by taking the 
differences of two Hansen test statistics: one computed from the 
fully efficient regression (i.e. using the whole set of over-
identifying restrictions) and the other computed from an inefficient 
but consistent regression (i.e. removing a set of instruments from 
the list). The null hypothesis states that the specified variables are 
proper instruments and must therefore not be rejected.  
 As suggested by Roodman (2009b), I include time dummies in the 
regression. They make it more likely that there will be no 
correlation across individuals in the disturbances, which is assumed 
by the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the 
coefficients’ standard errors.  
 Bond (2002) explains that the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable estimated with the GMM method usually lies between the 
estimated coefficient of the OLS (ordinary least squares) and FE 
(fixed effects) estimators. I will assess whether the regression 
results obtained are consistent with these properties.   
 Lastly, my regression applies the robust estimator of the covariance 
matrix of the parameter estimates. This corrects the standard errors 
in the case of any heteroscedasticity or serial correlation in the 
errors (see Roodman, 2009b). Moreover, only the application of the 
robust option allows for the calculation of the Hansen and the 
difference-in-Hansen test statistic discussed above.  
I calculate the regressions with the software STATA30 using the GMM 
syntax “XTABOND2” by Roodman (2009b). Formula (V.6) shows the        
complete regression to estimate the coefficients λβk of the dependent 
variable TIER1Ri,t: 
                                            
29  Note that equal to the Hansen test a high instrument count also weakens the difference-
in-Hansen test (Roodmann, 2009a), underlining again the importance to correctly consider 
the number of instruments.   
30  “STATA® Data Analysis and Statistical Software” by StataCorp LP, Texas, USA.  
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TIER1Ri,t  =   λβ0 + (1 − λ)TIER1Ri,t−1 + λβ1RESTj,t +
λβ
2
RBPj,t +  λβ3CAPRj,t +  λβ4ERQj,t +  λβ5PRMj,t +
λβ
6
OWNj,t +  λβ7LTAi,t + λβ8LLRGLi,t + λβ9ROAAi,t +
λβ
10
DIVi,t +  λβ11BASAi,t + λβ12SYSi,t + λβ13CONj,t +
λβ
14
BMCj, + λβ15BGDPj,t + λβ16GDPCj,t + λβ17GGDPj,t +
λβ
18
BZSj,t + λβ19INFj,t + λβ20CRCj + νt + ui,t  
(V.6) 
As mentioned above, i is the numbering for the individual banks, ranging 
from 1 to N, t is the numbering for the individual years, ranging from 1 
to T and j is the numbering for the various countries, ranging from 1 to 
J. The regulatory variables for country j in year t are RESTj,t, RBPj,t, 
CAPRj,t, ERQj,t, PRMj,t and OWNj,t, the bank-specific control variables 
for bank i in year t are LTAi,t, LLRGLi,t, ROAAi,t, DIVi,t, BASAi,t and 
SYSi,t and the country-specific control variables for country j in year t 
are CONj,t, BMCj,t, BGDPj,t, GDPCj,t, GGDPj,t, BZSj,t, INFj,t and CRCj 
(the last variable is the same for all years T in a country j). The time 
dummy νt for every year t controls for the unobserved time-fixed effects 
and ui,t denotes the disturbance term.31  
Following the wording of Roodman (2009b), the lagged Tier 1 ratio 
enters the regression as an endogenous variable (“gmm style instrument 
with two lags”), all country-specific variables except the regulatory 
variables enter as strictly exogenous (“iv style instruments”) and the rest 
of the variables enter as predetermined (“gmm style instruments with one 
lag”). The use of the collapse option32 of XTABOND2 and the limitation 
to three lag periods aim to reduce the risk of too many instruments. As 
already mentioned, the addition of the robust option corrects the standard 
                                            
31  The paper also uses the term L.TIER1 (L. stands for “lagged”) for the lagged Tier 1 ratio 
TIER1Ri,t-1.   
32  The collapse option creates only one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather 
than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. Together with the lag limitation, 
this strongly decreases the number of instruments, which otherwise would be quite high 
and would cause the problems discussed.  
 Implementing the regression without lag limits or, by contrast, with maximally restricted 
lags, does not change the regression results significantly, except that in the first case the 
USD gross domestic product per capita (GDPC) becomes significantly positive (however, 
as expected at the cost of a weak Hansen test diagnostic). 
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errors in the case of any heteroscedasticity or serial correlation in the 
errors. 
Before discussing the detailed results of this regression in section V.5, 
the next section, section V.4, highlights the most important descriptive 
statistics of the dataset. 
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V.4. Descriptive Statistics  
The original dataset contains 44 141 observations for the years 2000 to 
2011. After eliminating the observations with missing variables 
(including those with no lagged Tier 1 ratio), 15 944 observations 
remain. All observations for the countries Chile and Romania (233 and 
110 respectively) drop completely, since they do not have data for the 
bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP) and for the bank  
z-score (BZS).  
The observations are subdivided into 2 772 banks, each with 1 to 11 
useable observations per bank.33 There is a minimum of 1 037 and a 
maximum of 1 878 observations per year; therefore the relative 
frequency ranges from 7 to 12% per year and the observations are quite 
evenly distributed (refer to Table V.1).  
The USA accounts for more than half of the total observations (8 747 
observations or approx. 55%) and Japan follows with 1 201 observations 
(approx. 8%). No other country shows more than 5% of the observations. 
The United Arab Emirates is the least represented with 17 observations 
(refer to Table V.1). 
 
 
 
 
[Continued on next page] 
                                            
33  Since the regression loses the first observation year (it does not have a lagged Tier 1 ratio), 
the descriptive statistics only consider the 11 years from 2001 to 2011.  
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Table V.1: Observations per country and per year 
As is evident in Table V.2, almost every variable significantly correlates 
with the other variables at least at the 10% significance level. However, 
the correlation coefficients between the various explanatory variables are 
quite low. Three variable pairs are correlated by just slightly more than 
0.5: the regulatory body power index (RBP) with the restriction index 
(REST), the bank z-score (BZS) with the dummy for crisis countries 
(CRC) and the dummy for crisis countries with the USD gross domestic 
product per capita (GDPC). The correlation between the Tier 1 ratio and 
its lagged value and between the bank’s total assets to the sum of all 
banks’ total assets of a country (BASA) and the dummy variable for 
system relevance (SYS) are the only correlations greater than 0.8.  
  
Statistics per country:  
ARE (United Arab Emirates), AUS (Australia), AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), BGR (Bulgaria), 
CAN (Canada), CHE (Switzerland), CHN (China), CYP (Republic of Cyprus), CZE (Czech 
Republic), DEU (Germany), DNK (Denmark), ESP (Spain), EST (Estonia), FIN (Finland), 
FRA (France), GBR (United Kingdom), GRC (Greece), HKG (Hong Kong), HUN (Hungary), 
IRL (Ireland), ISL (Iceland), ISR (Israel), ITA (Italy), JPN (Japan), KOR (Republic of Korea), 
LTU (Lithuania), LUX (Luxembourg), LVA (Latvia), MEX (Mexico), MLT (Malta), NLD 
(Netherlands), NOR (Norway), NZL (New Zealand), POL (Poland), PRT (Portugal), RUS 
(Russian Federation), SGP (Singapore), SVK (Slovakia), SVN (Slovenia), SWE (Sweden), 
TUR (Turkey), USA (United States of America) 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
 
Observations per country Observations per year
Country Observations % Country Observations % Year Observations %
ARE 17 0% ITA 600 4% 2001 1'037 7%
AUS 164 1% JPN 1'201 8% 2002 1'060 7%
AUT 218 1% KOR 154 1% 2003 1'129 7%
BEL 120 1% LTU 42 0% 2004 1'063 7%
BGR 49 0% LUX 53 0% 2005 1'099 7%
CAN 230 1% LVA 30 0% 2006 1'836 12%
CHE 188 1% MEX 120 1% 2007 1'797 11%
CHN 105 1% MLT 22 0% 2008 1'838 12%
CYP 50 0% NLD 238 1% 2009 1'878 12%
CZE 31 0% NOR 85 1% 2010 1'615 10%
DEU 332 2% NZL 58 0% 2011 1'592 10%
DNK 316 2% POL 66 0% Total 15'944 100%
ESP 523 3% PRT 121 1% Max: 1'878
EST 27 0% RUS 428 3% Min: 1'037
FIN 79 0% SGP 36 0%
FRA 306 2% SVK 37 0%
GBR 354 2% SVN 67 0%
GRC 84 1% SWE 119 1%
HKG 165 1% TUR 61 0%
HUN 61 0% USA 8'747 55%
IRL 95 1% Total 15'944 100%
ISL 41 0% Max: 8'747
ISR 104 1% Min: 17
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According to this analysis, correlations between the variables should not 
cause serious regression biases.34  
Table V.3 shows the means and standard deviations (sd) of the various 
variables classified by country. The mean Tier 1 ratio is 12.9% at a 
standard deviation of 17.6%. Compared to the other countries, Canada 
has the highest mean of 50.1% caused by some outliers.35 Japan shows 
the lowest mean of 8.1%. Accordingly, the mean Tier 1 ratio is 
considerably higher than the regulatory minimum ratio of 4% stipulated 
in the Basel rules. As is evident from Table V.4, differences in the mean 
Tier 1 ratios between various countries are significant at least at the 10% 
level for approx. two-thirds (584) of the possible differences.  
Comparing the average Tier 1 ratios across the 11 observation years 
(tables not displayed) reveals that the lowest mean Tier 1 ratio across all 
banks was 12.00% in 2008 (i.e. at the summit of the financial crisis). 
This is significantly lower than the means for the years 2011 (14.28%, 
the highest value for all observation years), 2010 (13.65%) and 2004 
(13.51%).36 The high values in the last two years of the observation 
period suggest that the crisis resulted in banks having higher Tier 1 
ratios. The significant mean differences for the various years confirm 
that it makes sense to include time dummies in the regressions. 37 
 
  
                                            
34 Performing six separate basis regressions, each excluding one of the above-mentioned six 
variables, confirms this expectation; that is, there are no substantial changes in the 
regression results.   
35  A robustness check, which discretionarily eliminates all negative Tier 1 ratios and all  
Tier 1 ratios above a value of 700%, reveals that outliers do not influence the regression 
results (refer to section V.8.4).  
36  The difference is significant at the 1%, 1% and 5% levels respectively.  
37  A regression with just the time dummies on the Tier 1 ratios results in a significant F-test 
value and additionally supports this statement.  
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Table V.3: Mean and standard deviation (sd) of variables per country  
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Table V.4: Significance of mean Tier 1 ratio differences between countries  
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Regarding the six regulatory variables (tables not displayed), the 
calculations show that the means of the variables for the year 2011 (i.e. 
after the financial crisis) are significantly (at 1% significance levels) 
higher than the means for the years 2001, 2003 and 2008 (i.e. before or 
during the financial crisis). The only exception is the mean for the capital 
regulation (CAPR), which is significantly lower in 2011 than in 2008. 
This supports the obvious assumption that the regulation became more 
severe after the financial crisis  
A further observation is that the USA has significantly higher means for 
four of the six regulatory variables compared to all  the other countries 
(the exceptions are the variables private monitoring PRM and ownership 
OWN).38 This partially supports the accusations of the US camp, which 
held that US regulation is more severe than that of other countries.  
Considering these observations, the next section, section V.5, aims to 
give explanations for the significant differences in the Tier 1 ratios. 
                                            
38  The mean differences are significant at the 1% level.  
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V.5. Regression Results  
Table V.5 shows the results for the basis regression. The diagnostics 
obtained, which I discussed in section V.3.3, support the model: the 
Arellano-Bond test for first-order serial correlation rejects the null 
hypothesis and there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
related to second-order serial correlation. This implies that there is 
expected autocorrelation of first order, but none of second order. Further, 
there is not enough evidence to reject the Hansen test for over-
identification, suggesting that the instruments used are valid. The 
resulting coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 0.94; as 
expected, it is therefore higher than the coefficient resulting from a fixed-
effect estimation (0.38) and (almost) lower than the coefficient from an 
OLS estimation (0.89). The value of 0.94 for the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable also satisfies the expectation that this coefficient has 
a value just less than, but not above, unity. In addition, there is not 
enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses related to the difference-
in-Hansen test.39 These observations indicate that there are no 
endogeneity issues and that the steady-state assumption is satisfied so 
that using the system GMM as method seems to be preferable to the 
difference GMM.40 The low number of instruments (71) relative to the 
number of individuals (2 772) and observations (15 944) implies that the 
regression is probably not weakened by too many instruments. Since the 
specification tests support the model, the next passage reveals the results 
of the regression. 
                                            
39  In fact, the default of XTABOND2 in STATA separately calculates a test statistic for 
every instrument subset: one for the exogeneity of the lagged differences of 
endogenous/predetermined variables in the level equation and one for the exogeneity of 
the non-endogenous or non-predetermined instrumental variables. The figures listed in 
my regression tables refer to these two test statistics. However, as explained in Roodman 
(2009b), XTABOND2 gives the possibility of performing further breakdowns of the 
difference-in-Hansen test. After all, “[…] researchers should consider applying a 
difference-in-Hansen test to all the system GMM instruments for the levels equation […]” 
(Roodman, 2009a, p. 148). Performing separate difference-in-Hansen tests for all 
instruments separately does not reveal problems in the regression.  
40  Further, as already noted in section V.3.3, results do not change in content when using the 
difference GMM instead of the system GMM.     
48 Regression Results 
 
Part V -- Paper 1: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Capital Adequacy 
Table V.5: Basis regression  
  One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 to 4.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL (Ratio 
of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (Return on average assets), DIV (Dividend dummy), 
BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS (dummy for system 
relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 1 to 3.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross domestic 
product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product 
growth), BZS (bank s-score), INF (Inflation), CRC (Crisis country) are strictly exogenous explanatory 
variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the  degrees 
of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9415 *** (7.65)
REST + 0.8028 *** (3.19)
RBP + -0.2985 (-0.96)
CAPR + 0.1088 (0.43)
ERQ + -0.1463 (-0.25)
PRM +/- -1.0698 ** (-2.01)
OWN + -0.1032 (-0.06)
LTA - -5.6983 *** (-3.27)
LLRGL + -0.1848 (-0.53)
ROAA +/- -0.0425 (-0.06)
DIV +/- 1.6312 ** (2.02)
BASA +/- 0.4671 (1.58)
SYS +/- 5.0124 * (1.94)
CON +/- 0.1968 (0.23)
BMC +/- -0.5299 ** (-2.52)
BGDP +/- 0.0533 *** (3.34)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 (1.44)
GGDP +/- 0.0428 (0.35)
BZS +/- -0.3376 *** (-2.93)
INF - -0.1022 (-0.59)
CRC - -4.3658 ** (-2.28)
Observations: 15 944
Groups: 2 772
Instruments  71
-2.21 **
0.84
35.83
9.62
7.94
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
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As anticipated, the coefficient on the lagged Tier 1 ratio (1 – λ) has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. This gives strong 
evidence that a substantial part of the current Tier 1 ratio is influenced 
by the past ratio and that banks adjust their Tier 1 ratio based on an 
adjustment factor. As mentioned, the coefficient is near unity, implying 
that the change in the Tier 1 ratio is persistent. In other words, the 
adjustment factor or speed of adjustment λ is quite low at only 0.06 and 
only a small gap between the Tier 1 ratio and the target Tier 1 ratio closes 
every year. The significant positive effect is considerably robust against 
all variations of regressions performed, showing that the lagged Tier 1  
ratio is one of the fundamental variables to explain the current Tier 1 
ratio. 
Regarding the robustness of the various variables, Table V.6 gives an 
overview of the results of the key checks, which I mention in my study; 
section V.8.4 explains the checks more in detail; and section V.8.5 shows 
the regression tables of the robustness checks.  
Related to the regulatory variables in the basis regression, the 
coefficients on restriction (REST) and private monitoring (PRM) show 
significant results (at the 1%- and 5%-significance level respectively). 
REST shows the predicted positive sign direction. Considering that this 
result is robust for all regressions performed, it implies that higher 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities effectively lead to higher Tier 
1 ratios.  
The coefficient on private monitoring (PRM) is negative (remember that 
the sign expectation was ambiguous). That is, a higher dependence on 
private monitoring and, in return, a lower dependence on direct 
regulation seem to lead to lower Tier 1 ratios for banks. 
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Table V.6: Overview of various regression results  
Results of the various regressions. “+” means that the coefficient on the corresponding 
variable is positive and significant at least at the 10% level.  “-” means the same for negative 
coefficients. Figures in parentheses “( )” mean that there are changes in the significance 
compared to the basis regression. Figures in exclamation points “! !” mean that there a 
changes in the signs of significant coefficients compared to the basis regression.  
 
If just one of the test diagnostics discussed is not within the expected result, this is indicated 
as “not ok” in the lowermost line.  
 
The variables are: TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio), L.TIER1R (lag of TIER1R), TCR (total capital ratio), 
L.TCR (lag of TCR), REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital 
regulation), ERQ (entry requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA 
(Log of total assets), LLRGL (Ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (Return on 
average assets), DIV (dividend dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total 
assets of a country), SYS (dummy for system relevance), CON (bank concentration), BMC 
(banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross domestic product), GDPC (gross 
domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), BZS 
(bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Predicted 
sign
Basis 
regression. 
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
without lag 
limits.
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
with further 
restricted 
lags.
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
with 
orthogonal 
deviation.
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
without 
USA.
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
without 
outliers. 
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Regression 
with TCR. 
Dep. 
variable: 
TCR
Basis 
regression 
with 
intrapolated 
data. 
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Basis 
regression 
without 
regulatory 
variables. 
Dep. 
variable: 
TIER1R
Explanatory 
variable
L.TIER1R + + + + + + + n/a + +
L.TCR + n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a + n/a n/a
REST + + + + + + + + + n/a
RBP + n/a
CAPR + n/a
ERQ + n/a
PRM +/- - - - ( ) ( ) - - - n/a
OWN + n/a
LTA - - - - - - - - - -
LLRGL +
ROAA +/-
DIV +/- + + + + + + + (  ) +
BASA +/- (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
SYS +/- + + + + ( ) ( ) + + ( )
CON +/- (-)
BMC +/- - - - - - - - - -
BGDP +/- + + + + + + + + +
GDPC +/- (+) (+) (+)
GGDP +/-
BZS +/- - - - - ( ) - - - -
INF - (-)
CRC - - - - - !+! - - - -
Test 
diagnostics:
ok not ok ok ok not ok ok ok ok ok
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The impact of PRM is not significant when excluding US banks from the 
regression.41 This suggests that the degree of private monitoring is 
crucial for US banks and not relevant for banks outside the USA. 
The coefficients on the other regulatory variables are not significant in 
the basis regression or in one of the robustness checks. Applied to 
regulatory body power (RBP), this means that direct regulation has no 
impact to the level of banks’ Tier 1 ratios. The US camp’s argument that 
tighter regulation for European banks would lead to fewer stressed banks 
is therefore weakened, since direct regulation seems not to matter – not 
even in the USA. 
Likewise, capital regulation (CAPR) does not influence the Tier 1 ratios 
and therefore similarly challenges the call for more severe capital 
regulations, which came up after the financial crisis.  
The insignificant results for entry requirements (ERQ) and ownership 
(OWN) further imply that indirect regulation severity through control of 
the difficulty to operate as a bank in a specific country and the degree to 
which ownership in banks is controlled does not matter in relation to the 
Tier 1 ratios.  
On the other hand and as shown below, various bank-specific and other 
country-specific variables seem to have a significant impact on the Tier 
1 ratios.  
The logarithm of total assets (LTA) is significant at the 1% level with a 
negative sign as predicted. This result is strongly robust. With regard to 
                                            
41  A robustness check, which performs the basis regression without US banks, shows several 
different results compared to the basis regression. The bank’s total assets to the sum of all 
banks’ total assets of a country (BASA) instead of the dummy variable for system 
relevance (SYS) is now significantly positive, still indicating that systemically relevant 
banks seem to have higher Tier 1 ratios. Further, the coefficient on the gross domestic 
product per capita in USD (GDPC) becomes significantly positive and the one for bank 
concentration (CON) becomes significantly negative. Considering that these variables are 
not relevant in most other regressions, these changes should not be over-interpreted. More 
interestingly, some – in other respects –robust variables change their behaviour when 
excluding US banks: the coefficients on the private monitoring index (PRM) and the bank 
z-score (BZS) lose their significance and the dummy for crisis country (CRC) remains 
significant, but the sign changes (i.e. it is positive now). Refer to the text for an 
interpretation of these results and to section V.8.4 for further regression details.  
 Note that these changes in the significance of the coefficients when excluding US banks 
also remain substantially the same for all possible robustness checks. Thus, the robustness 
check of performing the regression without US banks is itself also robust.  
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the possible explanations discussed in section V.3.2, larger banks 
probably have lower Tier 1 ratios because they are more diversified and 
less risky than smaller ones. Considering the result in respect of the 
systemic relevance discussed below, larger banks do not seem to have 
smaller Tier 1 ratios as a result of enjoying government guarantees. 
Given the results for the dividend dummy analysed below, the argument 
that larger banks have lower Tier 1 ratios thanks to having a lower cost 
of raising capital seems not to be relevant either.   
The next significant bank-specific variable is the positive coefficient on 
the dummy variable for system relevance (SYS), significant at the 10% 
level. Thus, the more systemically important a bank is in its country, the 
higher its observed Tier 1 ratio seems to be.42 Consequently, banks 
appear to somehow already adopt the “risk” topic in their Tier 1 ratios. 
This raises the question of whether the severity of the bank regulation or 
third party (e.g. political) pressure causes this result. Acknowledging the 
outcome from the various regulatory variables, the latter appears more 
obvious. Note that the result also applies in the regressions without US 
banks, indicating that the topic also seems to be adopted outside the 
USA. 
The last significant bank-specific variable is the dummy for dividend 
payers (DIV). The coefficient on this variable is significantly positive at 
the 5% level in the basis regression and only insignificant in one 
robustness regression. Following the expectations in section V.3.2, the 
reason for the positive coefficient could be that a bank that is able to pay 
a dividend is a bank that is in good financial condition, which assumes a 
higher Tier 1 ratio.43 The positive coefficient on the dividend dummy 
implies that the cost of raising capital does not influence the Tier 1 ratio.  
Continuing with the country-specific variables, the coefficient on the 
bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP) is significantly 
positive at the 1% level and strongly robust.44 This implies that the more 
important the banking sector of a country is relative to its economy in a 
                                            
42  This outcome is robust, since the coefficient either remains significant in all robustness 
checks or is confirmed by a significantly positive coefficient on the bank’s total assets to 
the sum of all banks’ total assets of a country (BASA). 
43  Note that a possible inverse dependency of such a variable is considered by regarding the 
variable as not strictly exogenous (see explanations in section V.3.3). 
44  The significantly positive sign remains in all robustness checks.  
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specific year, the higher the Tier 1 ratios of the banks in this country. 
Again, this is possibly explained by the assumption that banks somehow 
adopt the “risk” topic.  
Further, the coefficient on banks per million capita (BMC) is 
significantly (at the 5% level) negative.45 That is, the more banks a 
country has relative to its population in as specific year, the lower the 
Tier 1 ratio of these banks seems to be. In the light of the outcome of the 
other variables, a possible interpretation of this result is that a larger 
number of banks in a country implies that the risk is better distributed 
between these banks and therefore the Tier 1 ratio tends to be lower. 
The next significant variable (at the 10% level) in the basis regression is 
the dummy for crisis countries (CRC). As predicted, the Tier 1 ratio is 
lower if a bank is located in a crisis country. However, in the regression 
without US banks although the coefficient remains significant, it does 
change sign.46 That is, for non-US banks, crisis countries seem to cause 
higher Tier 1 ratios. In some way, this confirms the arguments of the US 
faction in the intercontinental discussion: non-US countries could have 
become crisis countries because the disclosed Tier 1 ratios of their banks 
were too high compared to their real economic situation and this in turn 
could have been caused by too lenient regulation.47  
The USA also influences the last significant variable, the aggregated 
bank z-score (BZS) of a country. In the basis regression the coefficient 
on this variable is significantly (at the 1% level) negative. That is, a 
higher z-score (i.e. a lower average probability of default for the banks 
of this country in a specific year) leads to a lower Tier 1 ratio. This 
suggests that banks in a banking system with lower default probability 
(i.e. being in a more “comfortable” environment and having lower risks) 
do not need the same amount of regulatory capital or can have more risk-
weighted assets than banks in banking systems with higher default 
                                            
45  This result applies in all robustness checks.  
46  Apart from the non-US banks regression, the coefficient is significantly negative in in all 
robustness checks as it is in the basis regression.   
47  Note that during the observation period of my study, there has also been another big crisis, 
the dot-com bubble (refer e.g. to Lowenstein, 2004). This might somehow influence the 
results of the CRC variable; therefore, interpretations should be made with caution. In any 
case, the variable is not essential for the rest of the outcome of the study – omitting it does 
not change the results of the other variables.  
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probabilities.48 However, the coefficient on BZS loses its significance in 
the regression without US banks. The probability of default does 
therefore not matter for non-US banks or, to put it differently, only US 
banks have smaller Tier 1 ratios when the average probability of default 
for the banks in a specific year is low. Therefore, I assume that this 
variable is not crucial in regard to the banks’ capital ratios.  
In conclusion, the basis regression and the robustness checks show both 
expected and surprising results in relation to the regulatory variables of 
interest, the bank-specific variables and further country-specific 
variables. The next section, section V.6, summarises these results and 
concludes the paper. 
                                            
48  This result is also valid in all robustness check apart from the non-US banks regression.  
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V.6. Conclusion and Outlook 
Debates on the appropriate regulation of banks have been ongoing for a 
long time, but have become more frequent and more controversial since 
the financial crisis in 2007. US opinion leaders in particular accuse other 
countries – primarily European countries – of having regulations that are 
not sufficiently severe to guide banks to hold adequately high capital.    
Motivated by these debates, I examine explanatory factors for the capital 
ratio levels of banks from 43 developed countries in the time period 
between 2000 and 2011. Besides bank-specific and country-specific 
factors, my paper includes six time-variant regulatory factors, which 
cover various aspects of regulatory severity. The use of the lagged capital 
ratio as a further explanatory variable completes the applied partial 
adjustment model, which is calculated using the GMM method.  
Even though the US camp arguments that its regulation is stricter than 
that of other countries, my study reveals the USA is not stricter for all 
regulatory factors. Nevertheless, consistent with the US argument, the 
data shows that there are indeed significant differences in banks’ Tier 1 
ratios between countries. Additionally, it seems that the regulation in 
general became stricter after the financial crisis and also that the post-
crisis average Tier 1 ratios became significantly higher than the ratios 
before the crisis. At first glance, one could therefore agree with the US 
camp that stricter regulation steers banks to have higher capital ratios.   
However, regarding such positive effects of the regulatory variables on 
the banks’ capital ratios, I find strong evidence only for activity 
restrictions; greater restrictions seem to educate banks on the need to 
have higher capital ratios. Thus, actual debates to further restrict bank 
activities appear to cover an effective instrument that would increase the 
capital ratios and raise the banks’ capital cushions. On the other hand, I 
find no evidence that countries’ power over the regulatory body, 
ownership restrictions, entry requirements or capital requirements 
influence banks’ capital ratios. These results therefore weaken the (US 
camp’s) votes to further increase the stringency of such instruments. On 
the contrary, there are indicators related to the USA that stronger private 
monitoring such as external audits or credit ratings may even lead banks 
to have lower capital ratios.  
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While the impact of the regulation on capital ratios therefore seems to be 
limited, I find strong evidence that the previous year’s capital ratio has a 
persistent impact on the present capital ratio. The yearly adjustment of 
the target capital ratio is only approximately 6%; that is, the adjustment 
seems to be considerably slower than some former studies have estimated 
(for instance, Berger et al. (2008) have obtained a rate between 45 and 
57%). I assume that the difference in the applied regression methods 
causes this discrepancy.  
Apart from the variables above, I also find support for a couple of 
significant explanatory bank-specific and other country-specific factors. 
There is evidence that banks paying dividends have higher capital ratios. 
A possible reason for this could be that a bank being able to pay out a 
dividend is a bank in good financial condition, which leads to a higher 
capital ratio. Further, larger banks seem to have smaller capital ratios. 
One could therefore at first glance agree to the regulatory argument that 
splitting larger banks into several smaller banks leads to higher capital 
ratios, since it reduces the “too big to fail” issue. However, my results 
imply that larger banks have lower capital ratios precisely because they 
are less risky than smaller ones. A bank having a higher (systemic) risk 
does indeed seem to have a higher capital ratio. This could be an 
indicator that such banks face greater (e.g. political) pressure to have 
larger capital cushions. Applied to the country-specific factors, this 
observation also holds for the banking sector as a whole: the more 
important the banking sector of a country relative to the rest of the 
economy, the higher the capital ratios of its banks appear to be. 
Additionally, the capital ratios seem to fall when the bank risk in an 
economy is shared among more banks. Overall, the results suggest that 
the riskiness of banks appears to have already been somehow 
implemented in the bank capital ratios.   
What do these results mean in relation to the future of bank regulation? 
Evidently, the past regulations across the various countries were not 
sufficiently accurate to have a direct impact on the capital adequacy of 
banks; bank-specific and other country-specific factors seem to be more 
important. It could be interesting for further research to examine whether 
the availability of more post-crisis data in future years will alter these 
results. However, merely increasing the regulatory severity as requested 
by the US camp might also remain ineffective in future. Prospective 
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changes in bank regulation should concentrate on the effective variables 
such as the activity restrictions or the “risk” topic. Additionally, changes 
should lead to the ineffective variables becoming powerful; for example, 
intuitively, capital regulations only matter if they are sufficiently strict 
and not when banks comply with them anyway.  
However, my study does possibly reveal an aspect that might partly 
confirm the accusations of the US camp. Apart from the USA, it seems 
that banks in crisis countries had higher capital ratios than banks in non-
crisis countries. The circumstances under which countries became crisis 
countries, despite their banks’ higher capital ratios, might indicate that 
the disclosed capital ratios of their banks were too high compared to their 
real economic situation. Therefore, an interesting topic for further work 
could cover the question of whether banks correctly disclose their Tier 1 
ratios and whether there is a measurable relationship between accurate 
disclosure and the severity of bank regulation.  
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V.8. Appendices 
V.8.1. Detailed Explanations of Variables 
Name of variable Explanation Source 
Tier 1 ratio 
(TIER1R) 
Measure of regulatory capital adequacy, 
calculating shareholder funds plus 
perpetual non-cumulative preference 
shares as a percentage of risk weighted 
assets and off balance sheet risks 
according to the Basel rules. 
Bankscope49. 
Total capital ratio 
(TCR) 
Broader measure for capital adequacy 
than the Tier 1 ratio, since it adds the Tier 
2 capital (which includes subordinated 
debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves 
and the valuation reserves) to the Tier 1 
capital. As for the Tier 1 ratio, this ratio 
is calculated as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets and off-balance sheet 
risks according to the Basel rules.  
Bankscope.  
Restriction (REST) Measure for regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 14 
and is composed as follows: It adds 0 
each if the answer to the following 
questions50 
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001).  
                                            
49  Observations in Bankscope that did only have the value N (i.e. no value) for “common 
positions” were eliminated if they could not be manually calculated from other available 
positions. Common positions are those that are expected for every bank (such as total 
assets or the Tier 1 ratio). Non-common variables (such as e.g. loan loss reserves, i.e. 
positions that could have no value because the bank does not have any) were considered 
with value 0.  
50  Note that the explanations in relation to the calculation of the variables are based on the 
question verbalisation and question numbering from the latest update of the survey in 
2011, as introduced by Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Peria and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012). 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 4.1 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
securities activities?” 
 4.2 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
insurance activities?” 
 4.3 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in real 
estate activities?” 
 4.4 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
nonfinancial businesses except 
those businesses that are auxiliary to 
banking business (e.g. IT company, 
debt collection company etc.)?” 
is “A full range of these activities can be 
conducted directly in banks.” 
It adds 1 point each if the answers to the 
above questions is “A full range of these 
activities are offered but all or some of 
these activities must be conducted in 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a 
common holding company or parent.” 
It adds 2 points each if the answer to the 
above questions is “Less than the full 
range of activities can be conducted in 
banks, or subsidiaries, or in another part 
of a common holding company or 
parent.” 
                                            
However, I ensured that my study only included questions that – with regard to contents 
– also agree to the other three surveys. Note moreover that questions not answered in one 
of the surveys were considered as “no”, if not otherwise derivable.   
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
It adds 3 points each if the answer to the 
above questions is “None of these 
activities can be done in either banks or 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a 
common holding company or parent.” 
Moreover, it adds 1 if the answer to 
 question 7.2 “Are there any 
regulatory rules or supervisory 
guidelines regarding asset 
diversification?” is yes,  
 question 7.2.2 “Are banks 
prohibited from making loans 
abroad?” is yes.  
Regulatory body 
power (RBP)  
Measure for the direct power of the 
regulatory body following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 13 
and is composed as follows: It adds 1 if 
the answer to 
 question 5.9 “Are auditors required 
to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or 
senior managers in illicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse?” is yes,  
 question 5.10 “Does the banking 
supervisor have the right to meet 
with the external auditors and 
discuss their report without the 
approval of the bank?” is not no, 
 question 5.12b “In cases where the 
supervisor identifies that the bank 
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001).  
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
has received an inadequate audit, 
does the supervisor have the powers 
to take actions against the auditor?” 
is yes,  
 question 5.7.a “Do supervisors 
receive a copy of the following: The 
auditor's report on the financial 
statements” is yes,  
 question 10.5.b “Do banks disclose 
to the supervisors off-balance sheet 
items?” is yes, 
 question 12.3.2 “Can the 
supervisory authority force a bank 
to change its internal organizational 
structure?” is yes,  
 question 11.1.f “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to constitute provisions to cover 
actual or potential losses?” is yes, 
 question 11.1.j “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to reduce or suspend dividends to 
shareholders?” is yes,  
 question 11.1.k “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to reduce or suspend bonuses and 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
other remuneration to bank directors 
and managers?” is yes,  
 question 11.5.a “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
activities: Declare insolvency?” is 
“Bank Supervisor”, 
 question 11.5.b “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
activities: Supersede shareholders' 
rights” is “Bank Supervisor”, 
 question 11.5.b “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
activities: Remove and replace bank 
senior management and directors” is 
“Bank Supervisor”,  
 question 12.20 “How frequently are 
onsite inspections conducted in 
large and medium size banks?” is 
more than yearly.  
Capital regulation 
(CAPR) 
Measure for the regulatory oversight of 
bank capital following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 5 
and is composed as follows: It adds 1, if 
the answer to 
 question 1.4.2 “Are the sources of 
funds to be used as capital verified 
by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities?” is yes,  
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001). 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 question 1.4.3 “Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent 
injections of capital be done with 
assets other than cash or government 
securities?” is no, 
 question 1.5 “Can initial capital 
contributions by prospective 
shareholders be in the form of 
borrowed funds?” is no,  
 question 3.2.a “Which risks are 
covered by the current regulatory 
minimum capital requirements in 
your jurisdiction: Credit risk?” is 
yes,  
 question 3.2.a “Which risks are 
covered by the current regulatory 
minimum capital requirements in 
your jurisdiction: Market risk?” is 
yes. 
Entry requirements 
(ERQ) 
Measure for the difficulty to operate as a 
bank in a specific country following the 
survey explained in Barth et al. (2001). 
The variable can take a maximum value 
of 8 and is composed as follows: It adds 
1 if the answer to 
 question 1.6.a “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Draft bylaws?” is 
yes,  
 question 1.6.b “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001). 
Appendices 69 
 
Part V -- Paper 1: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Capital Adequacy 
Name of variable Explanation Source 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Intended 
organizational chart?” is yes,  
 question 1.6.d “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Market / business 
strategy?” is yes,  
 question 1.6.e “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Financial 
projections for first three years?” is 
yes,  
 question 1.6.f “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Financial 
information on main potential 
shareholders?” is yes,  
 question 1.6.g “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: 
Background/experience of future 
Board directors?” is yes,  
 question 1.6.h “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: 
Background/experience of future 
senior managers?” is yes,  
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 question 1.6.i “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Source of funds to 
be used as capital?” is yes. 
Private monitoring 
(PRM) 
Measure for the degree to which the 
private sector is empowered, facilitated 
and encouraged to monitor banks 
following the survey explained in Barth 
et al. (2001). The variable can take a 
maximum value of 12 and is composed as 
follows: It adds 1 if the answer to 
 question 5.1 “Is an audit by a 
professional external auditor 
required for all commercial banks in 
your jurisdiction?” is yes,  
 question 5.1.1.a “Does the external 
auditor have to obtain a professional 
certification or pass a specific exam 
to qualify as such?” is yes,  
 question 5.1.2 “Are specific 
requirements for the extent or nature 
of the audit spelled out?” is yes,  
 question 8.1 “Is there an explicit 
deposit insurance protection system 
for commercial banks?” is no,  
 question 9.3 “Does accrued, though 
unpaid, interest/principal enter the 
bank's income statement while the 
loan is classified as non-
performing?” is no,  
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001). 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 question 9.5 “If a customer has 
multiple loans and advances and one 
of them is classified as non-
performing, are all the other 
exposures automatically classified 
as non-performing as well?” is yes,  
 question 10.1 “Are banks required 
to prepare consolidated accounts for 
accounting purposes?” is yes,  
 question 10.5.1.b “Do banks 
disclose to the public: Off-balance 
sheet items” is yes,  
 question 10.5.1.c “Do banks 
disclose to the public: Governance 
and risk management framework” is 
yes,  
 question 10.5.2 “Are bank directors 
legally liable if information 
disclosed is erroneous or 
misleading?” is yes,  
 question 10.7 “Are commercial 
banks required by supervisors to 
have external credit ratings?” is yes,  
 question 10.8 “How many of the top 
ten banks (in terms of total domestic 
assets) are rated by international 
credit rating agencies (e.g., 
Moody's, Standard and Poor)?” is 
10. 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
Ownership (OWN) Measure for the degree to which 
regulations control for ownership in 
banks following the survey explained in 
Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take 
a maximum value of 3 and is composed 
as follows: It adds 1 if the answer to 
 question 2.3 “Is there a maximum 
percentage of a bank's equity that 
can be owned by a single owner?” is 
yes,  
 question 2.5.1 “Can related parties 
own capital in a bank?” is yes,  
 question 2.6.d “2.6 Can 
nonfinancial firms own voting 
shares in commercial banks: 
Nonfinancial firms cannot own any 
equity investment in a commercial 
bank?” is yes.  
Own calculation 
based on Barth et 
al. (2001). 
Log of total assets 
(LTA) 
Natural logarithm of the sum of all assets 
of a bank.   
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross 
loans (LLRGL) 
The ratio of the part of the loans for which 
the bank expects losses (but does not 
charge off) to the total loan portfolio.  
Bankscope. 
Return on average 
assets (ROAA) 
This is the ratio of the net income to the 
total assets (calculated as average of the 
previous and the subsequent year-end) of 
a bank.  
Bankscope. 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
Dividend dummy 
(DIV) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in case that 
the bank has paid out a dividend in the 
specific year and 0 otherwise.  
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Bank’s total assets 
to the sum of all 
banks’ total assets 
of a country 
(BASA) 
Ratio of a bank’s total assets to the sum 
of all banks’ total assets of the country for 
a specific year.  
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Dummy for system 
relevance (SYS) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in case that 
the bank’s total assets to the sum of all 
banks’ total assets of the country for a 
specific year is higher than 10% and 0 
otherwise.  
Own calculation.  
Bank concentration 
(CON) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in case that 
the total assets of the three biggest banks 
is more than 50% of all banks’ total assets 
of the country for a specific year, 0 
otherwise.  
Own calculation. 
Banks per million 
capita (BMC) 
Number of banks per country for a 
specific year divided by total population 
of this country in millions.  
Own calculation 
based on data 
from world 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Bank deposits per 
GDP (BGDP) 
Demand, time and saving deposits in 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP. 
Financial 
development and 
structure dataset 
(as explained in 
Beck et al., 2000) 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
Gross domestic 
product per capita 
in USD (GDPC) 
Explained by variable’s name.  World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Annual gross 
domestic product 
growth (GGDP) 
Explained by variable’s name. World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Bank z-score (BZS) Captures the probability of default of a 
country's banking system, calculated as a 
weighted average of the z-scores of a 
country's individual banks (the weights 
are based on the individual banks' total 
assets). The individual z-score divides a 
bank’s buffers (capitalisation and 
returns) by the volatility of those returns, 
according to formula (V.7), i.e. a lower z-
score indicates a higher probability of 
default:  
ROA +
Equity
Total Assets
Standard deviation of ROA
 (V.7) 
 
Financial 
development and 
structure dataset 
(as explained in 
Beck et al., 2000) 
Inflation (INF) Explained by variable’s name. World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Crisis country 
(CRC) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 if the 
country suffered a banking crisis during 
the financial crisis, 0 otherwise. Banking 
Own calculations 
based on 
classification 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
crisis countries are the ones named as 
systemic cases according to Laeven and 
Valencia (2010).  
made by Laeven 
and Valencia 
(2010).  
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V.8.2. Table of 
Abbreviations 
approx. Approximately 
AR(1) Autoregressive process 
of order 1 
AR(2) Autoregressive process 
of order 2 
ARE United Arab Emirates 
AUS Australia 
AUT Austria 
BEL Belgium 
BGR Bulgaria 
CAN Canada 
CHE Switzerland 
CHL Chile 
CHN China-People’s Rep. 
CYP Cyprus 
CZE Czech Republic 
DEU Germany 
df Degrees of freedom 
Dep. Dependent 
DNK Denmark 
DPD Dynamic panel data 
e.g. Exempli gratia (for 
example) 
ESP Spain 
 
 
 
EST Estonia 
et al. Et alii (and others) 
EU European Union 
FE Fixed effects 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
GBR United Kingdom 
GMM Generalized Method of 
Moments 
GRC Greece 
HKG Hong Kong 
HUN Hungary 
i.e. Id est (that is) 
i.i.d. Independently, 
identically distributed 
IRL Ireland 
ISL Iceland 
ISR Israel 
ITA Italy 
iv Instrumental variable 
JEL Journal of Economic 
Literature 
JPN Japan 
KOR Republic of Korea 
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LSDVC Least Square Dummy 
Variable Correction  
LTU Lithuania 
LUX Luxembourg 
LVA Latvia 
MEX Mexico 
MLT Malta 
n/a Not applicable  
NLD Netherlands 
No. Number 
NOR Norway 
NZL New Zealand 
OECD Organization for 
Economic Co-
operation and 
Development 
OLS Ordinary Least 
Squares 
POL Poland 
pp. Pages 
PRT Portugal 
ROU Romania 
RUS Russian Federation 
sd Standard deviation 
SGP Singapore 
SVK Slovakia 
SVN Slovenia 
SWE Sweden 
TUR Turkey 
USA United States 
USD United States Dollar 
Vol.  Volume  
vs Versus 
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V.8.3. Table of Symbols 
& and 
β Coefficient to be estimated 
C1 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: Statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with no unconsolidated companion   
C2 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: Statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with an unconsolidated companion 
C* Consolidation code according to Bankscope: additional 
consolidated statement 
D Explanatory variable 
εi,t Remainder disturbance for individual bank i at time t;  
εi,t = ui,t - μi 
i Numbering for individual bank (ranging from 1 to N) 
j Numbering for country (ranging from 1 to J) 
J Total number of countries 
k Numbering for explanatory variables (ranging from 0 to K) 
K Total number of explanatory variables 
L. Lagged 
λ Speed of adjustment 
μi Unobservable specific effect for individual i; μi = ui,t - εi,t.  
νt Unobservable time effect 
N Total population of individual banks 
® Registered Trademark 
t Numbering for time (ranging from 1 to T) 
t-test Student’s test 
T Total time periods 
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ui,t Regression disturbance term for individual i at time t;  
λvi,t = ui,t = μi + εi,t 
vi,t Disturbance term in estimation of target Tier 1 ratio for 
individual bank i at time t 
% Percentage 
* Target 
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V.8.4. Robustness Checks  
Changing Lags and Using Forward Orthogonal Deviations 
Section V.3.3 explained that the basis regression limits the lags of the 
endogenous and predetermined explanatory variables in order to avoid 
specification problems. However, this might be at the cost of losing 
information from the higher lagged variables.  
Table V.7 shows the regression with no lag limits. This regression does 
not change the signs of former significant coefficients. As expected, no 
formerly significant coefficients lose their significance, since the 
additional lags provide more information. On the contrary, two further 
coefficients turn out to be significant. The positive sign for the USD 
gross domestic product per capita (GDPC) indicates that banks in 
healthier economies have higher Tier 1 ratios. The positive coefficient 
on the bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks’ total assets of a country 
(BASA) underlines the finding that systemically relevant banks seem to 
have higher Tier 1 ratios.  
In the regression without lag limits, the Arellano-Bond test diagnostics 
and the value of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable are 
satisfactory. However, as anticipated, the Hansen test diagnostic shows 
that the regression without lag limits appears to cause instrument 
problems (total instruments are now 174, compared to 71 for the basis 
regression).  
Therefore, Table V.8 shows the results of the regression when the 
instruments are minimised to the lowest possible value of 45 (by using 
only one lag for GMM-style instruments). The regression diagnostics 
now support the model again.51 As for the regression without lag limits 
and in addition to the basis regression, the coefficient on the bank’s total 
assets to the sum of all banks’ total assets of a country (BASA) becomes 
significantly positive. Apart from this, all remains unchanged from the 
basis regression.  
                                            
51  Note that the difference-in-Hansen test is obsolete when taking just one lag for the GMM-
style instruments; therefore, the value n/a (not applicable) is included in Table V.8. 
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Therefore, the basis regression results seem to be quite robust against 
changes in the lag limits. This is also valid when using forward 
orthogonal deviations instead of differencing (refer to the description in 
section V.3.3). The results of this regression (see Table V.9) are similar 
to the ones of the basis regression;52 the only difference is that the 
coefficient on private monitoring (PRM) loses its significance, whereas 
the coefficients on the bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks’ total 
assets of a country (BASA) and on the USD gross domestic product per 
capita (GDPC) are now significantly positive.  
Regressions without USA  
According to the descriptive statistics in section V.4, more than half of 
the observations relate to the USA. As discussed in the introduction, this 
country plays an important role in the intercontinental debate. It might 
therefore be interesting to see which of the results are driven by the USA 
itself. Table V.10 shows the results of the basis regression excluding US 
banks.53 
In comparison to the basis regression, the coefficients on the bank’s total 
assets to the sum of all banks’ total assets of a country (BASA) and on 
the gross domestic product per capita in USD (GDPC) become 
significantly positive and the one for bank concentration (CON) becomes 
significantly negative. Furthermore, the coefficients on the private 
monitoring index (PRM) and the bank z-score (BZS) lose their 
significance. However, most interestingly, the dummy for crisis country 
(CRC) remains significant but changes sign (i.e. it is positive now), 
indicating that crisis countries outside the USA have higher Tier 1 ratios.  
It therefore seems that the USA has a relatively big impact on the 
regression results by even changing the manner of dependency of the 
explanatory variables.54  
                                            
52  All the regression diagnostics support the model.  
53  The test diagnostics for this regression are fine apart from the difference-in-Hansen test 
of the GMM style instrument subset, indicating some instrumentation problem. This could 
be caused by the decreased number of observations (7 197) and individuals (1 251) in this 
regression relative to its unchanged number of instruments (71).  
54  Note that these changes in the significance of the coefficients when excluding US banks 
remain the same if I re-perform all other mentioned robustness checks without US banks 
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Elimination of Outliers 
As discussed in section V.4, the Tier 1 ratio data contains some outliers. 
The present section repeats the basis regression, but discretionarily 
eliminates all negative Tier 1 ratios and all Tier 1 ratios above a value of 
700%.55  
Table V.11 shows that this regression does not change the results of the 
basis regression56: The bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks’ total 
assets of a country (BASA) instead of the dummy variable for system 
relevance (SYS) is now significantly positive, still indicating that 
systemically relevant banks appear to have higher Tier 1 ratios.   
To conclude, the regression is rather robust against the elimination of 
outliers.   
Using Total Capital Ratio instead of Tier 1 Ratio  
The Tier 1 ratio is just one of the two actual relevant capital adequacy 
measurements. The other is the total capital ratio. Compared to the Tier 
1 ratio, the total capital ratio adds the Tier 2 capital to the Tier 1 capital 
in the numerator. Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated debt, hybrid 
capital, loan loss reserves and the valuation reserves.  
                                            
(except that in the interpolated regression, the coefficient on the entry requirements [ERQ] 
becomes significantly negative; I assess this as insignificant, since this is the only 
regression in which this happens).  Thus, the robustness check to perform the regression 
without US banks is itself also robust. 
55  Note that the results do not change substantially when the data for the Tier 1 ratio is 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile instead of dropping the outliers: compared to the 
basis regression, the coefficients on the return on average assets (ROAA), the gross 
domestic product per capita in USD (GDPC) and the inflation (INF) become significantly 
positive and the dummy for crisis country (CRC) loses its significance. However, the 
winsorised regression does not satisfy the Hansen and difference-in-Hansen test 
diagnostics.  
56  The test diagnostics for the regression without outliers are satisfied.  
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Table V.12 reveals the results of the basis regression but using the total 
capital ratio instead of the Tier 1 ratio.57  Compared to the basis 
regression there are no changes.58   
Using Interpolated Regulatory Survey Data 
As defined in section V.3.1, I assume that changes in the severity of bank 
regulation occur immediately and not slowly. This section checks 
whether the regression results diverge when the changes in the regulatory 
severity occur smoothly over the years (i.e. in years with no survey 
available, the regulatory variables are interpolated).  
As is evident from Table V.13,59 there are only two changes to the results 
of the base regression: the coefficient on the bank’s total assets to the 
sum of all banks’ total assets of a country (BASA) turns out to be 
significant and positive, whereas the dummy for dividend payers (DIV) 
is no longer significant.  
Thus, it looks as if it does not substantially matter whether the model 
assumes immediate or smooth changes in the severity of regulation.   
Regression without Regulatory Variables 
As mentioned in section V.2, most previous studies have not explicitly 
considered regulatory variables. In order to check the robustness of the 
                                            
57  The test diagnostics are as expected.  
 Note that the total number of observations slightly decreased, since not all observations 
showing a Tier 1 ratio also show a total capital ratio. Using the “opposite” data (i.e. taking 
all observations which have a total capital ratio, but which do not necessarily have a Tier 
1 ratio; there are 16 893 total observations in this case), does not substantially change the 
results. The coefficients on the bank’s total assets to the sum of all banks’ total assets of 
a country (BASA) and one the dummy variable for system relevance (SYS) change 
significance and the coefficient on the USD gross domestic product per capita (GDPC) 
emerges as significant. However, the test diagnostics for this latter regression are less 
satisfying than for the first. 
58  The new Basel III rules stipulate an additional leverage ratio to be fulfilled. Proponents 
argue that this ratio is less easy for the banks to control themselves. Simply put, it is a 
ratio that compares book equity to total book assets without risk weighting the figures 
(refer to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Using such a ratio instead 
of the Tier 1 or the total capital ratio again leads to substantially the same results (with the 
difference that more coefficients become significant and the test diagnostics are not all 
satisfied, which might be the result of a changed number of observations). 
59  Again, all test diagnostics support this model.  
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bank-specific and the other country-specific coefficient results, the 
regression shown in Table V.14 drops the six regulatory variables.60 As 
the table shows, the dummy variable for system relevance (SYS) is no 
longer significant while, on the other hand, the coefficient on the 
inflation rate (INF) becomes significantly negative (as expected) at the 
10% confidence level. Accordingly, it would seem that this robustness 
check does not change the interpretation of the basis regression results 
substantially.   
                                            
60  This model also demonstrates support by all test diagnostics. Moreover, the results do not 
substantially change if I drop only separate regulatory variables.  
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V.8.5. Tables for Regression Results of Robustness Checks 
Table V.7: Regression without lag limits 
   One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 
to “infinity”.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to “infinity”.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9348 *** (7.40)
REST + 0.7069 *** (3.11)
RBP + -0.0757 (-0.34)
CAPR + -0.0985 (-0.45)
ERQ + 0.0125 (0.03)
PRM +/- -0.8308 * (-1.92)
OWN + 0.3472 (0.27)
LTA - -4.6340 *** (-3.20)
LLRGL + -0.0696 (-0.22)
ROAA +/- -0.0446 (-0.07)
DIV +/- 1.5150 * (1.93)
BASA +/- 0.5090 * (1.86)
SYS +/- 5.6632 ** (2.50)
CON +/- -0.1659 (-0.24)
BMC +/- -0.5565 *** (-2.72)
BGDP +/- 0.0461 *** (3.13)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 * (1.91)
GGDP +/- -0.0061 (-0.05)
BZS +/- -0.2673 *** (-2.86)
INF - 0.0162 (0.11)
CRC - -3.2909 ** (-2.18)
Observations: 15 944
Groups: 2 772
Instruments  174
-2.18 **
0.85
172.48 **
15.00
19.09
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 142)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
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Table V.8: Regression with further restricted lags 
   One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument  
lags 2.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (Log of total assets), 
LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV 
(dividend dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), 
SYS (dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument 
lag 1.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank Z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1cevel, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9572 *** (7.26)
REST + 1.4875 *** (3.86)
RBP + -0.4968 (-0.94)
CAPR + 0.2051 (0.64)
ERQ + 0.6686 (0.62)
PRM +/- -2.5316 *** (-2.90)
OWN + -0.8326 (-0.37)
LTA - -6.7380 *** (-3.25)
LLRGL + -1.0244 (-1.10)
ROAA +/- -0.7191 (-0.73)
DIV +/- 2.6245 ** (2.26)
BASA +/- 0.7116 * (1.73)
SYS +/- 5.3859 * (1.74)
CON +/- 0.1873 (0.16)
BMC +/- -0.6667 ** (-2.36)
BGDP +/- 0.0702 *** (3.40)
GDPC +/- 0.0000 (0.50)
GGDP +/- 0.0732 (0.40)
BZS +/- -0.4409 *** (-2.97)
INF - 0.1021 (0.44)
CRC - -5.8303 ** (-2.35)
Observations: 15 944
Groups: 2 772
Instruments  45
-2.30 **
0.49
18.89
n/a
n/a
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 13)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
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Table V.9: Regression with forward orthogonal deviations 
     One-step GMM regression with forward orthogonal deviations with robust standard errors. 
Dummy control variables and constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 
to 4.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to 3.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank Z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9041 *** (7.02)
REST + 0.6909 *** (3.13)
RBP + 0.0323 (0.16)
CAPR + -0.0562 (-0.25)
ERQ + 0.1484 (0.27)
PRM +/- -0.7116 (-1.07)
OWN + -0.9924 (-0.56)
LTA - -2.9409 *** (-2.88)
LLRGL + 0.0738 (0.36)
ROAA +/- -0.0753 (-0.11)
DIV +/- 1.5887 * (1.94)
BASA +/- 0.2820 (1.34)
SYS +/- 5.2106 *** (2.69)
CON +/- 0.2946 (0.41)
BMC +/- -0.3819 ** (-2.59)
BGDP +/- 0.0342 *** (3.27)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 ** (1.99)
GGDP +/- 0.0891 (0.96)
BZS +/- -0.1832 *** (-2.71)
INF - 0.0435 (0.33)
CRC - -2.5410 * (-1.71)
Observations: 15 944
Groups: 2 772
Instruments  71
-2.12 **
0.86
44.73
9.11
19.46
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
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Table V.10: Basis regression without USA 
  
  
One-step system GMM-regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 
to 3.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (Return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to 2.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9409 *** (8.17)
REST + 0.7969 ** (2.50)
RBP + -0.4104 (-0.81)
CAPR + 0.2923 (0.43)
ERQ + -0.7160 (-1.21)
PRM +/- -0.2088 (-0.39)
OWN + -1.7065 (-0.72)
LTA - -10.9584 *** (-2.65)
LLRGL + -0.1934 (-0.51)
ROAA +/- -0.9453 (-0.92)
DIV +/- 1.4819 * (1.91)
BASA +/- 0.9845 *** (2.64)
SYS +/- 4.5677 (1.27)
CON +/- -7.2974 *** (-3.27)
BMC +/- -1.1607 *** (-3.18)
BGDP +/- 0.0430 ** (2.34)
GDPC +/- 0.0003 *** (3.26)
GGDP +/- 0.2589 (1.52)
BZS +/- 0.0330 (0.44)
INF - -0.2390 (-0.57)
CRC - 7.0950 ** (2.51)
Observations: 7 197
Groups: 1 251
Instruments  71
-2.18 **
0.69
43.05
19.97 *
15.90
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
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Table V.11: Regression without outliers 
   
One-step system GMM-regression with robust standard errors. Negative Tier 1 ratios and 
those higher than 700% are dropped. Dummy control variables and constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 
2 to 3.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), 
LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV 
(dividend dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), 
SYS (dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument 
lags 1 to 2.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.8233 *** (5.68)
REST + 1.0431 *** (3.04)
RBP + -0.2603 (-0.86)
CAPR + 0.0504 (0.19)
ERQ + -0.8670 (-0.83)
PRM +/- -2.0935 ** (-2.34)
OWN + -1.6759 (-0.64)
LTA - -6.3655 *** (-3.34)
LLRGL + -0.4517 (-0.80)
ROAA +/- -0.4278 (-0.56)
DIV +/- 2.3483 *** (2.72)
BASA +/- 0.5701 * (1.66)
SYS +/- 4.5357 (1.51)
CON +/- 0.0077 (0.01)
BMC +/- -0.5590 ** (-2.44)
BGDP +/- 0.0540 *** (3.61)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 (1.45)
GGDP +/- 0.1011 (0.75)
BZS +/- -0.3811 *** (-2.66)
INF - 0.0197 (0.12)
CRC - -6.0308 ** (-2.11)
Observations: 15 877
Groups: 2 769
Instruments  71
-2.21 **
1.23
39.08
16.10
10.52
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
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Table V.12: Basis regression with total capital ratio instead of Tier 1 ratio 
    
One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
Total capital ratio (TCR) is the dependent variable.  
L.TCR (lagged TCR) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 to 3.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to 2.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TCR + 0.9566 *** (7.92)
REST + 0.7337 *** (2.62)
RBP + -0.4108 (-1.00)
CAPR + -0.0916 (-0.36)
ERQ + -0.0256 (-0.04)
PRM +/- -0.9591 * (-1.75)
OWN + -0.4873 (-0.25)
LTA - -5.8325 *** (-2.94)
LLRGL + -0.2850 (-0.55)
ROAA +/- -0.1567 (-0.22)
DIV +/- 1.7566 ** (2.18)
BASA +/- 0.3944 (1.33)
SYS +/- 5.1180 * (1.75)
CON +/- 0.4740 (0.54)
BMC +/- -0.4970 ** (-2.17)
BGDP +/- 0.0517 *** (3.34)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 (1.08)
GGDP +/- 0.0012 (0.01)
BZS +/- -0.3465 *** (-2.65)
INF - -0.1057 (-0.53)
CRC - -4.6499 * (-1.93)
Observations: 15 790
Groups: 2 742
Instruments  71
-2.19 **
0.88
38.79
16.84
8.26
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Dependent variable: TCR
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
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Table V.13: Basis regression with interpolated regulatory data 
  
  
One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors.  Dummy control variables 
and constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 
to 3.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to 2.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9384 *** (7.42)
REST + 0.5167 ** (2.15)
RBP + -0.3718 (-1.10)
CAPR + 0.0731 (0.20)
ERQ + -0.1845 (-0.32)
PRM +/- -1.5291 ** (-2.10)
OWN + 1.0548 (0.46)
LTA - -4.1736 *** (-2.98)
LLRGL + -0.3407 (-0.75)
ROAA +/- -0.1109 (-0.15)
DIV +/- 1.1617 (1.51)
BASA +/- 0.4211 * (1.69)
SYS +/- 4.7187 ** (2.36)
CON +/- -0.5422 (-0.72)
BMC +/- -0.4290 ** (-2.52)
BGDP +/- 0.0422 *** (3.29)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 (1.15)
GGDP +/- -0.0745 (-0.59)
BZS +/- -0.2387 *** (-2.75)
INF - 0.0024 (0.01)
CRC - -3.0441 * (-1.72)
Observations: 15 670
Groups: 2 732
Instruments  71
-2.16 **
0.75
50.42
9.42
21.98
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 39)
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
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Table V.14: Basis regression without regulatory variables 
  
 
One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
TIER1R (Tier 1 ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.TIER1R (lagged Tier 1 ratio) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 
to 4.  
LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return 
on average assets), DIV (dividend dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ 
total assets of a country), SYS (dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory 
variables with instrument lags 1 to 3.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank z-score), INF (Inflation), CRC (crisis country) are strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the 
degrees of freedom for the test statistic.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.TIER1R + 0.9391 *** (7.66)
LTA - -6.4248 *** (-3.35)
LLRGL + -0.1780 (-0.44)
ROAA +/- -0.0526 (-0.08)
DIV +/- 1.6562 ** (2.06)
BASA +/- 0.4199 (1.32)
SYS +/- 3.5386 (1.32)
CON +/- -0.0734 (-0.08)
BMC +/- -0.4647 ** (-2.34)
BGDP +/- 0.0470 *** (3.07)
GDPC +/- 0.0001 (1.24)
GGDP +/- 0.0114 (0.09)
BZS +/- -0.3599 *** (-2.85)
INF - -0.3488 * (-1.75)
CRC - -5.6949 *** (-2.71)
Observations: 15 944
Groups: 2 772
Instruments  47
-2.21 **
0.85
23.86
10.61
21.33
Dependent variable: TIER1R
Arellano–Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 21)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 7)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 18)
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VI. Paper 2: The Impact of Basel II on the Capital 
Ratios of Banks – A Difference-in-Difference 
Comparison between Early-Comprehensive and 
Late-Partial Adopters 
VI.1. Abstract 
This paper examines whether the introduction of the Basel II framework 
resulted in capital ratios of banks from affected countries developing 
differently compared to the ratios of banks from countries with a 
postponed introduction. I apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) 
approach in which the announced comprehensive introduction of Basel 
II in Continental Europe in 2004 is the “treatment”. To ensure similarity 
between treatment banks and control banks, I use propensity score 
matching strategies and construct comparable groups, before applying 
the DiD computations. Accordingly, I find strong evidence that there is 
a treatment effect; that is, that after the treatment in 2004, treatment 
banks had significantly higher capital ratios than control banks. The 
other control variables included in my calculations support this main 
result of a positive treatment effect: The outcome of these variables is 
comparable to other work performed on the subject of bank capital ratios. 
However, I also find indications that the change in regulation is at best 
only a partial explanation for the treatment effect, because simultaneous 
changes in reporting standards might also have caused the capital ratio 
increase of European banks. In other words, book values changed and 
the capital ratios went up because of a change in the measurement 
method. Consequently, the “real” effect might have been much smaller 
than it appears at first. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Banks, Bank regulation, Basel II, Capital ratios  
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G28, G38, M48 
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VI.2. Introduction and Background 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) 
published its new framework for the regulation of capital measurements 
and capital standards of banks. The framework, known as “Basel II”, was 
the successor to the original “Basel I” regulation issued in 1988 (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988). Whereas Basel I mainly 
dealt with minimal capital ratio rules for banks, Basel II was more 
extensive, being based on three pillars, that is, minimum capital 
requirements, a supervisory review process and market discipline. The 
aim of the new framework was to “promote the adoption of stronger risk 
management practices by the banking industry” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2004, p. 2) and eventually strengthen the entire 
banking system. The committee expected its member states to implement 
the framework as of year-end 2006. 
However, early on it emerged that not all the relevant countries planned 
to introduce the framework at the same rate or with the same rigour. 
Substantial differences were primarily identified between the 
Continental European legislators and the United States (US) and Chinese 
legislators: The European camp supported a quick and comprehensive 
introduction of the Basel II legislation, which finally resulted in the new 
directives, Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC, being 
introduced in 2006. The US camp, on the other hand, originally planned 
the introduction only for larger banks (e.g. Cornford, 2006) and even 
postponed the introduction timeline (Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, 2005). Similarly, China also distanced itself from its 
implementation commitments (see e.g. Cornford, 2005).  
One major point of concern was the uncertainty as to whether the 
implementation would have a positive or negative effect on the capital 
ratios of banks – critics maintained that with the new rules it “[…] 
became apparent that no one actually knows what regulatory capital 
requirements will be  […]” (Tarullo, 2006, no pagination).  
Based on this uncertainty, the aim of my paper is to examine whether the 
(announced) comprehensive introduction of the Basel II rules in affected 
countries led the capital ratios of the banks concerned developing 
differently compared to banks from countries with a postponed or 
rejected introduction. To do so, I apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) 
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approach, in which the announced comprehensive introduction of the 
Basel II framework in 2004 is the “treatment”. I use the banks from  
(mainly Continental) Europe EU15 countries as the treatment group and 
Chinese and US banks as the control group.61 In order to avoid the results 
being biased by other factors, the DiD regressions include various other 
possible explanatory factors. Additionally, to ensure similarity between 
the treatment banks and the control banks, I use propensity score 
matching methods and construct comparable groups, before applying the 
DiD regressions.  
Most of the existing work on the capital ratios of banks focuses on the 
impact of bank-specific and country-specific factors; question related to 
the regulation are mostly – if at all – only implicitly considered. For 
example, Gropp and Heider (2010) investigate the determinants of the 
capital structure of large and publicly traded banks in the years between 
1991 and 2004. They conclude that the process by means of which the 
capital structures of banks are set seems to be similar to non-banking 
firms and that therefore bank regulation appears to be of only limited 
importance. Note that they do not explicitly integrate regulation 
measures in their study. This is also true for Flannery and Rangan (2008). 
In a study that covers the largest US banks from 1986 to 2001, they 
conclude that especially market forces are important explanatory factors 
for the build-up of bank capital. On the other hand, Brewer, Kaufman 
and Wall (2008), for example, directly include measures for bank 
regulation. They examine large banks for the period 1992 to 2005 and 
conclude that there is some evidence that capital requirements have a 
positive effect on the capital ratios of banks. Similarly, Schaeck and 
Cihák’s (2009) study includes regulatory factors for European banks 
from 1999 to 2004. According to their findings, stricter capital regulation 
seems to lead to higher capital ratios. In his study of worldwide banks 
for the years 2000 to 2011, Lucadamo (2016) also includes regulatory 
explanatory factors. He finds evidence that the regulation of bank 
activity increases capital ratios. On the other hand, he discovers evidence 
                                            
61  In fact, after the selection of the appropriate comparison countries and banks, a small 
number of Chinese banks remain as control group observations besides the US bank 
observations. When I drop Chinese banks completely from my study and consider only 
US banks as control group observations, my results do not change.  
96 Introduction and Background 
 
Part VI -- Paper 2: The Impact of Basel II on the Capital Ratios of Banks 
that stronger private regulation leads to lower ratios. He concludes that 
other factors seem to be more important for banks’ capital ratios.  
De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) find comparable results in a similar study, 
covering the years 1994 to 2004, of various countries around the world. 
Francis and Osborne (2012) concentrate on UK banks for the years 1996 
to 2007. Among other things, they examine the effects of capital 
requirements on banks’ capital ratios and they conclude that banks raise 
targeted capital ratios in response to increasing capital requirements and 
vice versa.  
To summarise, a lot of work has already been done on the question of 
whether regulation affects the capital ratios of banks. Some studies 
conclude that there is no measurable regulation effect. In other studies, 
there is some evidence to show that regulation has an effect, at least in 
some way. Either way, in most studies regulation is far from being the 
main trigger for banks’ capital ratios. However, the studies that integrate 
a measure for regulation do so by including possible explanatory factors 
as separate variables. The composition of such factors appears to be quite 
difficult. Considering the findings of these studies, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether the lack of regulatory influence results from the fact 
that there is, effectively, only limited impact or if the regulation factors 
fail to be appropriately created. My paper reduces this complexity 
regarding the regulation measurement by applying the explained DiD 
strategy. To my knowledge, this is the first study that applies such an 
approach in order to measure the impact of bank regulation. Therefore, 
it is a new variation on the already abundant work conducted on the 
influence of regulation on the capital ratios of banks and it brings new 
insights to this topic. 
By applying this strategy, my main finding is that there is significant 
evidence of a treatment effect. This effect is positive in the amount of 
approximately 100 basis points. That is, I find that after the treatment in 
2004, banks from the EU15 treatment group show higher average capital 
ratios compared to the control group banks. However, it turns out that 
the regulation change is not necessarily the only factor that led to the 
treatment effect. There is some evidence to show that simultaneous 
changes in the bank reporting standards – mainly from cost-based local 
regulatory standards to fair-value-based International Financial 
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Reporting Standards (IFRS) – also led to higher capital ratios. In other 
words, book values changed and therefore the capital ratios went up 
because of a change in the measurement method. The “real” effect might 
therefore have been much smaller than it appears at first . The evidence 
regarding the effect of a reporting standard change is not entirely robust. 
But considering the results of the other studies in regard to the influence 
of regulation, it seems apparent that the introduction of Basel II had at 
best only a partial positive effect on the capital ratios of banks.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section VI.3 explains the data 
and methodology, section VI.4 shows the results of the basic model and 
the robustness checks and section VI.5 concludes the paper.  
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VI.3. Data and Methodology 
VI.3.1. Dataset 
As discussed above, in 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2004) published the new standard. Accordingly, 2004 is my 
treatment year, even though the standard did not become binding on that 
date (the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, presented its 
final, comprehensive version of the standard two years later; in addition, 
the EU – as a strong Basel II-supporter – did not introduce binding rules 
before its publication of the above-mentioned directives in 2006). 
However, the intensive discussions regarding the grade of 
implementation severity started in 2004 and, as Münstermann (2005) 
states, one could therefore expect banks to start restructuring their 
balance sheets ahead of a binding introduction date (note that in the 
robustness checks in section VI.4.2, I test changes in my results by 
considering possible other treatment dates). In order not to cover one pre- 
and one post-treatment year only, my study includes the seven years from 
2001 to 2007, that is, there are three pre-treatment years and four post-
treatment years. If I extend my study to, for example, the year 2011 (i.e. 
also including the years during and after the financial crisis), the 
significant treatment effect vanishes. This result is most probably biased 
by the crisis. Regressions based only on crisis countries confirm this 
assumption,62 because in some of these regressions the treatment effect 
turns out to be significant again. Therefore, I do not include years after 
2007 in my study. 
My treatment group consists of the countries that displayed a clear 
positive attitude to applying the Basel II rules quickly and 
comprehensively after their publication. The control group, on the other 
hand, contains countries with a clear intent to postpone the Basel II 
introduction or not to introduce it comprehensively. Cho (2013) 
performed a detailed study regarding Basel II endorsement in various 
countries. His “early-comprehensive” adopters correspond to my first 
group mentioned above, while his “late-partial” adopters agree with my 
latter group. Note that Cho (2013) also included a group of “non-
                                            
62  As crisis countries, I take either the “systemic cases” or the “systemic cases” plus the 
“borderline cases” defined by Laeven and Valencia (2010). Note that the USA as the 
important control group country is a crisis country.  
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implementers”. However, the non-implementers are mainly countries 
from developing nations. I focus on developed countries, since I expect 
them to be more similar when considering attributes other than Basel II 
endorsement. Cho’s (2013) early comprehensive adopters are the EU 
countries plus several other smaller countries such as Norway, Hong 
Kong and Lichtenstein. In the light of the discussion in my introduction, 
I focus on the EU countries only for this class, since their policy makers 
were the most insistent lobbyists in the discussions to apply Basel II.63 I 
take the 15 countries from the EU15 as my treatment group. The entry of 
ten further countries into the EU took place in 2004, that is, around the 
same time as the publication of Basel II. However, in order to avoid 
biases because of the similar dates of these two events, I do not consider 
these EU countries.64 Cho’s (2013) late partial adopters are the USA and 
China (and some other small countries for which there was not enough 
available data to include them in the population).  
The original total population is therefore 17 countries. Since I only take 
banks that have all data for all observation years (meaning that I use a 
balanced panel according to Baum, 2006), banks from Sweden and the 
United Kingdom drop out65 and the total population is 1 214 banks from 
15 countries.66  
The number of banks per country in Table VI.1 shows that most are US 
banks (806) and the least represented country is China with seven banks. 
                                            
63  Note that I also performed my study with different treatment groups that include non-
European countries as well: On the one hand, I chose the Basler Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) member countries valid as of 2004 (twelve countries without the 
USA, Grasl, 2012), while on the other, I selected all early-comprehensive countries 
according to Cho (2013). The results, particularly regarding the positive treatment effect, 
remain the same for both amendments. However, they are not as robust as if I had only 
taken EU countries. Considering my discussion regarding the debate between mainly the 
EU and the USA, my results focus on the regressions with only the EU countries in the 
treatment group.   
64  However, I found that my results do not change if I include all EU countries valid as of 
today in my treatment group.  
65  Note that there is no substantial change in my results if I drop the affected variables and 
instead include the two countries.  
66  The countries are: AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), DEU (Germany), DNK (Denmark), 
ESP (Spain), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), GRC (Greece), IRL (Ireland), ITA (Italy), 
LUX (Luxembourg), NLD (Netherlands), PRT (Portugal), CHN (China), USA (United 
States of America). 
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The banks in the treatment group are quite evenly distributed with no 
country reaching 10% of the total population. 
 
Table VI.1: Observations per country 
My study includes all banks from the Bankscope67 database with 
consolidation code C1, C2 and C*.68 That is, I only consider consolidated 
figures, since the regulatory requirements usually apply to the 
consolidated level. In the case of double bank entries, I prefer entries for 
which more relevant data were available to the entries with less available 
                                            
67  “Bankscope – World banking information source” from Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing BV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.  
68  Refer to section V.8.3 for a detailed explanation of the consolidation codes.  
Absolute and relative amount of observations per country.  
 
The countries are: AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), DEU (Germany), DNK (Denmark), ESP 
(Spain), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), GRC (Greece), IRL (Ireland), ITA (Italy), LUX 
(Luxembourg), NLD (Netherlands), PRT (Portugal), CHN (China), USA (United States of 
America) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Country
Observations 
per year %
Treatment group
AUT  31 2.55
BEL  19 1.57
DEU  36 2.97
DNK  24 1.98
ESP  59 4.86
FIN  10 0.82
FRA  101 8.32
GRC  11 0.91
IRL  16 1.32
ITA  38 3.13
LUX  10 0.82
NLD  26 2.14
PRT  20 1.65
 401
Control group
CHN  7 0.58
USA  806 66.39
 813
Total 1 214
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data. If there is equality, I favour entries with a C1 consolidation code 
over C2 and the latter over C*. 
I translate all values (except for ratios) into million USD (United States 
dollars) using the corresponding year-end foreign exchange rate 
according to Bankscope. 
Table VI.2 shows the mean and the standard deviations (sd) of the 
various variables by year. It turns out that the average capital ratio for all 
observations increased from 2001 to 2003, it dropped in 2004 and 2005 
and then slowly recovered in 2006 and 2007; however, not to the same 
level as before 2004. Going into detail reveals that the control group 
accounts for this pattern, since the treatment group shows a different 
picture: The capital ratios of the treatment group banks also increased 
from 2001 to 2003, but they did not drop in 2004 and increased slightly 
up to 2007. The drop in the average capital ratios of the control group 
after 2003 is significant at the 5% level, whereas the slight increase in 
the capital ratios of the treatment group is not significant. This 
observation anticipates the possibility of a treatment effect between the 
two (unmatched) groups. Before I investigate this finding further in 
section VI.4, the next two subsections explain the strategy I use to 
evaluate the treatment effect. 
 
 
 
 
[Continued on next page] 
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Table VI.2: Means and standard deviations of variables by year  
VI.3.2. Difference-in-Difference Strategy 
Wooldridge (2002) explains the general DiD framework, which I apply 
in my study. The idea is that one observes the outcome variable of 
interest in two time periods, one before treatment and the other after 
treatment, and for two different groups, one being the treatment group 
and the other being the control group. In the context of my study, the 
treatment is the announced comprehensive introduction of Basel II in 
2004 for the EU15 countries (the treatment group). I am interested in the 
question of whether there is a treatment effect on the capital ratios of 
banks, i.e. if the treatment group shows different capital ratios after 
treatment compared to the control group. An ordinary least squares 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of all variables by year. 
 
The variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), gETA (growth rate of ETA), lnTA 
(log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross domestic product per capita 
in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF (inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank 
deposits per gross domestic product). 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
YEAR ETA gETA lnTA DIV LLRGL ROAA lnGDPC GGDP INF lnBGDP
2001 9.69    4.69    7.66    0.65    1.63    0.96    10.32   1.43    2.79    4.22     
(9.25) (28.08) (1.99) (0.48) (3.3) (1.99) (0.4) (1.02) (0.58) (0.19)
2002 9.99    5.04    7.80    0.66    1.60    0.90    10.37   1.71    1.85    4.24     
(9.23) (21.54) (2.01) (0.47) (1.79) (2.74) (0.38) (0.97) (0.64) (0.19)
2003 10.16  2.51    7.94    0.67    1.64    1.09    10.46   2.28    2.25    4.24     
(9.46) (22.87) (2.05) (0.47) (1.84) (1.55) (0.33) (1.33) (0.43) (0.18)
2004 9.72    -4.24   8.07    0.69    1.59    1.12    10.55   3.46    2.49    4.24     
(9.71) (22.99) (2.08) (0.46) (1.92) (1.63) (0.31) (0.9) (0.45) (0.19)
2005 9.63    0.83    8.15    0.71    1.47    1.19    10.60   2.98    2.98    4.26     
(9.46) (35.92) (2.07) (0.46) (1.78) (2.47) (0.31) (1.11) (0.69) (0.21)
2006 9.86    3.17    8.29    0.71    1.36    1.27    10.65   2.92    2.86    4.29     
(9.6) (18.94) (2.1) (0.45) (1.47) (2.16) (0.3) (1.01) (0.7) (0.22)
2007 9.90    1.18    8.41    0.71    1.41    1.06    10.72   2.27    2.63    4.34     
(9.91) (47.57) (2.15) (0.45) (1.97) (2.21) (0.27) (1.28) (0.56) (0.22)
Total 9.85    1.88    8.05    0.68    1.53    1.08    10.52   2.44    2.55    4.26     
(9.52) (29.93) (2.08) (0.46) (2.08) (2.15) (0.36) (1.29) (0.69) (0.21)
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(OLS) regression based on the following formula (VI.1) answers this 
question:    
ETAi,t = β0 + β1Treatmenti + β2Postt+ 
β3Post x Treatmenti,t+ εi,t  
(VI.1) 
ETAi,t is the capital ratio of bank i at time t. Variable Treatment i is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if bank i is part of the 
treatment group (0 otherwise). Variable Post t is a dummy which takes 
the value of 1 if the time period t of the observation is after the treatment 
date of 2004 (0 otherwise). Variable Post x Treatmenti,t is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the observation is one from a 
treatment group bank after the treatment date (0 otherwise). ε i,t is an error 
term and β0 to β4 are the coefficients to be estimated: Whereas β0 is the 
constant, β1 shows the estimated difference in the capital ratios between 
treated and non-treated banks before the treatment date; β2 reveals the 
estimated difference in the capital ratios of control banks before and after 
treatment; and β3 exposes the estimated treatment effect and represents 
the DiD estimator of interest in my study.  
One can assume that the variables explained above are not the only 
explanatory variables for the banks’ capital ratios. Thus, I expand 
formula (VI.1) using a number of K control variables Dk,i,t with their 
corresponding coefficients αk. I include a couple of bank-specific control 
variables, capturing the bank’s size, profitability, riskiness and dividend 
payment ability, which according to existing studies showed significant 
impacts on banks’ capital ratios (refer e.g. to Berger, DeYoung, 
Flannery, Lee & Öztekin, 2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2008; Gropp & 
Heider, 2010; or Lucadamo, 2016). Further, I assume that 
macroeconomic factors such as the health of the economy or the inflation 
rate could also influence capital ratios, so I include these factors as 
country-specific control variables.    
In detail, my control variables in the base model are bank size calculated 
as the natural logarithm of the sum of all assets of a bank (LTA) 69; bank 
                                            
69  Since the sum of assets is also the denominator of the left-hand variable in my regression 
formula and the results show that the coefficient on this variable is significantly negative, 
one might assume that this could bias the results. Therefore, even if the correlation 
coefficient of ETA and LTA in my dataset is considerably low (-0.13), I also performed 
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risk calculated as the ratio of the part of the loans for which the bank 
expects losses (but does not charge off) to the total loan portfolio 
(LLRGL); bank profitability calculated as the ratio of the net income to 
the total assets (as an average of the previous and the current year-end) 
of a bank (ROAA); a dividend dummy for dividend-paying banks (DIV); 
the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita in USD 
(LGDPC); the annual growth of the gross domestic product per capita 
(GGDP); and the inflation rate (INF).70   
As explained above, my study is based on pooled panel data from several 
pre-treatment and several post-treatment years. Greene (2008) shows that 
in such a model the OLS estimator might result in biased results. To 
correct for possible biases, I expand my model by including bank-fixed 
effects ai and time-fixed effects vt. Note that the treatment dummy 
variable becomes redundant when including bank fixed effects. 
Similarly, the post dummy variable is unnecessary when including time 
fixed effects.71 In all my regressions, I follow the proposal of Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) to use cluster-robust standard errors in 
many-year-data DiD studies. This should help to correct for a possible 
serial correlation pattern. If not otherwise stated, the clustering is at bank 
level.  
To conclude, my regression model appears as follows in formula (VI.2): 
ETAi,t = β0 + ai + vt+ 
β3Post x Treatmenti,t+ ∑ αkDk,i,t
K
k=0 + εi,t  
(VI.2) 
As Wooldridge (2002) states, the DiD estimator has certain advantages 
over other estimators. It corrects for errors caused by changes over time 
                                            
my regression with non-asset based, but income statement based variables to measure 
bank size: the net interest revenue, other operating income and overhead expenses. If I use 
these variables, my results do not change. Because total assets is the more commonly 
known variable for measuring firm size, I therefore continue with this variable in my 
study.  
70  Refer to section V.8.1 for more detailed definitions of and explanations for the sources of 
the used variables. 
71  (Separate) F-tests to check whether the bank or time-fixed effects are jointly significantly 
different from zero fail to reject the null hypothesis, which indicates that it is advisable to 
include these fixed effects (see e.g. Murray, 2006). Further, Hausman (1978) tests 
hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level, indicating that the fixed effects model should be 
preferred to the random effects model (e.g. Baltagi, 2008).   
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for reasons unrelated to the treatment. Furthermore, it also corrects for 
errors resulting from the risk that the treatment group and the control 
group might have systematic, unmeasured differences not caused by the 
treatment. “By comparing the time changes in the means for the 
treatment and control groups, both group-specific and time-specific 
effects are allowed for.” (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 130). Nevertheless, it is 
apparent from the idea of the model that one should use a control group 
that is similar to the treatment group. In other words, the two groups 
should satisfy the parallel trend assumption, meaning that had the 
treatment not taken place, their outcome development should have been 
similar over time. In order to construct an adequate control group, I apply 
the propensity score matching strategy discussed in the next section.  
VI.3.3. Matching Strategy  
The model of propensity score matching, which I use in order to assign 
an adequate control group to the treatment group, was established by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The basis for my matching is the year 
before treatment, that is 2003 (in the robustness checks in section VI.4.2, 
I test possible changes in my results in the case of other base years for 
the matching). The propensity score is the conditional probability for an 
individual to participate in a treatment based on various covariates. 
Untreated individuals are allocated to treated individuals according to 
their calculated propensity scores (i.e. they are matched). In the case of 
simple nearest neighbour matching (refer e.g. to Abadie & Imbens, 
2006), each untreated individual is matched with the treated individual 
that has the most similar propensity score. However, if the propensity 
scores are widely spaced, this approach could result in bad matches. To 
avoid such bad matches, there are various other possibilities for 
performing the matching. The most important of these include calliper 
matching (e.g. Cochran & Rubin, 1973) and kernel-based matching (e.g. 
Heckman, Ichimura & Todd, 1998). The first ensures that untreated 
individuals only match to treated individuals if their propensity scores 
lie within a defined range. The second assigns weights to each untreated 
individual based on how well it matches its corresponding treated 
individual.  
Further, there is the possibility of matching each treated individual to 
just one or to more than one untreated individuals and there is the option 
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to match the same untreated individual to more than one treated 
individuals (which is a matching with replacement; according to Smith 
& Todd, 2005; this method should increase the accuracy of the matching 
strategy).         
As Caliendo and Kopeining (2005) state, any discrete choice model is 
suitable for calculating the propensity scores, especially in the binary 
treatment case in my study. I use a probit72 regression, where the 
dependent variable is a dummy, which is 1 in the case of an EU15 bank 
and 0 otherwise. As the most important explanatory variables of the 
probit regression, I include the lagged capital ratio (L.ETA) and the 
growth of the equity ratio (gETA). This approach should ensure that the 
parallel trend assumption is optimally satisfied. As further explanatory 
variables, I include the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets and the 
dividend dummy discussed above. Further, I follow Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002) and Garrido, Kelley, Paris, Roza, Meier, Morrison and Aldridge 
(2014) to attempt transformations of the explanatory variables in order 
to balance the result. After various attempts, I obtained the most 
appropriate results when including a second-order term for the lagged 
capital ratio, the capital ratio growth rate and the banks’ size variable.73  
Note that the selection of the right covariates is not testable but, 
according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the unconfoundedness 
assumption is key. This states that, conditional on the covariates, the 
assignment to the treatment has to be independent of the outcome. 
Therefore, in section VI.4.2, I test whether my results change when using 
different covariate compositions in my matching strategy. The second 
key assumption explained by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is overlap, 
which means that each observation in the population has to have some 
chance to be in the treatment group or to be in the control group. By 
applying calliper matching in my base set-up, I ensure that I use only 
good matches as control group individuals (for the calliper distance 
measure I take a discretionary value of 0.01). Further, my base set -up 
matches two untreated individuals to each treated individual and I apply 
                                            
72  Different approaches, such as using a logit regression, do not change the results of my 
study.  
73  The results do not change without second-order terms but the matching statistics are much 
better, so it would appear to be more appropriate to include the terms.  
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a matching with replacement. In section VI.4.2, I change these 
specifications in my robustness checks.   
Before that, however, the next section, VI.4.1, starts by giving the results 
of the general model. 
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VI.4. Results  
VI.4.1. Results of the Basic Model 
As noted in section VI.3.1, the data show that from 2001 to 2007 the 
capital ratios of the treated banks developed differently from the ratios 
of the control banks in the original (unmatched) sample. In order to 
examine a possible general treatment effect, I therefore start by 
performing a simple DiD regression for this unmatched sample 
according to formula (VI.2). In the first instance, I did not include any 
control variable Dk,i,t. Column 1 of Table VI.3 shows the result of this 
regression. Coefficient β3, that is, the treatment effect of interest, has a 
positive value of 0.72 and is significant at the 1% level. Without 
considering other influencing factors, this result suggests that the 
treatment had a positive effect on the capital ratios of banks of the 
treatment group in contrast to the control group. Otherwise stated, it 
seems that the announced comprehensive introduction of the Basel II 
framework resulted in banks from early-comprehensive adopter 
countries having higher capital ratios compared to banks from late-
partial adopter countries. On average, these ratios were higher by 
72 basis points.  
However, considering the low within R-squared74 value, it seems that 
this regression is not a fully explanatory model. Column 2 of Table VI.3 
therefore shows the regression with the same data when I include the 
control variables Dk,i,t. The within R-squared value is now considerably 
higher. I still find a significant treatment effect (at the 1% significance 
level). The value of the estimated coefficient β3 is 0.99 and is therefore 
slightly higher than it is without the control variables. 
  
                                            
74 There are various R-squared measures for assessing the goodness-of-fit of a fixed effects 
regression. I use the within R-squared according to the discussion in Wooldridge (2013). 
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Table VI.3: Standard DiD results  
To summarise, there would seem to be a significant treatment effect 
when analysing the unmatched, full sample. However, the discussion in 
section VI.3 raised the question of whether the control group is adequate 
when using this full sample. 
Post x Treatment 0.72 *** 0.99 *** 0.60 ** 0.96 ***
(0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.30)
lnTA -4.91 *** -4.85 ***
(0.77) (0.71)
DIV -0.33 * 0.01
(0.19) (0.13)
LLRGL -0.08 -0.13 *
(0.05) (0.08)
ROAA 0.16 0.26 ***
(0.12) (0.08)
lnGDPC 4.34 *** 3.90 ***
(1.53) (1.24)
GGDP 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.06)
INF 0.12 0.14
(0.11) (0.09)
lnBGDP 1.06 -0.16
(1.23) (1.16)
Constant 9.69 *** -2.16 8.89 *** 12.46
(0.09) (11.33) (0.10) (9.29)
Observations 8 498 8 498 7 644 7 644
Groups 1 214 1 214 1 092 1 092
Within R-squared 0.009 0.184 0.009 0.217
Control Variables No Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Level Bank Bank Bank Bank
standard 
result for 
unmatched 
sample
standard 
result for 
matched 
sample (no 
control 
variables)
standard 
result for 
matched 
sample
Dependent variable: 
ETA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
standard 
result for 
unmatched 
sample (no 
control 
variables)
Results of different regressions of ETA on various independent variables. 
t-values included in parentheses. 
*** shows significance of the calculated coefficient at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 
the 10% level.  
 
The regression variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), Post x Treatment 
(treatment effect of interest), lnTA (log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio 
of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross 
domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF 
(inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank deposits per gross domestic product) and a constant.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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As an analysis of this question, Panel A of Table VI.4 shows the 
differences between the treatment group and the control group in the 
variable averages of the full sample for the year 2003. Panel B of the 
same table shows the pooled averages of the three pre-treatment years 
2001 to 2003. The table also shows the standardised percentage bias 
according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). This bias is the mean 
difference of the treatment group and the control group as a percentage 
of the square root of the average sample variances of these two groups. I 
assume the bank-specific control variables to be of most interest for this 
analysis.75  
The average of the biases of these variables for the year 2003 is quite 
high at 44.5% (the bias is 40.3% for the pooled averages of the years 
2001 to 2003). This result suggests that there are noteworthy differences 
in the characteristics of the treatment group banks compared to the 
control group banks. 
 
 
 
 
[Continued on next page] 
 
                                            
75  The inclusion of country-specific variables in this analysis (and in the matching 
procedures discussed below) seems meaningless, considering that there are just two 
control group countries in the sample. When I nevertheless perform the matching 
procedures including my country-specific variables, only a small treatment group in the 
matched sample results (i.e. the other banks do not match). However, I still obtain a 
positive treatment effect with this approach, which is just slightly not significant at the 
10% level (probably due to the small sample size).  
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Table VI.4: Comparison of variable means for treatment and control group (unmatched 
sample)  
Because of this concern, I perform the matching approach discussed 
above before applying the DiD regression again. The basis matching 
strategy according to section VI.3.3 results in a treatment group of 364 
banks. That is, I lose only 37 banks because there was no adequate match 
for these banks. The corresponding control group is 728 banks (since 
there are two control banks per treatment bank), therefore the total 
Comparison of variable means for treatment and control group before matching procedures.  
 
The variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), gETA (growth rate of ETA), lnTA 
(log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross domestic product per capita 
in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF (inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank 
deposits per gross domestic product). 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Panel A - only year 2003
N Mean N Mean
ETA 401      9.80     813      10.34   -0.54            -5.2              
gETA 401      3.45     813      2.04     1.41             6.0               
lnTA 401      9.18     813      7.33     1.84             97.5             
DIV 401      0.36     813      0.82     -0.46            -105.7          
LLRGL 401      2.17     813      1.38     0.78             38.3             
ROAA 401      0.94     813      1.16     -0.22            -14.1            
lnGDPC 401      10.27   813      10.56   -0.29            -98.3            
GGDP 401      1.10     813      2.87     -1.77            -149.9          
INF 401      2.24     813      2.26     -0.02            -4.0              
lnBGDP 401      4.31     813      4.20     0.10             48.3             
Average bias of the bank specific variables 44.5             
Panel B - years 2001 to 2003
N Mean N Mean
ETA 1'203   9.68     2'439   10.08   -0.40            -3.9              
gETA 1'203   3.98     2'439   4.13     -0.15            -0.6              
lnTA 1'203   8.94     2'439   7.24     1.70             89.9             
DIV 1'203   0.36     2'439   0.81     -0.45            -102.7          
LLRGL 1'203   2.17     2'439   1.36     0.81             28.6             
ROAA 1'203   0.73     2'439   1.11     -0.38            -16.0            
lnGDPC 1'203   10.10   2'439   10.52   -0.42            -134.8          
GGDP 1'203   1.59     2'439   1.92     -0.33            -26.8            
INF 1'203   2.47     2'439   2.21     0.26             36.0             
lnBGDP 1'203   4.29     2'439   4.20     0.09             41.4             
Average bias of the bank specific variables 40.3             
Delta 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Bias in % 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Control group 
(unmatched)
Treatment 
group
Treated Control Group 
(unmatched)
Delta 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Bias in % 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
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number of banks is 1 092 and the total number of observations for the 
seven years is 7 644. Panel A of Table VI.5 reveals the results of the 
basis matching strategy, showing that the bias of the variables of concern 
significantly decreases after matching – the average bias of these 
variables is now 10.2%, compared to 44.5% without matching. Similarly, 
the pooled average bias for the pre-treatment years 2001 to 2003 drops 
from 40.3% to 9.8%. Therefore, the basis matching strategy seems to 
lead to a considerable reduction in the characteristic differences of the 
banks in the pre-treatment period, even if the matching itself is based 
only on the year 2003.76 
Columns 3 to 4 of Table VI.3 show the result of the DiD regression on 
the matched sample. The regression without control variables visible in 
column 3 of this table still show a positive estimated coefficient β3 of 
0.99 (the significance is at the 1% level). Including control variables and 
therefore allowing for possible bank- or country-specific factors does not 
change this result: The estimated treatment effect remains at 
approximately the same amount (0.96) and at the same significance level 
of 1% (see column 4 of Table VI.3). 
As an interim conclusion, the results in Table VI.3 indicate that there is 
a significant positive effect of the announced comprehensive 
introduction of Basel II on the capital ratios of banks – the effect is a 
capital ratio increase in the amount of approximately 100 basis points. 
This finding suggests that the introduction of new extensive bank 
regulations could in fact have the intended increase in the bank’s capital 
buffers. 
Note that, even though I do not consider the results of the control 
variables as the primary focus of my study, there are also interesting 
outputs for these. These findings are basically in line with the other 
studies discussed in section VI.2. I find very strong evidence that bigger 
banks have lower capital ratios than smaller banks (this finding is valid 
for every regression and every robustness check performed).  
                                            
76  However, I also apply a matching strategy based on the complete pre-treatment period 
2001 to 2003 in the robustness checks in section VI.4.2.  
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Table VI.5: Comparison of variable means for treatment and control group (matched 
sample)  
Comparison of variable means for treatment and control group after matching procedures.  
 
The variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), gETA (growth rate of ETA), lnTA 
(log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross 
loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross domestic product per capita 
in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF (inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank 
deposits per gross domestic product). 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Panel A - only year 2003
N Mean N Mean
ETA  364 9.30      728 9.39     -0.09            -0.9              -82.9                      
gETA  364 3.32      728 2.95     0.37             1.6               -74.1                      
lnTA  364 9.23      728 9.15     0.08             4.3               -95.6                      
DIV  364 0.39      728 0.38     0.02             3.8               -103.6                    
LLRGL  364 2.24      728 1.22     1.03             50.1             30.9                       
ROAA  364 0.91      728 0.91     -0.01            -0.4              -96.9                      
lnGDPC  364 10.27    728 10.44   -0.17            -57.4            -41.6                      
GGDP  364 1.07      728 3.11     -2.05            -173.6          15.8                       
INF  364 2.23      728 2.22     0.01             2.1               -152.7                    
lnBGDP  364 4.31      728 4.19     0.12             55.3             14.5                       
10.2             -77.1                      
Panel B - years 2001 to 2003
N Mean N Mean
ETA 1 092 9.18     2 184 9.16     0.03             0.3               -107.0                    
gETA 1 092 4.23     2 184 5.42     -1.19            -4.4              685.6                     
lnTA 1 092 8.99     2 184 9.06     -0.06            -3.4              -103.7                    
DIV 1 092 0.39     2 184 0.40     -0.01            -3.2              -96.9                      
LLRGL 1 092 2.24     2 184 1.17     1.07             37.8             32.2                       
ROAA 1 092 0.68     2 184 0.90     -0.22            -9.4              -41.2                      
lnGDPC 1 092 10.11   2 184 10.41   -0.30            -95.6            -29.1                      
GGDP 1 092 1.57     2 184 2.17     -0.59            -48.0            79.3                       
INF 1 092 2.47     2 184 2.15     0.32             44.2             22.8                       
lnBGDP 1 092 4.29     2 184 4.18     0.11             49.1             18.7                       
9.8               -75.8                      
Average bias and reduction respectively of the 
bank specific variables
Average bias and reduction respectively of the 
bank specific variables
Treatment 
group
Control group 
(matched)
Delta 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Bias in % 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Bias reduction 
in % (unmatched 
vs. matched 
control group)
Treatment 
group
Control group 
(matched)
Bias reduction 
in % (unmatched 
vs. matched 
control group)
Bias in % 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
Delta 
(treatment 
vs. control 
group)
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There is also strong support for the finding that the ratio increases with 
the profitability of a bank and the economic health of its environment 
(i.e. not all, but most regressions confirm these results). Further, I find 
some evidence that the banks’ ratios decrease as the banks’ riskiness 
increases. For a few regressions only I find that dividend payers seem to 
have lower capital ratios, that the capital ratios appear to be lower in the 
case of higher growth rates of the gross domestic product and that the 
ratios seem to be higher in the case of higher inflation rates and the 
greater importance of the banking sector in a country. 
In order to ensure that different specifications of the set-up do not change 
the result of the base set-up, I perform a couple of robustness checks. I 
explain these checks and their output in the next section, section VI.4.2.  
VI.4.2. Robustness Checks 
Table VI.6 and Table VI.7 report the results of the various robustness 
checks.  
First, I perform the standard regression with clustering of the standard 
errors on country level instead of firm level. As column 1 of Table VI.6 
shows, the treatment effect remains at the same amount, while the 
significance level drops slightly to 5%.  
The next two robustness checks deal with the treatment date. In the base 
set-up, I consider that the treatment took place in 2004, the year in which 
the Basel II framework was published, as noted in section VI.2. 
However, at that time the EU had not yet released its official 
implementation plan – this happened in 2006. My argument for defining 
the year 2004 as the treatment date is that EU banks had probably already 
started implementing the Basel II rules at the date of the publication of 
the rules and not at the date of the announcement of the detailed 
implementation plan. Nevertheless, I also perform the DiD regression 
with treatment date 2006 (in this case I do not consider the years 2004 
and 2005 to prevent a possible announcement bias). I therefore have only 
five observation years (three pre-treatment years from 2001 to 2003 and 
two post-treatment years from 2006 to 2007) for this regression, which 
decreases the population to 5 460 observations. Column 2 of Table VI.6 
reveals that there is still a significant treatment effect (at the 1% level); 
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Results of different regressions of ETA on various independent variables.  
t-values included in parentheses. 
*** shows significance of the calculated coefficient at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 
the 10% level.  
 
The regression variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), Post x Treatment 
(treatment effect of interest), lnTA (log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio 
of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross 
domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF 
(inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank deposits per gross domestic product), Post (post treatment 
dummy) and a constant.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
the estimated effect of 1.41 is even higher than in the base set-up. Thus, 
it does not matter if I consider the treatment date to be 2004 or 2006.  
 
Table VI.6: Robustness checks (part 1)  
  
Post x Treatment 0.96 ** 1.41 *** 0.16 0.74 ** 0.60 ** 1.90 ***
(0.39) (0.46) (0.24) (0.32) (0.28) (0.66)
lnTA -4.85 *** -4.82 *** -4.88 *** -10.31 *** -4.26 ***
(0.98) (0.71) (0.71) (0.79) (0.90)
DIV 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.24 0.06
(0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25)
LLRGL -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 * -0.37 *** -0.12
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09)
ROAA 0.26 ** 0.28 *** 0.26 *** 0.41 *** 0.28 *
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.17)
lnGDPC 3.90 ** 3.28 *** 5.38 *** 4.63 *** 0.31
(1.39) (1.20) (1.33) (1.13) (2.89)
GGDP 0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.17 ** -0.40 *
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.23)
INF 0.14 0.28 ** -0.06 -0.14 0.57 **
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.27)
lnBGDP -0.16 0.30 0.64 0.66 2.91
(1.89) (1.51) (1.10) (1.31) (2.69)
Post -0.30 *** 1.05 ***
(0.11) (0.38)
Constant 12.46 0.00 *** -5.36 50.66 *** 9.17 *** 31.59 *
(10.13) (0.00) (9.22) (9.59) (0.06) (18.45)
Observations 7 644 5 460 7 644 6 699 7 644 2 184
Groups 1 092 1 092 1 092  957 1 092 1 092
Within R-squared 0.217 0.224 0.215 0.462 0.006 0.200
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Cluster Level Country Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
(6)
clustering 
at country 
level
treatment 
date 2006
treatment 
date 2002
not 
considering 
big US-banks
two periods 
model with 
pooled 
years (no 
control 
variables)
two periods 
model with 
pooled years
Dependent variable: 
ETA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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On the other hand, I also perform a regression where I consider the 
treatment date to be 2002 – that is, clearly before the announcement of 
Basel II. Such a regression, in which one would not expect to obtain a 
significant treatment effect, is known as a placebo test. It is one of the 
highly recommended tests when performing DiD studies (refer e.g. to 
Angrist & Krueger, 1999). Column 3 of Table VI.6 reveals that the 
treatment effect coefficient loses its significance in this regression, 
which is the expected outcome. This observation strengthens the result 
of a positive and significant treatment effect in the regressions with the 
correct treatment date. 
As a further robustness check, I consider that the USA first 
communicated the quick application of the Basel II rules at least for their 
big banks, when the framework was announced in 2004 (refer to the 
discussion in section VI.2). This means that one could expect these banks 
to show a similar reaction to the announcement as European banks; an 
effect, which might bias my basis results. Therefore, I also perform a 
calculation that excludes US banks with total assets higher than  
USD 25 billion (which was the definition of a big bank according to the 
implementation idea in the USA). The result is again a positive 
coefficient of 0.74, significant at the 5% level (see column 4 of  
Table VI.6). I therefore conclude that the fact that the original US 
approach planned to treat small to medium-sized banks differently from 
big banks does not affect my outcome.77 
The next robustness check deals with possible serial correlation pattern. 
As already noted above, Bertrand et al. (2006) have concerns about such 
a pattern in cases in which a DiD regression includes more than two 
periods. One of their proposed strategies for addressing these concerns 
is the use of cluster-robust standard errors, as I do in my regressions. 
Another possibility is to pool the pre- and the post-treatment years in the 
regression. This involves taking the averages of the variables for the 
years 2001 to 2003 to obtain just one pre-treatment “year” and the 
averages of the variables for the years 2004 to 2007 to obtain just one 
post-treatment “year”. Since there are only two years in this regression, 
it is not necessary to include time-fixed effects, just a dummy “Post” for 
                                            
77  Note that it does also not matter whether or not I exclude big non-US banks from the 
calculation. As a general principle, outliers do not bias my results: There are no changes 
in the outcome if I winsorise all variables e.g. at the 2% level.  
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the post-treatment period. Columns 5 and 6 of Table VI.6 show the 
results of this regression; the first without control variables and the 
second with control variables included. Again, I find a positive treatment 
effect (0.60; significant at 5% and 1.90 respectively; significant at 1%). 
Therefore, it does not seem that serious serial correlation issues affect 
my results.  
The next couple of robustness tests cover different matching approaches. 
First, I check the outcome of my regression when I use calliper distance 
measures other than 0.01 in the matching strategy. Column 1 of  
Table VI.7 reveals the results when I apply no calliper matching at all. 
This means that for every treated bank there is a matched control bank, 
even if the match is not good. Accordingly, the number of observations 
increases (from a total of 7 644 to a total of 8 421) at the cost of a 
possibly less appropriate matching result (i.e. the decrease of the 
standardised percentage bias, according to Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, 
is lower than for the calliper matching). The DiD-regression based on 
this matching strategy still shows a positive treatment effect of 0.96 
(significant at the 1% level). The result of the opposite, that is, an 
unreasonably strict distance measure, appears in column 2 of Table VI.7. 
The calliper distance measure in this case is only 0.001, decreasing the 
total observations to only 4 368 (193 treated banks could not be matched 
with an appropriate control bank and therefore drop out, which means 
that only 208 treated banks and 416 corresponding control group banks 
enter the regression). Nevertheless, in this case I also find a positive 
treatment effect of 0.98, significant at the 5% level.  
A further possibility for ensuring that the results are based on good 
matches is to ignore banks with propensity scores close to zero and close 
to unity (because untreated observations often show a distribution close 
to zero and treated observations close to unity, which might question the 
assumption that there is common support in the matching results). If I 
drop banks with propensity scores below 0.1 and above 0.9, I obtain a 
treatment effect of 0.79 (significant at the 1% level) in my DiD 
regression (refer to column 3 of Table VI.7). 
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Table VI.7: Robustness checks (part 2)  
Next, I perform a matching with kernel-based weighting instead of 
nearest neighbour matching. Note that in this case, every treatment bank 
and every control bank enters the matching; the former each have a 
weight of 1 and the latter have individual weights according to the quality 
of their ability to be used as a match. This matching method results in a 
Results of different regressions of ETA on various independent variables. 
t-values included in parentheses. 
*** shows significance of the calculated coefficient at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 
the 10% level.  
 
The regression variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), Post x Treatment 
(treatment effect of interest), lnTA (log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio 
of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross 
domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF 
(inflation), lnBGDP (log of bank deposits per gross domestic product) and a constant.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Post x Treatment 0.96 *** 0.98 ** 0.79 *** 0.99 *** 1.05 *** 0.90 *** 0.57 ** 0.74 **
(0.29) (0.45) (0.23) (0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29)
lnTA -4.81 *** -5.04 *** -4.42 *** -4.91 *** -5.43 *** -5.21 *** -5.57 *** -5.60 ***
(0.68) (1.01) (0.63) (0.77) (0.88) (0.74) (0.69) (0.67)
DIV -0.06 0.04 0.16 -0.33 * -0.14 -0.08 -0.49 ** 0.15
(0.15) (0.20) (0.11) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.16)
LLRGL -0.13 * -0.13 -0.11 * -0.08 -0.09 -0.19 ** -0.24 ** -0.49 ***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06)
ROAA 0.26 *** 0.40 *** 0.24 ** 0.16 0.26 *** 0.41 *** 0.27 *** -0.09 *
(0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0.05)
lnGDPC 4.03 *** 4.05 ** 3.56 *** 4.34 *** 4.19 *** -0.23 -0.10 -0.06
(1.20) (1.62) (1.15) (1.53) (1.52) (1.24) (1.02) (0.71)
GGDP 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.15 ** 0.08 -0.05
(0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
INF 0.10 0.22 * 0.08 0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.03 0.00
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
lnBGDP 0.22 -0.04 0.40 1.06 0.45 1.50 2.23 * -0.09
(1.10) (1.89) (1.07) (1.23) (1.23) (1.18) (1.16) (1.20)
Constant 9.30 11.71 9.91 -2.16 12.10 50.94 *** 50.28 *** 59.77 ***
(9.07) (11.99) (8.65) (11.33) (10.80) (9.69) (10.41) (8.26)
Observations 8 421 4 368 8 071 8 498 5 096 7 602 7 938 7 623
Groups 1 203  624 1 153 1 214  728 1 086 1 134 1 089
Within R-squared 0.207 0.246 0.213 0.184 0.253 0.227 0.214 0.287
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
(7)
matching 
performed 
with pooled 
years
(8)
matching 
performed 
with further 
covariates 
and pooled 
years
(4)
matching 
with kernel-
based 
weighting
(5)
one to one 
matching
(6)
matching 
performed 
with further 
covariates
Dependent variable: 
ETA matching 
without 
caliper 
distance
(1) (2)
matching 
with stricter 
caliper 
distance
(3)
prospensity 
scores <0.1 
and >0.9 
dropped
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treatment group of 401 banks and a control group of 813 banks; that is, 
a total of 1 214 banks or 8 498 observations enter the DiD regression. 
Again, the results of this DiD regression show a significant treatment 
effect of 0.99 (at the 1% level; see column 4 of Table VI.7).  
In the last robustness check related to the matching method, I perform 
one-to-one matching (i.e. a treatment bank matches with one control 
bank only).78 Accordingly, the number of control banks drops to 364 
(which is the same as the number of treated banks) and the number of 
observations to 5 096. The resulting treatment effect is 1.05 and 
significant at the 1% level (see column 5 of Table VI.7).  
To conclude, I assume that my results are not sensitive to changes in the 
matching method. A further arguable point might be the choice of the 
covariates in the matching strategy. My first alternative strategy in this 
context is the inclusion of further covariates, that is, the other bank-
specific variables used in my study. This strategy leads to a marginally 
lower number of observations of 7 602. This does not substantially 
change the matching output (however, the matching statistics are slightly 
worse than in the base strategy) and does therefore also not influence the 
subsequent DiD regression – the result is a significant treatment effect 
of 0.90 (significant at the 1% level; refer to column 6 of Table VI.7 for 
details).  
An additional alternative strategy is to base the matching not only on the 
year before treatment; column 7 of Table VI.7 shows the regression 
results I obtain when I perform a “pooled” matching for the years 2001 
to 2003 with the original matching covariates. That is, the matching is 
not only based on the covariates for year 2003, but also takes into 
consideration their values for 2001 and 2002. The total number of 
observations in this case is 7 938. The resulting treatment effect is 0.57, 
significant at the 5% level.  
Column 8 of Table VI.7 reveals the results of the same pooled matching 
strategy that also includes the additional covariates as in the preceding 
                                            
78  Note that the opposite is also possible, e.g. the matching of three (or even more) control 
banks for every treatment bank. In this case the results regarding the treatment effect do 
not change either. However, considering that in the original population there are only 813 
control banks and 401 treatment banks (the ratio of control banks to treatment banks is 
only slightly above 2), this approach does not seem to make sense.   
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passage. That is, this strategy includes all the possible information in my 
dataset to perform good matches, which results in 363 treated banks to 
be considered and a total number of 7 623 observations. Interestingly, 
the matching statistics remain quite good, despite the fact that many 
covariates have to be matched: The average standardised percentage bias 
of the variables of interest for the years 2001 to 2003 drops to 4.3% after 
matching (table not displayed) – which is even better than the average 
bias of 9.8% in the original model. But in the original model the bias for 
the lagged capital ratio and for the capital ratio growth is lower (i.e. 
better), which in my opinion is more important than a slightly better 
average bias. However, it does not matter which strategy is chosen 
because I find a significant treatment effect of 0.74 (significant at the 5% 
level) in the full matching model as well.   
To conclude, my results seem to be robust regarding various 
specifications of the matching strategy or the regression model. 79 That 
is, banks from European countries show significantly higher capital 
ratios than banks from the control group after the treatment date of 2004. 
However, even though the announcement of the Basel II introduction in 
2004 might be an explaining factor, there is another possible occurrence 
that could be considered as “treatment” instead of the Basel II subject  – 
the change in bank reporting standards during this time. The next section, 
VI.4.3, examines this topic in more detail.  
VI.4.3. Changed Regulation versus Changed Reporting Standards? 
It is worth noting that it was during my observation horizon that the 
application of the IFRS became mandatory in 2005 for publicly traded 
EU banks (Regulation [EC] 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council). Before the use of IFRS, many of the local reporting 
standards applied by Continental European banks stipulated the cost 
principle (refer e.g. to Costa & Guzzo, 2013). This is in contrast to the 
fair value principle imposed by IFRS. Therefore, a change in the 
reporting standards might also have had an effect on the capital ratios of 
banks: different measurement methods might have resulted in changes in 
the banks’ accounting book values, which in turn might have led to 
                                            
79  Note that I also performed various combinations of the robustness checks and did not find 
any substantial changes in my results.  
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changes in the capital ratios. This raises the question of whether my 
identified treatment effect was caused by the change in bank regulation 
or by the change in reporting standards. To answer this question, this 
section reveals a couple of additional robustness checks.  
First, I only include the year 2004 in my post-treatment period, since the 
mandatory application of IFRS did not occur before 2005. In this case, I 
still find a significant treatment effect of 1.12 (refer to column 1 of Table 
VI.8), which indicates that the announced introduction of Basel II led to 
an increase in the capital ratios.  
However, one may argue that banks could also have introduced IFRS 
before it became mandatory in 2005. In the next test, I therefore 
completely exclude all banks that experienced a change in their reporting 
standards in any of the years of my observation horizon. This approach 
should eliminate any possible bias resulting from the reporting standard 
change. Column 2 of Table VI.8 shows the results of this change when I 
exclude the affected banks after the matching procedures from section 
VI.4.1. In this case, I still obtain a significant treatment effect of 1.09 
(significant at the 1% level). Having eliminated the possible reporting 
standard change bias, this result means that the announced introduction 
of Basel II for early-comprehensive adopters did indeed lead to a 
treatment effect. 
But if I exclude affected banks before performing the matching 
procedures, the result changes: There is still a treatment effect, but it is 
no longer significant at the 10% level (refer to column 3 of Table VI.8).80 
That is, banks with an early-comprehensive announced introduction of 
Basel II no longer show any significant difference in their capital ratios 
compared to late-partial adopters after 2004. In other words, the 
significant treatment effect from earlier regressions might have been 
partially caused by the reporting standard change and not (only) the Basel 
II introduction.  
 
                                            
80  Note that this result is robust with respect to the matching robustness checks described in 
section VI.4.2.  
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Table VI.8: Robustness checks (part 3)  
Although the relatively small population could cause the loss of 
significance (there are only 1 617 observations), the treatment effect 
nevertheless remains insignificant (even if just slightly) if I use the full 
possible sample; that is, if I perform the procedures on all banks with no 
Results of different regressions of ETA on various independent variables. 
t-values included in parentheses. 
*** shows significance of the calculated coefficient at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 
the 10% level.  
 
The regression variables are: ETA (ratio total equity to total assets), Post x Treatment 
(treatment effect of interest; the treatment is the announced comprehensive introduction of 
Basel II in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4); it is the change in reporting standards in columns (5), 
(6) and (7)), lnTA (log of total assets), DIV (dividend dummy), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average assets), lnGDPC (log of gross domestic 
product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), INF (inflation), 
lnBGDP (log of bank deposits per gross domestic product) and a constant.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Post x Treatment 1.12 *** 1.09 ** 0.16 0.68 0.20 -1.02 * 0.66 * -0.85
(0.29) (0.46) (0.49) (0.44) (0.53) (0.52) (0.36) (1.60)
lnTA -4.64 *** -4.83 *** -5.92 *** -4.95 *** -6.17 *** -6.86 *** -4.13 *** -7.11 ***
(1.00) (0.82) (1.17) (0.91) (1.12) (1.18) (0.54) (1.11)
DIV 0.29 * 0.15 -0.44 -0.29 -1.14 *** -0.45 * -0.53 *** -0.13
(0.15) (0.17) (0.31) (0.35) (0.39) (0.24) (0.15) (0.34)
LLRGL -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09)
ROAA 0.08 0.26 * 0.20 *** 0.13 0.27 0.23 *** 0.82 *** 0.12
(0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.16) (0.07) (0.18) (0.24)
lnGDPC 3.96 ** 3.81 ** 4.62 * -2.56 0.65 6.71 * 7.56 *** 3.03
(1.98) (1.69) (2.76) (4.77) (6.99) (3.77) (2.81) (2.81)
GGDP -1.71 -0.21 * -0.06 5.38 ** -0.30 ** -0.15 -0.12 ** -0.33
(3.68) (0.11) (0.09) (2.44) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.27)
INF 0.08 0.26 ** 0.16 -0.13 0.28 0.23 * 0.04 -0.23
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.11) (0.22)
lnBGDP 0.03 -5.42 -0.08 0.32 6.47 ** 1.11 n/a n/a
(0.10) (4.24) (3.87) (0.23) (2.47) (1.48)
Constant 16.53 33.79 9.21 -0.98 25.22 -2.58 -30.73 40.74
(17.86) (22.36) (31.91) (29.34) (61.27) (32.47) (27.81) (28.21)
Observations 4 368 4 928 1 617 5 866 1 470 2 807 7 833 2'331
Groups 1 092  704  231  838  210  401 1 119 333
Within R-squared 0.164 0.240 0.321 0.190 0.291 0.305 0.291 0.224
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Level Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Dependent variable: 
ETA
(1)
only 2004 
as post 
treatment 
date
(2) (3)
excluding 
banks with 
changed 
reporting 
standards 
after 
matching
excluding 
banks with 
changed 
reporting 
standards 
before 
matching
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
excluding 
banks with 
changed 
reporting 
standards 
without 
matching
Matched 
Continental 
Europe 
banks with 
and without 
reporting 
standards 
change
Unmatched 
Continental 
Europe 
banks with 
and without 
reporting 
standards 
change
Continental 
Europe 
banks 
versus 
matched UK 
banks
UK banks 
versus 
matched 
control 
banks
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reporting standard changes but without limiting them by doing matching 
procedures (refer to column 4 of Table VI.8). Thus, the preliminary 
conclusion is that there is in fact some evidence that the treatment effect 
might somehow be influenced by changed reporting standards. 
Column 5 of Table VI.8 shows the results of a further check related to 
this objection. In this DiD regression I use only European banks. The 
treatment variable is not the introduction of Basel II (since all European 
banks underwent this introduction) but the change in reporting standards. 
This means that the treatment group consists of all banks that did not 
change their reporting standards during the observation horizon and the 
control group consists of the banks that did.81 If the change in reporting 
standards was the primary influence on the capital ratios of banks, there 
should be a measurable treatment effect. But, as the results show, the 
effect is not significant; that is, a change in reporting standards does not 
reveal any significant effect on the capital ratios. However, the 
population is relatively small again. Performing the same procedure on 
an unmatched and therefore bigger sample reveals a significant treatment 
effect (at the 10% level – refer to column 6 of Table VI.8). This is the 
suspected result, namely, (European) banks with a change in the 
reporting standards had significant higher capital ratios after the 
treatment than banks without a change.  
The next test is similar to the one above, but this time I introduce banks 
from Great Britain into the analysis. As stated in section V.3.1, I initially 
dropped these banks because data for the variable lnBGDP was not 
available for all years. Note that if I drop the variable and include Great 
Britain banks instead, my general result does not change. That is, I still 
obtain a significant treatment effect for European banks including Great 
Britain compared to the control group banks.  However, comparing Great 
Britain banks with Continental European banks might be of additional 
interest: both groups experienced the announced comprehensive 
introduction of Basel II in 2004. In contrast to Continental Europe, 
however, Great Britain already knew the use of fair value accounting 
before the introduction of IFRS (Cairns, Massoudi, Taplin & Tarca, 
                                            
81  Since it has more banks that changed their reporting standards than banks that did not, I 
define the latter as the treatment group. The reason is that is makes more sense for the 
matching procedures if the treatment group is smaller than the control group. However, 
taking the inverse approach does not change the result.   
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2011). Therefore, one could expect that the introduction of IFRS had no 
effect on the accounting book values and capital ratios of British banks 
– in contrast to Continental European banks, for which the change from 
cost-based to fair-value accounting might have resulted in a change in 
the accounting book values and capital ratios. That is, if the change of 
capital ratios is only due to Basel II, I should not obtain a treatment effect 
when comparing these two groups. If I obtain such an effect, it could be 
caused by the presence of changed financial reporting standards instead 
of the Basel II introduction. Column 7 of Table VI.8 shows that this is 
indeed the case: There is a treatment effect of 0.66, which is significant 
at the 5% level.82 Taking into account the above considerations, this 
result is an additional indicator that the treatment effect was not (only) 
caused by changes in regulation, but also by changes in the accounting 
standards. 
As a last test in this context, I include only Great Britain banks in the 
treatment group and compare them with the control banks. Both groups 
already knew the use of fair value accounting before the introduction of 
IFRS, but only Great Britain banks faced the announced comprehensive 
introduction of Basel II. The possible bias of a change from cost-based 
to fair-value accounting should therefore be eliminated in this check and 
one might interpret a significant treatment effect as the result of the 
introduction of Basel II. But, as column 8 of Table VI.8 shows, the 
treatment effect is not significant. This result could be caused by the 
relatively small number of observations (there are only 333 groups and 
2 331 observations).83 However, it is a further evidence for the 
conclusion that the introduction of Basel II was not the only reason for 
the changes of the capital ratios. 
Based on these findings, the next section, VI.5, summarises my results 
and its implications and discusses possibilities for further work. 
                                            
82  Note that it does not matter whether I perform this test on a matched or on an unmatched 
sample.  
83  The treatment effect remains insignificant, regardless of whether I perform this test on a 
matched or unmatched sample or whether I specifically exclude or include banks with 
changed reporting standards. The only thing that changes is that some of the control 
variables such as LLRG, ROAA, LnGDPC and GGDP becomes significant (they are also 
significant in most of the other regression, but in column 8 of Table VI.8 only lnTA is 
significant).  
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VI.5. Conclusion and Outlook 
The bank regulation framework Basel II, which was published in 2004, 
aimed to strengthen the banking system around the world. However, 
already at the time of publication, critical votes erupted and it became 
apparent that not all important countries planned to introduce the new 
rules at the speed and the magnitude stipulated by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.  
On the one hand, there was the (Continental) European camp, which 
supported a quick and comprehensive introduction of the new rules, 
while on the other hand there was the camp dominated by the US and 
China, which postponed the introduction or aimed for a less extensive 
approach. One of the most intensively discussed questions was, among 
others, whether the new rules would change the capital ratios of banks 
(the originators of the framework had intended an increase in the ratios).   
Motivated by these debates and these open questions, in this work I 
attempt to ascertain whether there is a measurable change in the capital 
ratios that was caused by the new framework. Accordingly, I perform a 
DiD approach by comparing early-comprehensive introducers (the 
treatment group) of Basel II with late-partial adopters (the control 
group), using 2004 (the publication year of the new rules) as the 
treatment date. In order to ensure that the various characteristics of 
treatment group banks and control group banks do not bias my results, I 
extend my study by applying a matching strategy before applying the 
DiD regressions. This results in only comparable banks entering the 
analysis. The matching strategy is based on several covariates. Further, 
in order to ensure that the DiD analysis as such is not biased by other 
factors, I also include other possible explanatory control variables in the 
regressions.  
The results regarding these control variables are comparable to other 
work performed on the subject of banks’ capital ratios: I find very strong 
evidence that bigger banks have lower capital ratios than smaller banks. 
There is also strong support for the finding that the ratio increases with 
a bank’s profitability and the economic health of its environment. 
Further, I find some evidence that banks’ ratios decrease as the banks’ 
riskiness increases. For a few regressions only, I find that dividend 
payers seem to have lower capital ratios, that capital ratios appears to be 
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lower in the case of higher growth rates of the gross domestic product 
and that ratios seem to be higher in the case of higher inflation rates and 
the greater importance of the banking sector in a country.  
However, as this was not my primary investigation focus, the results 
regarding the treatment effect are of far more interest for my study. I find 
evidence of such an effect in the amount of roughly 100 basis points. 
This result is highly robust in terms of variations in both the matching 
strategy and the DiD strategy, both regarding the effect size and its 
significance. That is, it seems that the announced comprehensive 
introduction of Basel II in 2004 led the affected banks to hold higher 
capital ratios in this amount compared to banks from countries with no 
introduction. However, it turns out that the regulation change is not 
necessarily the only factor that led to the treatment effect. There is 
evidence that simultaneous changes in bank reporting standards – mainly 
from cost-based local regulatory standards to fair-value-based IFRS – led 
to higher capital ratios as well. In other words, book values changed and 
therefore the capital ratios went up because of a change in the 
measurement method. The “real” effect might have been much smaller 
than it appears at first, although the evidence regarding the reporting 
standards change is not entirely robust. Considering the results of other 
studies relating to the influence of the regulation, it is nevertheless 
apparent that the introduction of Basel II had at best only a partial 
positive effect on the capital ratios of banks.  
This result is of interest with regard to future changes in bank regulation, 
especially the introduction of Basel III, which was announced in 2010 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). The increase in 
capital ratios alone does not necessarily mean that banks or the banking 
system have become more stable with the introduction of Basel II. It may 
be that capital ratios are not directly linked to the stability of the system; 
or that increased capital ratios are merely the result of changes in the 
reporting standards and not the banks’ risk-absorbing ability; or that the 
capital ratios should in any case be disproportionately higher than 
required by the framework (refer e.g. to Admati & Hellwig, 2013). 
Whatever the case, the financial crisis that occurred after my observation 
horizon revealed that several banks ran into existential problems despite 
the application of the Basel II rules. Accordingly, a topic for further 
research could be whether the introduction of Basel III or other future 
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framework developments have a positive effect on the capital ratios of 
banks; future crises will show whether this effect has the power to 
prevent such problems from occurring in the banking sector in the future. 
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VI.7. Appendices 
VI.7.1. Detailed Explanations of Variables 
Name of variable Explanation Source 
Treatment A dummy variable, which takes the value 
1, if bank is part of the treatment group 
(i.e. in the standard regression: if it is an 
EU15 bank), 0 otherwise.   
Own calculation.  
Post A dummy variable, which takes the value 
1, if the time period t of the observation 
is after the treatment date 2004, 0 
otherwise. 
Own calculation.  
Post x Treatment A dummy variable, which takes the value 
1, if the observation is one from a 
treatment group bank after the treatment 
date, 0 otherwise. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable shows the 
treatment effect of interest.  
Own calculation. 
Equity-to-assets 
ratio (ETA) 
The ratio of total equity to total assets.  Own calculation 
based on data 
from 
Bankscope84. 
Lagged equity-to-
assets ratio 
(L.ETA) 
The previous year figure of the above 
variable.  
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope 
                                            
84  Observations in Bankscope that only contained the value N (i.e. no value) for “common 
positions” were eliminated if they could not be manually calculated from other available 
positions. Common positions are those that are expected for every bank (such as total 
assets). Non-common variables (such as e.g. loan loss reserves, i.e. positions that could 
have no value because the bank does not have any) were considered with value 0.  
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
Growth rate of the 
equity-to-assets 
ratio (gETA) 
The growth rate of the ETA-ratio 
calculated as shown in formula (VI.3):  
(
ETA
L. ETA
− 1) x 100 (VI.3) 
 
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope 
Log of total assets 
(LTA) 
Natural logarithm of the sum of all assets 
of a bank. The variable is a measure for 
the size of the bank. 
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Dividend dummy 
(DIV) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in cases 
where the bank has paid out a dividend in 
the specific year and 0 otherwise.  
Own calculation 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross 
loans (LLRGL) 
The ratio of the part of the loans for which 
the bank expects losses (but does not 
charge off) to the total loan portfolio. The 
variable is a proxy for the bank’s (credit) 
risk; the higher the value, the higher a 
bank’s risk.  
Bankscope. 
Return on average 
assets (ROAA) 
This is the ratio of the net income to the 
total assets (calculated as an average of 
the previous and the current year-end) of 
a bank and measures the bank’s 
profitability.  
Bankscope. 
Log of gross 
domestic product 
per capita in USD 
(lnGDPC) 
Natural logarithm of the gross domestic 
product per capita in USD. The variable 
is a measure of the health of a country’s 
economy in a specific year. 
Own calculation 
based on data 
from world 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
Annual gross 
domestic product 
growth (GGDP) 
Explained by the variable’s name. As 
above, the variable is a measure of the 
health of a country’s economy in a 
specific year. 
World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Inflation (INF) Explained by the variable’s name. The 
variable measures the influence of the 
price level on the capital ratios. 
World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Log of bank 
deposits per GDP 
(lnBGDP) 
Natural logarithm of the demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks as a share of GDP. This variable 
measures the importance of the banking 
system relative to the economy of the 
country in a specific year. 
Own calculation 
based on data 
from the financial 
development and 
structure dataset 
(as explained in 
Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt & Levine, 
2000) 
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VI.7.2. Table of 
Abbreviations 
AUT Austria 
BCBS Basler Committee on 
Banking Supervision 
BEL Belgium 
CHN China – People’s Rep. 
DEU Germany 
DiD Difference-in-
difference 
DNK Denmark 
EC European Commission 
eds. Editors 
e.g. Exempli gratia (for 
example) 
ESP Spain 
et al. Et alii (and others) 
EU European Union 
EU15 Member countries of 
the European Union 
prior to the addition of 
ten further countries 
on 1 May 2004 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
GRC Greece 
i.e. Id est (that is) 
 
 
 
 
IFRS International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
IRL Ireland 
ITA Italy 
JEL Journal of Economic 
Literature 
LUX Luxembourg 
n/a Not applicable 
NLD Netherlands 
No. Number 
OLS Ordinary Least 
Squares 
pp. Pages 
PRT Portugal 
QIS Quantitative impact 
study 
sd Standard deviation 
USA United States 
USD United States Dollar 
Vol.  Volume  
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VI.7.3. Table of Symbols 
& and 
α Coefficient to be estimated (relating to control variables)  
a Bank fixed effect 
β Coefficient to be estimated (relating to treatment variables) 
C1 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with no unconsolidated companion   
C2 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with an unconsolidated companion 
C* Consolidation code according to Bankscope: additional 
consolidated statement 
D Explanatory control variable 
εi,t Disturbance for individual bank i at time t 
i Numbering for individual bank (ranging from 1 to N) 
k Numbering for explanatory control variables (ranging from 0 
to K) 
K Total number of explanatory control variables 
L. Lagged 
N Total population of individual banks 
t Numbering for time (ranging from 1 to T) 
t-value Test statistic for Student’s test 
T Total time periods 
v Time fixed effect 
% Percentage
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VII. Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank 
Liquidity Structure – A Dynamic Panel Data 
Study 
VII.1. Abstract 
Recent studies have concluded that direct bank regulation around the 
world is not the dominant factor when banks set their capital ratios; the 
ratios mainly and persistently depend on their past levels and on other 
influencing variables. My paper deals with the same topic of direct bank 
regulation with regard to the banks’ liquidity structure (measured as the 
net stable funding ratio, NSFR). By means of a partial adjustment model, 
calculated using the generalised method of moments regression 
technique, I examine explanatory regulatory variables, other country-
specific variables and bank-specific variables for banks in 43 developed 
countries for the years 2000 to 2011. Similar to the results for capital 
ratios, I find evidence that the past NSFR is an important (but less 
persistent) explanatory factor for the present NSFR and that the ratio 
increases as the importance and risk of a country’s banking sector 
increases. In addition, in common with the results for capital ratios, it 
seems that a greater degree of private bank monitoring also leads to lower 
NSFRs. This suggests that relying on private monitoring results in 
weaker balance sheet figures in general. Additionally, I find that banks 
appear to disregard the liquidity structure in the case of higher capital 
regulation severity, indicating that they prioritise compliance with the 
capital ratio rules. Further, I find evidence that economic growth leads 
to higher NSFRs. The latter observations seem to be highly applicable to 
US banks, that is, they seem to be less relevant for banks in other 
countries. Still, the overall results suggest that the regulation of the 
NSFR could be a promising instrument in future bank regulation.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Banks, Liquidity structure, Bank regulation  
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G28 
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VII.2. Introduction and Background 
Initially, bank regulation was primarily aimed at banks’ capital ratios by 
stipulating that a bank’s eligible capital measure in relation to an asset 
measure had to exceed a defined threshold. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1988) introduced this principle in its “Basel I” 
framework and this has remained in place up to today in the new 
“Basel III” rules (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  
In addition to the capital structure, another aspect discussed early on by 
both the public and the regulators was banks’ liquidity and their liquidity 
structure (e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). 
Although several researchers claim that the roots of the financial crisis 
in 2007 were not bank liquidity problems (e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 
2013), the focus on the regulation of liquidity structure increased after 
the crisis (e.g. Kay, 2009 and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2008). This encouraged the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2011) to include two numerical liquidity constraints in the Basel III 
framework. According to these constraints, banks have to fulfil both a 
long-term and a short-term oriented liquidity ratio, the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) respectively. 
However, researchers have not yet tried to find evidence for the linkage 
between bank regulation and banks’ liquidity structure (although several 
studies have tried to expose the influence of the regulation on banks’ 
capital ratios).  
Prompted by the increased importance of bank liquidity structure 
regulation and the lack of empirical work on this matter, my paper tries 
empirically to find explanatory factors for banks’ liquidity structure, in 
particular for the NSFR.85 I aim to answer the question as to whether 
bank regulation determines banks’ NSFRs or whether banks set their 
liquidity structure ratios based on other factors or even individually for 
every bank. 
Most of the studies related to banks’ capital ratios find some evidence 
for the influence of the regulation by using various data and methods,86 
                                            
85  Refer to section VII.3.2 for a detailed description of the NSFR.  
86  E.g. Gropp and Heider (2010), Flannery and Rangan (2008), Brewer, Kaufman and Wall 
(2008), Schaeck and Cihák (2009) and, recently, Lucadamo (2016).  
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but other explanatory factors seem to be of more importance. Lucadamo 
(2016, p. 5) concludes that “[…] regulation is not the dominant factor 
when banks set their capital ratios.” Based on the study of Lucadamo 
(2016), I intend to ascertain whether this is also valid in regard to the 
banks’ liquidity structure.  
I assume that a more severe regulation should lead to a “stronger” 
liquidity structure and therefore to a higher NSFR. I use the same six 
regulatory index variables to measure regulation severity and the same 
further possible bank-specific and country-specific explanatory factors 
as Lucadamo (2016). My dataset includes cross-country bank figures for 
43 developed countries and the 12 years from 2000 to 2011 (i.e. covering 
the period before and after the financial crisis) in a partial adjustment 
model calculated with advanced dynamic panel data regression methods. 
I consider the idea that the explanatory variables and particularly the 
regulatory severity might change during the observation period.   
My findings reveal that there are both similarities and differences 
between the results concentrating on the liquidity structure in my study 
and the ones focusing on the capital structure in Lucadamo (2016), even 
though the studies have a fairly symmetric set-up. As noted above, 
Lucadamo (2016) finds only limited evidence that bank regulation 
influences the capital ratios of banks: only one factor – higher activity 
restrictions – seems to lead to higher capital ratios; a higher degree of 
private bank monitoring even seems to lead to lower ratios. The latter 
also applies to the present study, suggesting that relying on the private 
sector leads to weaker balance sheet figures in general. Additionally, I 
find that banks seem to disregard the liquidity structure in the case of 
greater severity in capital regulation, implying that they first try to 
comply with the capital ratio rules. Further, I find evidence that 
economic growth leads to higher NSFRs. These results seem to be caused 
particularly by US banks, that is, they seem to be less relevant for banks 
in other countries. The finding that higher importance – and therefore 
risk – of the banking sector in a country seems to lead to higher liquidity 
structure ratios applies to all countries. This result is also applicable for 
the capital ratios in Lucadamo (2016). Also similar to the evidence for 
capital ratios, the current liquidity structure ratio seems to be highly 
dependent on its past level. However, there is less persistence in the 
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change process compared to the capital ratios, implying that banks 
quickly adapt their NSFR in the case of changing circumstances. 
To summarise, banks’ liquidity structure-setting process would seem to 
be more unpredictable than the capital ratio process. Nevertheless, the 
NSFRs appear to matter and there are some influencing factors, 
especially for US banks. Considering the increasing attention paid by 
regulators, policy makers, academics and other stakeholders to banks’ 
liquidity structure, the NSFR could be a promising instrument in future 
bank regulation.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section VII.3 explains the data 
and methodology used, section VII.4 illustrates the descriptive statistics 
of the dataset before the results of the regression are revealed in  
section VII.5, and section VII.6 concludes the paper.  
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VII.3. Data and Methodology 
VII.3.1. Dataset 
My study uses the same dataset as the one used by Lucadamo (2016). 
That is, the focus is on developed countries, since I expect that the 
banking sector has some importance and the regulation has some 
influence in such countries. Lucadamo (2016) defines developed 
countries as the ones belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)87, countries with important (i.e. 
“global”) financial centres according to „The Global Financial Centres 
Index 10“88 and the other European Union (EU) countries not included 
above.89 This results in an original total population of 45 countries.  
The year population consists of the 12 years from 2000 to 2011 
(however, as a result of the regression methodology described below, the 
first year drops out and is just used for lagging and differencing). Since 
my study uses yearly data, the financial year-end date is rounded to the 
next year-end if a bank does not have 31 December as the financial year-
end date.90 
My study uses data for all banks for the described years and countries 
from the Bankscope91 database. To be comparable with the paper on 
capital ratios by Lucadamo (2016), I only consider consolidated figures, 
that is, banks with Bankscope consolidation codes C1, C2 and C*.92 In 
                                            
87  These are Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), 
Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), 
Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel 
(ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Republic of Korea (KOR), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg 
(LUX), Mexico (MEX), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), 
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden 
(SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR), and the United 
States of America (USA). 
88  See Yeandle and von Gunten (2013). The additional countries to consider are China 
(CHN), Hong Kong (HKG), Russian Federation (RUS), Singapore (SGP), and the United 
Arab Emirates (ARE).  
89  These are Bulgaria (BGR), Latvia (LVA), Malta (MLT), Republic of Cyprus (CYP), and 
Romania (ROU).  
90  E.g. observations of banks with financial year-end 31 March 2008 are included in the 
population of 31 December 2008.  
91  “Bankscope – World banking information source” from Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing BV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.  
92  Refer to section V.8.3 for a detailed explanation of the consolidation codes.  
144 Data and Methodology 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
the case of double bank entries, I prefer entries for which more relevant 
variable data is available to the entries with less available data. If there 
is equality, I favour entries with C1 consolidation code over C2 and the 
latter over C*.  
My model uses unbalanced panel data according to Wooldridge (2010), 
by excluding banks with missing data for the variables of interest in a 
particular year,93 but including them in the years in which all necessary 
data is available.  
All values (except for ratios) are translated in million USD (United States 
dollars) using the corresponding year-end foreign exchange rate 
according to Bankscope.  
I use the same regulatory data as Lucadamo (2016), which is based on 
the bank regulatory survey in Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2001) 
conducted for the years 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2011. The other years in 
the observation horizon adopt the value of the nearest of these four 
observation points (e.g. year 2001 adopts the survey data of 2000 and 
year 2002 adopts that of 2003). Thus, the paper assumes that changes in 
the severity of bank regulation occur immediately and not slowly. This 
appears obvious, since the possible answers to the survey questions are 
mostly binary (“yes” or “no”).94  
VII.3.2. Model 
My model is based on the same partial adjustment model considerations 
as the one from Lucadamo (2016), but it changes the variable of interest 
from the capital ratio (in particular the Tier 1 ratio) to the NSFR.95 The 
                                            
93  The banks not included in the population for the regression of a particular year are 
nevertheless included in the calculation of the country-specific variables of interest for 
these years (such as e.g. the ratio of banks per one million capita per country).   
94  However, a robustness check, which considers that regulatory severity changes smoothly 
by interpolating the values, does not materially change the regression results, except that 
the private monitoring variable (PRM) loses its significance, which is in line with other 
robustness checks (refer to the discussion in section VII.5 and to the overview of the 
robustness check results in Table VII.6).  Thus, it looks as if it does not substantially 
matter whether the model assumes immediate or smooth changes in the severity of the 
regulation. 
95  One could expect that the capital ratio might also directly influence the liquidity structure. 
However, including the Tier 1 ratio in the regression system of my paper does not 
substantially change the results and does not lead to a significant influence of the Tier 1-
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basis of the idea is that every bank i (ranging from 1 to N) has a target 
NSFR (NSFR*i,t) in year t (ranging from 1 to T). The target ratio depends 
on a set of explanatory variables Dk,i,t. The explanatory variables can be 
bank specific (i.e. they vary for every bank i) or country specific (i.e. 
they are the same for all banks i in a country j at time t or they are the 
same for all banks i in a country j for all time periods T). Each 
explanatory variable has its corresponding coefficient βk (k ranging from 
0 to K) 96 to be estimated (see formula (VII.1)):97 
NSFRi,t
∗  =  ∑ βkDk,i,t
K
k=0
+ vi,t (VII.1) 
Publicly disclosed information does not usually reveal the target NSFRs 
of banks. Considering that a bank’s NSFR probably does not equal its 
target value, one could expect a bank to try to adjust the actual value 
toward its target.98 The result is that the difference between the current 
year’s NSFR and the previous year’s NSFR should equal the difference 
between the target NSFR and the previous year’s NSFR, multiplied by 
all banks’ invariant99 speed of adjustment λ as shown in formula (VII.2): 
NSFRi,t- NSFRi,t-1=  λ (NSFRi,t
* - NSFRi,t-1) (VII.2) 
Substituting formula (VII.1) into formula (VII.2) and rearranging results 
in the dynamic regression model to be estimated according to  
formula (VII.3):100 
                                            
ratio in regard to the NSFR (the same is valid for the opposite when including the NSFR 
in the regressions for the Tier 1 ratio in Lucadamo, 2016). This outcome suggests that I 
can treat the liquidity ratio setting process as an autonomous subject matter for 
investigation compared to the capital ratio setting process.  
96  D0,i,t equals 1, which means that k = 0 represents the constant.  
97  The formula includes a disturbance term vi,t.  
98  Refer for example to Lintner (1956), who developed a similar dividend setting mode or to 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), who tried to apply such a model to describe a firm’s market 
debt ratio 
99  In line with Lucadamo (2016), my model assumes that the speed of adjustment λ is the 
same for all banks. In my regression, the coefficient on λ does not substantially change 
either when performing separate regression in regard to various bank categories (e.g. small 
banks vs large banks, European banks vs non-European banks etc.).   
100  As in Baltagi (2008), I consider the regression disturbance term as a one-way error 
component model λvi,t = ui,t = μi + εi,t, where μi denotes the unobservable individual 
specific effect and εi,t denotes the remainder disturbance.  
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NSFRi,t  =   λ ∑ βkDk,i,t
K
k=0
+ (1 − λ) NSFRi,t−1 + ui,t (VII.3) 
Note that a speed of adjustment λ converging to 0 means that the 
adjustment process is persistent, that is, only a small gap between the 
NSFR and the target NSFR closes every year and the other explanatory 
variables are only of minor importance. On the other hand, a speed of 
adjustment λ converging to 1 means that the adjustment process is 
immediate, that is, the past NSFR is only of minor importance and the 
other explanatory variables have more influence. 
The Basel III framework defines the NSFR as the ratio of the available 
amount of stable funding to the required amount of stable funding. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011, p. 25), 
“[…] the NSFR standard is structured to ensure that long term assets are 
funded with at least a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to 
their liquidity risk profiles”. Formula (VII.4) shows the calculation of 
the ratio:   
NSFR =  
Available amount of stable funding 
Required amount of stable funding
=
∑ wfaLa
A
a=1
∑ wfbAb
B
b=1
> 100%  (VII.4) 
The available amount of stable funding consists of various liability 
categories La (ranging from 1 to A) multiplied by their weighting factor 
wfa; the higher the weighting factor, the higher the assumed stability of 
the respective liability category. The weighting factors range from 0 to 
1, but do not add up to 1. Similarly, the denominator consists of various 
asset categories Ab (ranging from 1 to B) multiplied by their weighting 
factor wfb; the higher the weighting factors of the asset category, the 
lower the assumed liquidity of the respective category. Again, the 
weighing factors range from 0 to 1, but do not add up to 1. A higher 
NSFR is related to more stable funding and therefore to a “better” mid -
term liquidity situation; the Basel framework demands that the NSFR be 
higher than 100%.  
Since the NSFR will not move to a minimum standard before 1 January 
2018, banks have not been obligated to disclose their NSFR as yet and 
Bankscope does therefore not have this data for the observation horizon 
of my study.  
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However, based on the data that are available in Bankscope, Vazquez 
and Federico (2012) developed an approximation to calculate the NSFR, 
enabling reasonable results. My study applies this method to obtain the 
required NSFR data (refer to their Table 1 and to the additional 
comments in their paper for further explanations of the calculation).101   
Lucadamo (2016) constructs and uses the following explanatory 
variables Dk,i,t, which I accordingly apply in formula (VII.3). These 
include regulatory variables102, bank-specific control variables and 
further country-specific control variables.103  
The following regulatory variables measure various direct or indirect 
regulatory components: 
 Restriction (REST): This is an index measuring regulatory 
restrictions on the activities of banks, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001), that is, the variable is composed of 
various questions that deal with the topic of whether banks are 
allowed to engage in various activities. The variable’s value ranges 
from 1 to 14, whereas a higher value is related to greater restrictions 
and therefore to more severe regulation. Accordingly, I expect that 
a higher value of the variable leads to a higher NSFR.  
                                            
101  As a robustness check, I apply an alternative calculation used by the International 
Monetary Fund (2011); refer to their Table 2.1 and the corresponding further explanations 
for more details regarding this method. Overall, this calculation leads to higher NSFRs on 
average (1.25 compared to 1.05 in the basis method) and only the coefficients on lagged 
NSFR and the annual gross domestic product growth GGDP remain significant in the 
regression. The changes to the basis regression are therefore similar to the changes from 
the basis regression to the regression without US banks. In the basis calculation method, 
the NSFR average of US banks is significantly different from the overall average (by 0.14, 
significant at the 1%-level). In the regression with alternative NSFR calculations, this 
significant mean difference disappears. Considering that US banks seem to influence 
much of the coefficients’ significance (as discussed in detail in section VII.5), the non-
existing mean difference between US banks and the overall average might lead to the 
coefficients losing their significance in the alternative NSFR calculation method.   
102  As a further robustness check, I drop the regulatory component, i.e. the six regulatory 
variables, from the regression. This leads to the insignificance of the coefficients on the 
variables banks per million capita (BMC) and annual gross domestic product growth 
(GGDP). This result does not change substantially when dropping only separate 
regulatory variables. 
103  Refer to section VII.8.1 for more detailed definitions explanations of the sources of the 
variables used. 
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 Regulatory body power (RBP): This is an index measuring the 
direct power of the regulatory body, following the survey explained 
in Barth et al. (2001). The maximum value of the variable is 13; I 
link a higher value to more severe regulation and therefore expect 
it to lead to a higher NSFR.  
 Capital regulation (CAPR): This index measures the regulatory 
oversight of bank capital, following the survey explained in Barth 
et al. (2001). Again, a higher value relates to greater capital 
regulation (the maximum value is 5) and therefore to a more severe 
regulation, which should lead to a higher NSFR. 
 Entry requirements (ERQ): This is an index measuring the difficulty 
of operating as a bank in a specific country, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take a maximum 
value of 8. The higher the value, the greater the difficulty for banks 
to enter the country’s market and therefore the more severe the 
regulation. Therefore, I expect higher values to lead to higher 
NSFRs. 
 Private monitoring (PRM): This is an index measuring the degree 
to which the private sector is empowered, facilitated and 
encouraged to monitor banks, following the survey explained in 
Barth et al. (2001). The maximum value of the variable is 12. As 
noted in Lucadamo (2016), the expected influence of this variable 
is ambiguous. On the one hand a higher private monitoring index 
could be related to a more severe regulation and therefore leads to 
higher NSFRs, while on the other hand one could assume that a 
higher index is associated with more outside or self-regulation and 
therefore less severe bank regulation, which will consequently lead 
to lower NSFRs.    
 Ownership (OWN): This index measures the degree to which 
regulations control for ownership of banks, following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The higher the index, the stricter 
the ownership regulation. The maximum value of the variable is 3 
and therefore I expect a higher value to lead to a higher NSFR.  
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The model’s bank-specific variables are the following: 
 Log of total assets (LTA): This variable measures the size of a bank 
by using the natural logarithm of the sum of all assets of the bank 
according to Bankscope.104 In line with the results for capital ratios 
in Lucadamo (2016), I expect that larger banks have lower NSFRs, 
because for example they might be more diversified and therefore 
less risky or because they need lower liquidity cushions, since they 
have a lower cost of raising new liquidity.  
 Ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLRGL): This variable 
is the ratio of the part of the loans for which the bank expects losses 
(but does not charge off) to the total loan portfolio according to 
Bankscope. It is a measure of the bank’s credit risk, having higher 
values for higher credit risks. I assume that higher credit risks lead 
banks to have higher NSFRs, since affected banks need higher 
liquidity cushions to absorb such credit risks.   
 Return on average assets (ROAA): The ROAA is the ratio of the net 
income to the total assets (calculated as an average of the previous 
and the subsequent year-end) of a bank taken from Bankscope. This 
variable measures the profitability of a bank. With respect to the 
capital ratios, studies have found profitability to have a positive 
influence (e.g. Flannery & Rangan, 2008 for banks or Öztekin & 
Flannery, 2012 for non-banks). However, higher profitability could 
be related to less riskiness and therefore to lower capital ratios. I 
assume the same ambiguousness for the NSFR.  
 Dividend dummy (DIV): This is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a bank has paid out a dividend in the specific year and 
0 otherwise. The data are based on Bankscope. Again, the 
relationship of this variable is ambiguous: On the one hand, the 
possibility of paying out a dividend might indicate that a bank is 
already in good financial condition and therefore a higher NSFR 
                                            
104 Since the NSFR and the sum of assets are both balance sheet based figures, I also performed 
my regression with non-balance sheet based figures, but used income statement based 
variables to measure bank size (the net interest revenue, other operating income and 
overhead expenses) in order to test for a possible correlation bias. My results do not 
change if I use these variables. Therefore, I continue with the total assets figure only, since 
this is the more commonly known variable for measuring firm size. 
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could be expected. On the other hand, according to formula (VII.4), 
the (cash) pay out of a dividend directly decreases the NSFR.  
 Banks’ total assets to the sum of all banks’ total assets for a country 
(BASA): BASA is the ratio of banks’ total assets to the sum of all 
banks’ total assets for the country for a specific year according to 
data from Bankscope. This variable is a measure of the relative 
importance (and therefore the system relevance) of a bank in its 
country. An important (“too big to fail”) bank could experience 
different treatment from an unimportant bank, thus affecting its 
NSFR:105 The system relevance could cause the regulator to be 
stricter with the banks and therefore ask for a higher NSFR. On the 
other hand, higher system relevance might increase a bank’s power 
over the regulator; together with the assumption that such a bank 
knows that it would obtain support in case of failure, this could lead 
to a lower NSFR. Following Lucadamo (2016), I include two 
measures of system relevance in the basis regression:106 BASA is 
the relative measure, whereas SYS is a more stringent dummy 
variable. The value for SYS is 1 if the BASA value of a bank is 
higher than 10% in its country in a specific year.107 The argument 
for the sign prediction of SYS is the same as for BASA.  
The further country-specific variables are the following:  
 Bank concentration (CON): This dummy variable takes the value of 
1 if the banking industry in a country is highly concentrated and 0 
otherwise. Following Lucadamo (2016), I define an industry as 
highly concentrated if the sum of total assets of the three largest 
banks is more than 50% of all a country’s banks’ total assets for a 
                                            
105  Stern and Feldman (2004) trace the term “too big to fail” back to a statement from Stewart 
B. McKinney made during congressional hearings related to the bailout of the insolvent 
bank Continental Illinois in 1984. The term is used in connection with banks that have 
such a high systemic risk that their failure would result in extensive negative 
macroeconomic impacts. To avoid these impacts, their failure has to be prevented by 
support from the government or another superior body.     
106  Note that the regression results do not change by using only either of the two variables or 
both together.  
107  There is no exact numeric definition for regulators to rate a bank as system relevant; 
therefore, the 10% threshold is a discretionary value. The regression results do not 
materially change when using another threshold.  
Data and Methodology 151 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
specific year.108 The basis for the data is Bankscope. This variable 
is similar to the variable SYS above, that is, instead of the 
importance of just one bank, it measures the importance of several 
banks together. Accordingly, the explanation for the sign prediction 
is also the same as for SYS, resulting in an ambiguous prediction.  
 Banks per million capita (BMC): This variable measures the size of 
the banking sector in a country in relation to its population, based 
on data explained in The World Bank (2012). In Lucadamo (2016), 
a higher number of banks per population indicated a better risk 
distribution among the banks in a country and led to lower capital 
ratios. The same explanation might also be the case for the liquidity 
ratios. On the other hand, a higher relative number of banks points 
to higher bank sector importance, which causes similar sign 
ambiguity as for the variable CON discussed above.  
 Bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP): This variable is 
the amount of demand, time and savings deposits in deposit money 
banks as a share of the GDP of a country. The data originate from 
the financial development and structure dataset (as explained in 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2000). BGDP is a measure of the 
importance of the banking system relative to the economy of the 
country in a specific year. Applying similar explanations as for the 
above variables CON and BMC, the sign prediction is ambiguous.  
 Gross domestic product per capita in USD (GDPC): This variable 
is a measure of the health of a country’s economy in a specific year. 
GDPC and the variable annual gross domestic product growth 
(GGDP) implement the influence of macroeconomic conditions on 
the banks’ financial structure. Both variables are based on the 
database described in The World Bank (2012). Better economic 
health could be linked to banks that are more profitable; as 
discussed above, profitability has an ambiguous sign prediction, 
resulting in an ambiguous prediction for these two variables as well.  
 Bank z-score (BZS): This variable measures the probability of 
default of a country's banking system. The data are based on the 
financial development and structure dataset as explained in Beck et 
                                            
108  Using other similar thresholds does not materially change the regression results. 
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al. (2000). The z-score divides a bank’s buffers (capitalisation and 
returns) by the volatility of those returns (a lower z-score therefore 
indicates a higher probability of default). BZS is the weighted 
average of the z-scores of a country's banks, using the individual 
banks’ total assets as weights. Obtaining a negative coefficient’s 
sign, Lucadamo (2016) found that – especially in the USA – banks 
seem to have higher capital ratios in the case of higher default 
profitability (i.e. when they are in a less “comfortable” 
environment). However, considering that lower NSFRs should be 
accompanied by a higher default probability per se, one would 
expect a positive sign prediction. The total prediction is therefore 
also ambiguous.  
 Inflation (INF): This variable measures the influence of the price 
level on the banks’ liquidity structure. This variable is based on the 
database described in The World Bank (2012). Since inflation could 
both increase the assets of a bank or increase the liabilities, the 
prediction for the sign of this coefficient is ambiguous.  
 Crisis country (CRC): CRC has the value of 1 if a country suffered 
a bank crisis during the financial crisis and 0 otherwise.  In line with 
Lucadamo (2016), bank crisis countries are the “systemic cases” 
according to Laeven and Valencia (2010). Lucadamo (2016) found 
a negative relationship between the variable and the capital ratios 
of banks. He expected this result because of the explanation that the 
country underwent a crisis because the banks did not have 
sufficiently high capital ratios. However, the results were only valid 
for US banks; that is, non-US banks had even higher capital ratios 
in cases where they were crisis country banks (a possible 
explanation raises doubt about the correct disclosure of the capital 
ratios). I expect that there is no such contradiction in the liquidity 
ratios, that is, I assume a negative sign prediction in my study.     
VII.3.3. Regression Methodology  
As stated above, the model I apply according to formula (VII.3) is a 
dynamic regression model. Combined with panel data, as in my study, it 
becomes a DPD (dynamic panel data) model (Baum, 2006). There are 
various features of such a model that might restrict the use of 
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conventional estimation models. Nickel (1981) showed by way of 
example for the within-group estimator with fixed effects that serious 
biases could occur if these features are not considered. The following 
two problems in particular require attention:     
 The lagged dependent variable might cause autocorrelation issues: 
Applied to my formula (VII.3), the explanation in Baltagi (2008) 
shows that the current NSFR (NSFRi,t) is a function of the 
unobservable and time-invariant individual specific effect μ i. It 
immediately follows that the previous year’s NSFR (i.e. NSFR i,t-1) 
is also a function of μi. Therefore, the right-hand regressor  
NSFRi,t-1 is correlated with the error term ui,t = μi + εi,t,109 which 
could lead to serious biases. This even applies when the εi,t are not 
serially correlated (Baum, 2006). There are methods for correcting 
for possible correlations between the error term and the other 
regressors in conventional estimation methods such as ordinary 
least squares (OLS). One example is the use of the within 
transformation, which eliminates the individual specific effect μ i. 
However, as Bond (2002) reveals, the correlation with the lagged 
dependent variable remains. In studies like mine in particular, 
which use a large number of individuals and a small number of time 
periods (“large N, small T” studies), the magnitude of possible 
biases might be considerably high (Hsiao, 2007).    
 There could be issues of explanatory variables that are not strictly 
exogenous: Greene (2008) explains that such explanatory variables 
violate the necessary assumptions of conventional estimation 
methods. However, as in Lucadamo (2016), one of the central 
assumptions of my paper is the exogeneity of the regressors; banks 
set their NSFR as a residual figure based on various decisions made 
and circumstances given. Economically speaking, it is not 
reasonable that the NSFR has an impact on the explanatory 
variables.110 One would, for example, not assume that the NSFR in 
time t has an impact on a bank’s profitability in the same or in past 
                                            
109  Note that in terms of this assumption there would also be autocorrelation in 
formula (VII.1), since vi,t =  
μi
λ
+
εi,t
λ
. 
110  Based on both the economic logic and the various regression tests discussed below, there 
is no evidence of endogeneity issues in my model.   
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periods. Following the argument of Lucadamo (2016), it may only 
be possible that some variables are predetermined. That is, shocks 
in the NSFR in time t could have an impact on such variables in 
following periods. However, it is not likely that this would be the 
case for the country-specific variables; because they are 
macroeconomically related one would not assume that the NSFR of 
a bank influences such macroeconomic conditions. However, 
predetermination might be possible for the bank-specific and the 
regulatory variables.  
In order to avoid biases in DPD models, there are two established 
methods. Kiviet (1995) introduced the first method, which entails the 
application of bias-corrected least square dummy variables (LSDVC). 
These corrected variables adjust the bias caused by the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable as a regressor. Whereas Kiviet’s (1995) paper 
concentrates on balanced panels, Bruno (2005a) showed that the 
application of LSDVC is also possible in the case of unbalanced panels. 
It seems that the method works well in the case of a small population of 
individuals N (refer e.g. to Judson & Owen, 1999), but not in case of a 
big N (Baltagi, 2008) or in the case of not strictly exogenous regressors 
(Bruno, 2005b).  
Considering my dataset and the assumptions discussed above, and 
following Lucadamo (2016), the second method for dealing with DPD 
models appears more adequate: the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimators. These use instrumental variables (also called “iv” or 
“instruments”) that are correlated with the explanatory variables but not 
with the error term (Greene, 2008). Even if the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the error term, the accurate use of instruments leads to 
unbiased results. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) as well as Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982) suggest this method for DPD models by way of a first 
differencing approach. Applied to my formula (VII.3), the following 
expression (VII.5) results: 
NSFRi,t −  NSFRi,t−1 =   λ ∑ βk(Dk,i,t − Dk,i,t−1) 
K
k=0
+ (1 − λ) (NSFRi,t−1 − NSFRi,t−2) + εi,t − εi,t−1 
(VII.5) 
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Formula (VII.5) shows that differencing causes the individual specific 
effect μi in the error term ui,t = μi + εi,t to disappear. As explained in 
Baltagi (2008), this allows the NSFRi,t-2 to be deployed as an instrument 
for (NSFRi,t-1 – NSFRi,t-2), since the term is highly correlated with 
(NSFRi,t-1 – NSFRi,t-2), but not correlated with (εi,t – εi,t-1). According to 
Baum (2006) even if the error term is not i.i.d. (independently, 
identically distributed), the instrument in the form of the lagged 
dependent variable leads to consistent parameter estimates. Additional 
information is available in older time periods or in other variables. 
Hence, GMM estimators increase efficiency by also using NSFR i,t-3 and 
further lags as well as the other variables Dk,i,t as instruments. 
Considering that GMM methods allow for the potential autocorrelation 
and endogeneity issues discussed above to be dealt with, my study 
applies these methods in line with Lucadamo (2016). One can perform 
GMM in the form of the difference GMM (as introduced by Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) or the system GMM (as explained by Arellano & Bover, 
1995, as well as Blundell & Bond, 1998). The former uses lagged levels 
of the explanatory variables as instruments for equations in first 
differences as shown above. The system GMM, on the other hand, 
increases the possible utilisable instruments and uses lagged differences 
of the explanatory variables as instruments for equations in levels 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). Compared to the difference GMM, the system 
GMM can improve precision and reduce finite sample bias (see 
Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, system GMM suffers less from gaps in 
unbalanced panels and it does not eliminate time invariant explanatory 
variables (Roodman, 2009b). Accordingly, the system GMM seems to 
perform better in numerous studies (refer e.g. to Flannery and Hankins, 
2013). While there are additional constraints to be considered when using 
the system GMM (refer to the discussion below), it is important to note 
that the results from section VII.5 do not differ substantially when I use 
either the system GMM or the difference GMM. Depending on the 
robustness regression applied, more coefficients become insignificant in 
the difference GMM (which is not surprising, since the difference GMM 
is less precise than the system GMM). As in Lucadamo (2016), this fact 
and the results of the specification tests indicate that there is no evidence 
that the use of the system GMM is not appropriate in my study.  
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Further, one can perform GMM estimators in the one-step or the two-
step form. As Bond (2002) explains, the latter form shows some 
efficiency gains in the robust version. Since I do not see such gains in 
my regressions, I apply the one-step estimator.    
Of course, GMM estimators also have limitations. One possible issue 
pertaining to these methods is the instrument count (i.e. the number of 
instrumental variables used for the regression) relative to the sample size. 
According to the discussion in Roodman (2009a), a high instrument 
count might lead to invalid results not being detected because 
specification tests are weakened at the same time. Further, as noted by 
Flannery and Hankins (2013), GMM estimators need the absence of 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals. To address the possible 
issues, I implement the same specification tests and robustness checks as 
Lucadamo (2016): 
 One of the compulsory tests when applying GMM estimators is 
Hansen’s (1982) tests for over-identification (Baum, Schaffer & 
Stillman, 2003 and Baum, 2006): Since the null hypotheses assume 
correct model specifications and valid over-identifying restrictions, 
the test must not be rejected, as this would call into question either 
or both of those hypotheses. However, the Hansen test is one of the 
tests discussed above that could be violated if too many instruments 
are used.111 Roodman (2009a) emphasises that too many 
instruments could even lead to implausibly perfect probability 
values (p-values) of 1.00. Roodman (2009b) states that there are no 
clear rules on what constitutes “too many instruments”. I therefore 
follow his suggestions, firstly, to report and assess the instrument 
count in comparison to the sample size, secondly, to use techniques 
for reducing the instrument count and, finally, to perform 
robustness checks in order to observe the changes in the results and 
the test statistics when the instrument count is changed.  
 As explained above, GMM estimators require second-order serial 
correlation to be absent. The relevant test, as per Arellano and Bond 
(1991), analyses whether there is such a correlation in the residuals 
                                            
111  Note that the Sargan statistic (Sargan, 1958) is similar to the Hansen statistic; it is not 
weakened by too many instruments but requires homoscedastic errors, which I cannot 
assume in the context of my paper. Therefore, I do not use this specification test. 
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(“Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences”). The null 
hypothesis for second-order serial correlation must not be rejected, 
since it states that there is no serial correlation of second order.  
 Roodman (2009b) explains that the additional assumption for the 
use of the system GMM is that changes in the instrumenting 
variables have to be uncorrelated with the individual fixed effects. 
According to the example in Roodman (2009a), the coefficient on 
the dependent variable (1 – λ) has to be smaller than 1 and the 
dependent variable converges to steady-state levels. I will therefore 
analyse the persistence of the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. Further, I will apply the difference-in-Hansen 
test to examine the validity of the additional moment conditions as 
suggested by Bond (2002):112 The test takes the difference of two 
Hansen test statistics and allows the subsets of instruments to be 
checked. One statistic is computed from the fully efficient 
regression (using the whole set of over-identifying restrictions) and 
the other is computed from an inefficient but consistent regression 
(removing a set of instruments from the list). The null hypothesis 
must not be rejected, since it states that the specified variables are 
proper instruments. 
 Roodman (2009b) proposes the inclusion of time dummies in the 
regression, which I do in my study. The dummies make it more 
likely that there is no correlation across individuals in the 
disturbances (this is assumed by the autocorrelation test and the 
robust estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients).  
 I will assess whether the coefficient that is obtained on the lagged 
dependent variable lies between the estimated coefficients of OLS 
(ordinary least squares) and FE (fixed effects) estimators, which 
should be expected according to Bond (2002).  
 To correct the standard errors in the case of any heteroscedasticity 
or serial correlation in the errors, I apply the robust estimator of the 
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates according to Roodman 
(2009b). Moreover, the robust option is a precondition for 
                                            
112  A high instrument count also weakens the difference-in-Hansen test (Roodmann, 2009a), 
emphasising the need to carefully assess the number of instruments used.   
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performing the Hansen and the difference-in-Hansen specification 
tests discussed above.  
I use the software STATA113, in particular the GMM syntax 
“XTABOND2” by Roodman (2009b), to calculate the complete 
regression according to formula (VII.6) to estimate the coefficients λβk 
of the dependent variable NSFRi,t: 
NSFRi,t  =   λβ0 + (1 − λ)NSFRi,t−1 + λβ1RESTj,t +
λβ
2
RBPj,t +  λβ3CAPRj,t +  λβ4ERQj,t +  λβ5PRMj,t +
λβ
6
OWNj,t +  λβ7LTAi,t + λβ8LLRGLi,t + λβ9ROAAi,t +
λβ
10
DIVi,t +  λβ11BASAi,t + λβ12SYSi,t + λβ13CONj,t +
λβ
14
BMCj, + λβ15BGDPj,t + λβ16GDPCj,t + λβ17GGDPj,t +
λβ
18
BZSj,t + λβ19INFj,t + λβ20CRCj + νt + ui,t  
(VII.6) 
i is the numbering for the individual banks, ranging from 1 to N, t is the 
numbering for the individual years, ranging from 1 to T and j is the 
numbering for the various countries, ranging from 1 to J. The explanatory 
regulatory variables for country j in year t are REST j,t, RBPj,t, CAPRj,t, 
ERQj,t, PRMj,t and OWNj,t, the bank-specific control variables for bank i 
in year t are LTAi,t, LLRGLi,t, ROAAi,t, DIVi,t, BASAi,t and SYSi,t and 
the country-specific control variables for country j in year t are CON j,t, 
BMCj,t, BGDPj,t, GDPCj,t, GGDPj,t, BZSj,t, INFj,t and CRCj (the last 
variable is the same for all years T in a country j). The time dummy νt 
for every year t controls for the unobserved time-fixed effects and ui,t 
denotes the disturbance term.  
Following the wording of Roodman (2009b), the lagged NSFR114 enters 
the regression as an endogenous variable (“gmm style instrument with 
two lags”), all country-specific variables except the regulatory variables 
enter as strictly exogenous (“iv style instruments”) and the rest of the 
variables enter as predetermined (“gmm style instruments with one lag”). 
                                            
113  “STATA® Data Analysis and Statistical Software” by StataCorp LP, Texas, USA.  
114  NSFRi,t-1 or L.NSFR (L. stands for “lagged”) 
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Using the collapse option115 of XTABOND2, and limiting the lag periods 
to three, reduces the risk of too many instruments. The inclusion of the 
robust option corrects the standard errors in the case of any 
heteroscedasticity or any serial correlation in the errors. 
Section VII.5 reveals the detailed results of this regression, but first the 
next section, section VII.4, discusses the most important descriptive 
statistics of the dataset. 
                                            
115  The collapse option creates only one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather 
than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. Together with the lag limitation, 
this strongly decreases the number of instruments, which would otherwise be quite high 
and might cause the problems discussed. 
 When performing the regression without lag limitation and without the collapse option, 
the variables capital regulation (CAPR), private monitoring (PRM), banks per million 
capita (BMC) and bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP) become 
insignificant, although the additional lags should provide more information. However, the 
test diagnostics are not satisfied at all, indicating expected instrument issues (total 
instruments are now 906, compared to 71 in the basis regression). The effect is similar 
when limiting the lags without using the collapse option or when using the collapse option 
and not limiting the lags.  
 In the case of a regression with maximally restricted lags (in which test diagnostics remain 
intact), only the banks per million capita (BMC) and bank deposits per gross domestic 
product (BGDP) lose their significance. The loss of information (there are only 45 
instruments) anticipates this effect.   
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VII.4. Descriptive Statistics 
The original dataset taken from Lucadamo (2016) contains 44 141 
observations for the years 2000 to 2011. All observations pertaining to 
the countries Chile and Romania (233 and 110 respectively) drop out 
completely from this original population, since they do not have data for 
the bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP) or for the bank z-
score (BZS). After eliminating the observations that have no values in 
regard to the important variables, 32 855 observations remain. 
Within the observation horizon, 5 182 different banks have 1 to 11 
useable observations per bank.116 The minimum number of observations 
per year is 2 162, whereas the maximum is 4 060; that is, the relative 
frequency ranges from 7 to 12%, meaning that the observations are quite 
evenly distributed within the observation horizon (refer to Table VII.1). 
More than half of the total observations is based on the USA (17 879 
observations, or approximately 54%),117 followed by France (1 651 and 
5% respectively) and Japan (1 539 and 5% respectively). No other 
country equals or constitutes more than 5% of the observations. The 
country with the fewest number of observations is the United Arab 
Emirates (22 observations). Refer to Table VII.1 for further details. 
                                            
116  Since the regression loses the first observation year (it has no lagged NSFR), the 
descriptive statistics also consider only the 11 years from 2001 to 2011.  
117  As discussed in Lucadamo (2016), the USA plays an important role in the intercontinental 
debate on whether bank regulators outside the USA are sufficiently strict. A robustness 
check without US banks reveals that the results of the basis regression to the liquidity 
structure of banks are strongly influenced by this country (note that the test diagnostics 
are satisfied): apart from the lagged NSFR, only the coefficient on the banks deposit per 
gross domestic product (BGDP) remains significant in such a robustness regression 
(however, compared to the study on capital ratios in Lucadamo, 2016, there are no 
significant sign reversions in the regressions without US banks). Refer to the presentation 
of results in section VII.5 for a discussion of this outcome. Note that the regression without 
US banks shows similar characteristics in regard to other robustness checks as the basis 
regression. 
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Table VII.1: Observations per country and per year 
Table VII.2 shows that almost every variable correlates significantly 
with the other variables at least at the 10% significance level, but the 
correlation coefficients are quite low. The coefficient is just slightly 
higher than 0.5 for four variable pairs: the correlation between the NSFR 
and its lagged value; between the regulatory body power index (RBP) 
and the restriction index (REST); between the bank z-score (BZS) and 
bank concentration (CON); and between the dummy for crisis countries 
(CRC) and the USD gross domestic product per capita (GDPC).  
Statistics per country: ARE (United Arab Emirates), AUS (Australia), AUT (Austria), BEL 
(Belgium), BGR (Bulgaria), CAN (Canada), CHE (Switzerland), CHN (China), CYP (Republic 
of Cyprus), CZE (Czech Republic), DEU (Germany), DNK (Denmark), ESP (Spain), EST 
(Estonia), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), GBR (United Kingdom), GRC (Greece), HKG (Hong 
Kong), HUN (Hungary), IRL (Ireland), ISL (Iceland), ISR (Israel), ITA (Italy), JPN (Japan), 
KOR (Republic of Korea), LTU (Lithuania), LUX (Luxembourg), LVA (Latvia), MEX (Mexico), 
MLT (Malta), NLD (Netherlands), NOR (Norway), NZL (New Zealand), POL (Poland), PRT 
(Portugal), RUS (Russian Federation), SGP (Singapore), SVK (Slovakia), SVN (Slovenia), 
SWE (Sweden), TUR (Turkey), USA (United States of America) 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
 
Observations per country Observations per year
Country Observations % Country Observations % Year Observations %
ARE 22 0% ITA 767 2% 2001 2'788 8%
AUS 431 1% JPN 1'539 5% 2002 2'951 9%
AUT 487 1% KOR 200 1% 2003 3'691 11%
BEL 307 1% LTU 78 0% 2004 3'887 12%
BGR 88 0% LUX 160 0% 2005 4'060 12%
CAN 461 1% LVA 132 0% 2006 2'839 9%
CHE 733 2% MEX 367 1% 2007 2'752 8%
CHN 147 0% MLT 71 0% 2008 2'758 8%
CYP 94 0% NLD 441 1% 2009 2'723 8%
CZE 84 0% NOR 124 0% 2010 2'274 7%
DEU 777 2% NZL 105 0% 2011 2'162 7%
DNK 360 1% POL 152 0% Total 32'885 100%
ESP 795 2% PRT 260 1% Max: 4'060
EST 62 0% RUS 785 2% Min: 2'162
FIN 148 0% SGP 141 0%
FRA 1'651 5% SVK 94 0%
GBR 1'385 4% SVN 119 0%
GRC 129 0% SWE 193 1%
HKG 352 1% TUR 174 1%
HUN 166 1% USA 17'879 54%
IRL 204 1% Total 32'885 100%
ISL 95 0% Max: 17'879
ISR 126 0% Min: 22
162 Descriptive Statistics  
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Table VII.2: Correlations between variables 
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The correlation is higher than 0.8 only between the bank’s total assets to 
the sum of all banks’ total assets for a country (BASA) and the dummy 
variable for system relevance (SYS). Based on this analysis, I do not 
expect serious regression biases caused by correlations between the 
variables.118 
An analysis of the means and the standard deviations (sd) of the various 
variables (refer to Table VII.3 for details classified per country) reveals 
that the average NSFR of 1.1 is slightly above the minimum standard of 
1 (equals 100%) that will be requested by Basel III. The maximum 
average NSFR of 2.2 belongs to Hong Kong, while the minimum of 0.7 
belongs to Ireland. The standard deviations of the various average 
NSFRs per country are quite high for Canada, the United Kingdom, Hong 
Kong and Hungary, which is caused by some outliers in these 
countries.119  
Table VII.4 shows that slightly more than 60% or 554 of the possible 
NSFR differences between various countries are significant at least at the 
10% level.  
  
                                            
118 The results of eight separate regressions, each excluding one of the above-mentioned eight 
variables (apart from the NSFR), confirm this expectation; i.e. there are no substantial 
changes in the regression results, except that the variable banks per million capita (BMC) 
partially loses its significance (as in other robustness checks discussed later).   
119  A robustness check without outliers (i.e. without observations with a NSFR above a 
discretionary value of 400%) results in several changes. Whereas the coefficient on the 
variables private monitoring (PRM) and banks per million capita (BMC) lose their 
significance (in line with some other robustness checks), three more coefficients become 
significant: the one for the regulatory body power (RBP), the one for the ownership index 
(OWN) and the one for the banks z-score (BZS); all three with a negative sign (refer to 
the overview in Table VII.6). However, this result should not be overstated in view of the 
strongly violated test diagnostics. The results are similar when using other thresholds for 
eliminating outliers, when winsorising the NSFR at various percentile levels or when just 
dropping the above-mentioned countries from the regression.  
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Table VII.3: Mean and standard deviation (sd) of variables per country   
NSFR
REST
RBP
CAPR
ERQ
PRM
OWN
LTA
LLRGL
ROAA
DIV
BASA
SYS
CON
BMC
BGDP
GDPC
GGDP
BZS
INF
CRC
A
R
E
M
e
a
n
1
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
5
.0
8
.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
8
.9
5
.2
0
.5
0
.7
4
.5
0
.2
1
.0
2
.8
5
7
.8
4
5
 6
5
3
4
.9
2
2
.5
0
.9
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
1
.4
3
.0
4
.1
0
.5
5
.9
0
.4
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
 0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
A
U
S
M
e
a
n
1
.0
5
.7
1
0
.3
2
.8
7
.6
9
.7
1
.2
8
.7
1
.5
1
.2
0
.5
2
.5
0
.1
0
.9
2
.1
7
8
.4
3
7
 2
4
7
3
.0
1
1
.0
3
.0
0
.0
S
D
0
.5
0
.6
1
.4
0
.7
0
.5
1
.2
0
.4
2
.2
5
.5
2
.5
0
.5
5
.3
0
.3
0
.3
0
.3
1
2
.9
1
2
 2
8
7
0
.9
2
.8
0
.8
0
.0
A
U
T
M
e
a
n
1
.0
3
.1
1
0
.1
3
.2
7
.8
6
.4
0
.2
9
.0
1
.6
0
.6
0
.3
2
.2
0
.1
0
.1
5
.7
8
9
.0
3
9
 6
9
5
1
.7
2
6
.4
2
.0
1
.0
S
D
0
.5
0
.8
1
.2
1
.8
0
.4
0
.8
0
.4
1
.8
2
.0
2
.4
0
.4
4
.1
0
.3
0
.4
0
.4
6
.0
8
 2
9
6
2
.1
6
.8
0
.8
0
.0
B
E
L
M
e
a
n
1
.2
4
.0
1
1
.0
3
.5
7
.8
7
.2
0
.2
9
.5
0
.5
1
.3
0
.4
3
.6
0
.2
0
.9
2
.8
9
5
.5
3
6
 7
4
4
1
.5
5
.9
2
.2
1
.0
S
D
0
.7
0
.8
0
.0
1
.1
0
.4
0
.9
0
.4
2
.4
1
.2
3
.4
0
.5
6
.2
0
.4
0
.3
0
.3
7
.1
8
 1
9
2
1
.5
1
.3
1
.1
0
.0
B
G
R
M
e
a
n
1
.1
5
.3
1
0
.1
3
.5
8
.0
8
.3
0
.3
7
.2
3
.6
1
.7
0
.3
1
2
.1
0
.3
1
.0
1
.2
4
6
.5
5
 0
3
0
3
.3
1
6
.8
5
.6
0
.0
S
D
0
.5
1
.5
0
.2
0
.9
0
.0
0
.4
0
.4
1
.6
3
.1
1
.6
0
.5
1
7
.5
0
.5
0
.0
0
.3
1
2
.8
1
 8
5
0
4
.0
1
.7
3
.0
0
.0
C
A
N
M
e
a
n
1
.8
4
.0
8
.4
2
.0
8
.0
7
.5
1
.0
8
.0
1
.3
1
.2
0
.5
1
.7
0
.1
0
.2
2
.0
1
3
7
.1
3
4
 6
9
3
2
.3
2
1
.4
2
.2
0
.0
S
D
1
5
.4
1
.0
1
.5
0
.0
0
.0
1
.4
0
.0
2
.7
3
.6
4
.6
0
.5
4
.1
0
.3
0
.4
0
.2
1
3
.7
7
 9
1
1
0
.8
1
.6
0
.3
0
.0
C
H
E
M
e
a
n
1
.3
3
.3
1
2
.2
3
.0
8
.0
8
.2
0
.5
8
.2
1
.8
1
.3
0
.6
1
.5
0
.0
1
.0
9
.4
1
2
9
.0
5
4
 5
8
1
1
.7
7
.4
0
.8
1
.0
S
D
0
.5
1
.5
1
.9
1
.1
0
.0
0
.4
0
.5
2
.3
6
.2
3
.8
0
.5
5
.4
0
.2
0
.0
0
.7
8
.7
1
2
 6
1
6
1
.6
1
.4
0
.7
0
.0
C
H
N
M
e
a
n
1
.1
1
1
.4
1
0
.0
3
.0
7
.4
8
.8
1
.1
1
0
.8
2
.2
1
.3
0
.5
3
.9
0
.2
0
.3
0
.0
4
6
.8
4
 0
1
3
1
0
.0
1
9
.0
3
.3
0
.0
S
D
0
.5
0
.6
0
.0
1
.0
0
.6
1
.2
0
.5
2
.3
1
.9
1
.0
0
.5
6
.6
0
.4
0
.5
0
.0
4
.1
1
 1
3
6
1
.5
2
.4
2
.5
0
.0
C
Y
P
M
e
a
n
1
.0
6
.6
1
0
.2
2
.5
5
.4
8
.0
0
.6
7
.9
6
.6
0
.1
0
.2
1
1
.7
0
.4
1
.0
8
.5
1
9
5
.4
2
4
 1
0
7
2
.6
4
.2
2
.7
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
1
.1
1
.7
1
.5
2
.1
0
.8
0
.5
1
.9
5
.2
4
.5
0
.4
1
4
.0
0
.5
0
.0
0
.8
3
3
.5
6
 2
1
3
2
.0
1
.7
1
.1
0
.0
C
Z
E
M
e
a
n
1
.0
7
.8
8
.3
2
.6
8
.0
8
.3
0
.1
8
.3
7
.9
0
.7
0
.5
1
0
.4
0
.3
1
.0
1
.0
6
0
.7
1
3
 8
9
9
3
.4
8
.6
2
.6
0
.0
S
D
0
.3
0
.8
1
.3
0
.5
0
.0
0
.8
0
.3
1
.8
1
4
.4
4
.4
0
.5
1
1
.1
0
.5
0
.0
0
.1
1
.8
4
 8
6
9
3
.7
1
.0
1
.8
0
.0
D
E
U
M
e
a
n
0
.9
2
.8
9
.0
2
.0
6
.6
7
.6
0
.0
9
.7
1
.2
0
.1
0
.3
1
.3
0
.0
0
.2
1
.0
1
0
3
.7
3
6
 1
5
7
1
.1
1
1
.2
1
.6
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
0
.8
1
.0
1
.1
1
.0
0
.6
0
.0
2
.6
2
.4
3
.9
0
.5
2
.8
0
.1
0
.4
0
.1
8
.4
6
 6
1
0
2
.6
1
.8
0
.7
0
.0
D
N
K
M
e
a
n
1
.0
5
.6
9
.1
2
.2
8
.0
7
.8
0
.2
8
.4
2
.9
0
.7
0
.3
3
.0
0
.1
1
.0
6
.6
5
6
.4
5
0
 3
0
6
0
.5
1
4
.6
2
.1
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
0
.6
1
.1
1
.0
0
.0
0
.8
0
.4
2
.0
5
.5
2
.4
0
.5
7
.5
0
.3
0
.0
1
.0
6
.9
1
0
 1
0
6
2
.5
2
.5
0
.6
0
.0
E
S
P
M
e
a
n
0
.8
2
.8
9
.1
4
.8
7
.6
8
.6
0
.2
9
.3
2
.5
0
.6
0
.4
1
.3
0
.0
0
.4
1
.8
1
1
1
.8
2
6
 5
0
6
2
.0
2
3
.7
2
.8
1
.0
S
D
0
.2
0
.8
1
.0
0
.4
0
.5
0
.5
0
.7
1
.8
4
.3
1
.7
0
.5
3
.7
0
.2
0
.5
0
.2
3
0
.9
6
 3
0
6
2
.3
1
.7
1
.2
0
.0
E
S
T
M
e
a
n
1
.0
3
.1
1
2
.0
2
.6
8
.0
7
.7
0
.1
6
.4
3
.6
2
.1
0
.2
1
7
.7
0
.4
1
.0
4
.4
3
9
.8
1
1
 2
3
7
4
.5
7
.4
4
.2
0
.0
S
D
0
.4
1
.8
0
.9
1
.1
0
.0
0
.7
0
.4
2
.5
4
.2
4
.3
0
.4
2
6
.7
0
.5
0
.0
0
.7
1
0
.1
4
 4
4
6
6
.6
2
.2
2
.6
0
.0
F
IN
M
e
a
n
1
.2
4
.0
7
.9
1
.1
6
.5
7
.5
0
.2
8
.5
0
.5
1
.3
0
.5
7
.3
0
.2
1
.0
2
.7
5
2
.9
4
0
 0
8
1
1
.7
1
8
.3
1
.7
0
.0
S
D
0
.7
0
.9
1
.0
1
.1
1
.5
1
.9
0
.4
2
.5
0
.9
3
.9
0
.5
1
3
.9
0
.4
0
.0
0
.3
6
.7
8
 5
5
3
3
.9
7
.2
1
.3
0
.0
F
R
A
M
e
a
n
0
.8
4
.3
9
.1
3
.4
6
.7
7
.9
0
.2
9
.1
3
.0
1
.1
0
.4
0
.6
0
.0
0
.0
2
.5
7
0
.2
3
4
 6
6
4
1
.1
1
6
.2
1
.7
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
1
.9
1
.0
1
.4
0
.7
0
.9
0
.4
2
.1
4
.5
2
.8
0
.5
2
.0
0
.1
0
.0
0
.1
6
.7
7
 1
8
1
1
.6
2
.9
0
.6
0
.0
G
B
R
M
e
a
n
2
.1
0
.1
8
.1
3
.0
8
.0
8
.5
0
.0
8
.4
1
.1
1
.0
0
.4
0
.6
0
.0
0
.0
2
.7
1
2
7
.0
3
5
 9
6
1
1
.6
1
1
.1
2
.0
1
.0
S
D
1
7
.5
0
.3
1
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.5
0
.0
2
.6
3
.3
9
.5
0
.5
1
.9
0
.1
0
.0
0
.1
2
2
.5
6
 6
0
2
2
.5
5
.0
0
.7
0
.0
Descriptive Statistics  165 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
  
NSFR
REST
RBP
CAPR
ERQ
PRM
OWN
LTA
LLRGL
ROAA
DIV
BASA
SYS
CON
BMC
BGDP
GDPC
GGDP
BZS
INF
CRC
G
R
C
M
e
a
n
0
.8
5
.0
9
.1
2
.5
7
.0
8
.3
0
.2
9
.5
4
.0
-0
.5
0
.3
6
.9
0
.3
1
.0
1
.3
8
6
.2
2
4
 6
8
7
1
.1
2
.1
3
.3
1
.0
S
D
0
.2
0
.0
1
.8
0
.5
0
.0
0
.8
0
.4
1
.5
4
.3
4
.4
0
.5
8
.0
0
.4
0
.0
0
.1
1
0
.7
3
 9
5
9
4
.1
1
.7
0
.9
0
.0
H
K
G
M
e
a
n
2
.2
1
.5
9
.3
2
.1
6
.2
8
.6
0
.2
8
.5
1
.2
1
.5
0
.6
2
.5
0
.1
1
.0
6
.0
2
6
7
.9
2
8
 7
6
8
4
.8
1
1
.7
1
.6
0
.0
S
D
1
5
.9
0
.5
0
.5
1
.0
0
.4
0
.9
0
.4
2
.3
2
.2
5
.7
0
.5
5
.9
0
.3
0
.0
0
.3
2
7
.5
3
 3
1
7
3
.3
1
.9
2
.2
0
.0
H
U
N
M
e
a
n
1
.7
6
.3
1
1
.8
4
.4
7
.9
8
.1
0
.3
7
.7
2
.7
1
.7
0
.4
6
.6
0
.2
1
.0
1
.6
4
2
.6
1
0
 8
2
8
1
.9
1
5
.6
5
.5
1
.0
S
D
1
0
.0
1
.5
0
.4
0
.5
0
.3
0
.8
0
.4
2
.1
3
.9
4
.4
0
.5
7
.9
0
.4
0
.0
0
.1
4
.3
3
 0
4
6
3
.3
1
.6
1
.7
0
.0
IR
L
M
e
a
n
0
.7
3
.6
1
0
.7
2
.6
4
.5
8
.6
0
.2
9
.9
2
.1
0
.0
0
.3
4
.8
0
.2
0
.8
5
.3
9
1
.4
4
8
 4
1
2
2
.3
3
.4
2
.4
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
0
.5
2
.0
0
.5
4
.0
0
.5
0
.4
1
.7
5
.7
3
.7
0
.5
7
.2
0
.4
0
.4
0
.9
1
4
.0
8
 2
2
3
4
.1
1
.9
2
.7
0
.0
IS
L
M
e
a
n
1
.2
4
.9
8
.2
2
.9
7
.9
7
.5
0
.5
7
.4
3
.3
1
.7
0
.4
1
0
.0
0
.3
1
.0
3
7
.7
6
8
.9
4
7
 2
3
7
3
.7
-0
.4
5
.5
1
.0
S
D
0
.6
1
.2
1
.5
1
.0
0
.3
0
.5
0
.5
1
.7
5
.5
6
.0
0
.5
1
4
.2
0
.4
0
.0
1
1
.4
1
9
.9
1
1
 6
1
1
3
.7
1
.8
2
.9
0
.0
IS
R
M
e
a
n
1
.0
9
.3
8
.0
3
.6
4
.1
9
.1
0
.2
9
.1
3
.1
0
.7
0
.3
8
.7
0
.3
1
.0
1
.7
8
6
.6
2
2
 3
5
8
3
.2
2
4
.5
2
.2
0
.0
S
D
0
.3
0
.7
1
.0
0
.9
1
.9
0
.3
0
.4
1
.6
2
.2
1
.2
0
.5
9
.7
0
.5
0
.0
0
.3
2
.7
4
 5
6
1
2
.3
2
.3
1
.8
0
.0
IT
A
M
e
a
n
0
.9
6
.4
7
.8
2
.2
8
.0
8
.4
0
.2
9
.2
2
.8
0
.7
0
.1
1
.4
0
.0
0
.5
1
.3
6
3
.0
3
1
 2
2
2
0
.4
1
3
.6
2
.2
0
.0
S
D
0
.4
1
.3
2
.1
0
.4
0
.0
0
.8
0
.4
1
.8
3
.4
1
.9
0
.4
3
.7
0
.2
0
.5
0
.1
1
3
.7
5
 6
1
9
2
.2
4
.8
0
.7
0
.0
J
P
N
M
e
a
n
0
.9
7
.8
1
0
.3
2
.1
6
.9
8
.8
0
.0
9
.9
4
.1
0
.0
0
.8
0
.5
0
.0
0
.1
1
.4
1
9
4
.4
3
5
 0
4
5
0
.4
9
.9
-0
.2
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
0
.9
0
.7
0
.3
0
.3
0
.6
0
.0
1
.5
1
8
.7
2
.8
0
.4
1
.5
0
.1
0
.3
0
.0
7
.5
2
 4
2
5
2
.3
2
.3
0
.7
0
.0
K
O
R
M
e
a
n
0
.8
8
.1
9
.2
2
.4
7
.7
1
0
.0
0
.7
1
0
.9
2
.1
0
.8
0
.6
5
.2
0
.1
0
.2
0
.4
6
5
.0
1
7
 5
3
7
4
.1
6
.0
3
.3
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
2
.0
1
.5
0
.9
0
.5
0
.8
0
.5
1
.1
1
.0
0
.8
0
.5
4
.0
0
.3
0
.4
0
.1
3
.9
3
 7
1
0
1
.8
1
.7
0
.7
0
.0
L
T
U
M
e
a
n
0
.9
6
.1
1
1
.3
2
.0
8
.0
7
.8
0
.4
7
.0
3
.5
0
.3
0
.2
1
3
.7
0
.5
1
.0
2
.2
3
0
.3
9
 1
5
7
4
.4
5
.6
3
.4
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
1
.7
1
.5
1
.1
0
.0
1
.0
0
.8
1
.5
3
.5
1
.7
0
.4
1
4
.3
0
.5
0
.0
0
.2
7
.6
3
 4
5
0
7
.0
1
.6
3
.2
0
.0
L
U
X
M
e
a
n
1
.2
4
.7
1
1
.2
2
.4
8
.0
8
.2
1
.2
9
.4
0
.8
1
.0
0
.4
6
.6
0
.2
0
.7
3
3
.3
3
3
8
.5
8
9
 3
4
7
2
.3
3
2
.2
2
.3
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
2
.1
1
.0
0
.8
0
.0
0
.4
0
.4
1
.7
1
.2
2
.8
0
.5
6
.8
0
.4
0
.5
5
.3
3
6
.7
2
4
 1
4
9
3
.3
2
.7
0
.9
0
.0
L
V
A
M
e
a
n
1
.1
3
.7
1
0
.5
3
.1
8
.0
8
.0
0
.3
6
.7
4
.7
0
.1
0
.3
7
.8
0
.3
1
.0
6
.4
3
4
.1
9
 9
8
2
3
.2
3
.4
6
.0
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
0
.4
0
.6
1
.2
0
.0
0
.7
0
.4
1
.5
6
.5
3
.0
0
.4
8
.6
0
.5
0
.0
1
.4
6
.4
3
 4
2
7
9
.2
0
.7
4
.7
0
.0
M
E
X
M
e
a
n
1
.0
4
.5
9
.8
3
.0
8
.0
9
.3
0
.8
8
.4
5
.6
1
.5
0
.2
2
.9
0
.1
0
.0
0
.3
2
2
.5
8
 3
6
1
2
.0
2
6
.4
4
.5
0
.0
S
D
0
.4
2
.1
1
.2
0
.9
0
.0
1
.0
0
.8
1
.8
7
.6
3
.6
0
.4
3
.8
0
.3
0
.0
0
.0
2
.0
1
 3
1
4
3
.4
4
.7
0
.8
0
.0
M
L
T
M
e
a
n
1
.3
6
.6
1
2
.6
2
.6
8
.0
8
.1
0
.6
7
.3
3
.3
2
.2
0
.9
1
5
.2
0
.5
1
.0
1
7
.9
1
3
9
.1
1
7
 1
0
2
1
.7
1
6
.3
2
.4
0
.0
S
D
0
.6
0
.5
0
.6
0
.5
0
.0
0
.2
0
.5
1
.3
4
.5
5
.3
0
.4
1
5
.1
0
.5
0
.0
3
.7
4
.6
3
 5
5
5
2
.4
4
.2
0
.9
0
.0
N
L
D
M
e
a
n
1
.0
1
.6
8
.8
3
.1
7
.6
8
.0
0
.2
9
.3
0
.9
0
.7
0
.3
2
.4
0
.1
1
.0
2
.7
1
1
1
.9
4
0
 6
0
1
1
.4
8
.9
2
.0
1
.0
S
D
0
.5
0
.5
1
.0
0
.5
0
.5
0
.9
0
.4
2
.3
2
.6
4
.3
0
.4
6
.2
0
.3
0
.0
0
.3
1
4
.7
8
 7
5
6
1
.9
6
.6
0
.9
0
.0
N
O
R
M
e
a
n
0
.9
3
.8
9
.0
5
.0
8
.0
7
.7
1
.0
8
.0
1
.1
1
.8
0
.5
3
.1
0
.1
1
.0
7
.9
4
9
.9
6
2
 3
7
3
2
.5
2
4
.3
1
.7
0
.0
S
D
0
.3
2
.8
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.5
0
.0
1
.7
0
.8
4
.5
0
.5
7
.5
0
.3
0
.0
1
.0
1
.1
9
 0
3
5
1
.0
1
.9
0
.8
0
.0
N
Z
L
M
e
a
n
1
.1
0
.5
7
.2
0
.2
6
.5
1
0
.8
0
.1
8
.0
0
.6
2
.0
0
.4
9
.3
0
.4
1
.0
2
.9
8
0
.5
2
5
 9
1
1
2
.3
1
8
.7
2
.6
0
.0
S
D
0
.5
1
.7
0
.4
0
.6
0
.5
0
.6
0
.3
2
.5
0
.8
3
.6
0
.5
1
0
.6
0
.5
0
.0
0
.5
6
.6
5
 4
2
3
2
.0
7
.1
0
.7
0
.0
166 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
  
 M
e
a
n
 a
n
d
 S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 p
e
r 
c
o
u
n
tr
y
: 
A
R
E
 (
U
n
it
e
d
 A
ra
b
 E
m
ir
a
te
s
),
 A
U
S
 (
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
),
 A
U
T
 (
A
u
s
tr
ia
),
 B
E
L
 (
B
e
lg
iu
m
),
 B
G
R
 (
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
),
 C
A
N
 (
C
a
n
a
d
a
),
 C
H
E
 (
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
),
 C
H
N
 (
C
h
in
a
),
 C
Y
P
 
(R
e
p
u
b
lic
 o
f 
C
y
p
ru
s
),
 C
Z
E
 (
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
),
 D
E
U
 (
G
e
rm
a
n
y
),
 D
N
K
 (
D
e
n
m
a
rk
),
 E
S
P
 (
S
p
a
in
),
 E
S
T
 (
E
s
to
n
ia
),
 F
IN
 (
F
in
la
n
d
),
 F
R
A
 (
F
ra
n
c
e
),
 G
B
R
 (
U
n
it
e
d
 
K
in
g
d
o
m
),
 G
R
C
 (
G
re
e
c
e
),
 H
K
G
 (
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
),
 H
U
N
 (
H
u
n
g
a
ry
),
 I
R
L
 (
Ir
e
la
n
d
),
 I
S
L
 (
Ic
e
la
n
d
),
 I
S
R
 (
Is
ra
e
l)
, 
IT
A
 (
It
a
ly
),
 J
P
N
 (
J
a
p
a
n
),
 K
O
R
 (
R
e
p
u
b
lic
 o
f 
K
o
re
a
),
 
L
T
U
 (
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
),
 L
U
X
 (
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
),
 L
V
A
 (
L
a
tv
ia
),
 M
E
X
 (
M
e
x
ic
o
),
 M
L
T
 (
M
a
lt
a
),
 N
L
D
 (
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
),
 N
O
R
 (
N
o
rw
a
y
),
 N
Z
L
 (
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
),
 P
O
L
 (
P
o
la
n
d
),
 
P
R
T
 (
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l)
, 
R
U
S
 (
R
u
s
s
ia
n
 F
e
d
e
ra
ti
o
n
),
 S
G
P
 (
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
),
 S
V
K
 (
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
),
 S
V
N
 (
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
),
 S
W
E
 (
S
w
e
d
e
n
),
 T
U
R
 (
T
u
rk
e
y
),
 U
S
A
 (
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s
 o
f 
A
m
e
ri
c
a
) 
 a
n
d
 p
e
r 
v
a
ri
a
b
le
: 
N
S
F
R
 (
n
e
t 
s
ta
b
le
 f
u
n
d
in
g
 r
a
ti
o
),
 R
E
S
T
 (
re
s
tr
ic
ti
o
n
),
 R
B
P
 (
re
g
u
la
to
ry
 b
o
d
y
 p
o
w
e
r)
, 
C
A
P
R
 (
c
a
p
it
a
l 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
),
 E
R
Q
 (
e
n
tr
y
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
),
 P
R
M
 (
p
ri
v
a
te
 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
),
 O
W
N
 (
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
),
 L
T
A
 (
lo
g
 o
f 
to
ta
l a
s
s
e
ts
),
 L
L
R
G
L
 (
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
lo
a
n
 l
o
s
s
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
s
 t
o
 g
ro
s
s
 l
o
a
n
s
),
 R
O
A
A
 (
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
s
s
e
ts
),
 D
IV
 (
d
iv
id
e
n
d
 
d
u
m
m
y
),
 B
A
S
A
 (
b
a
n
k
’s
 t
o
ta
l 
a
s
s
e
ts
 t
o
 s
u
m
 o
f 
a
ll 
b
a
n
k
s
’ 
to
ta
l 
a
s
s
e
ts
 o
f 
a
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
),
 S
Y
S
 (
d
u
m
m
y
 f
o
r 
s
y
s
te
m
 r
e
le
v
a
n
c
e
),
 C
O
N
 (
b
a
n
k
 c
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
),
 B
M
C
 
(b
a
n
k
s
 p
e
r 
m
ill
io
n
 c
a
p
it
a
),
 B
G
D
P
 (
b
a
n
k
 d
e
p
o
s
it
s
 p
e
r 
g
ro
s
s
 d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 p
ro
d
u
c
t)
, 
G
D
P
C
 (
g
ro
s
s
 d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 p
ro
d
u
c
t 
p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 i
n
 U
S
D
),
 G
G
D
P
 (
a
n
n
u
a
l 
g
ro
s
s
 
d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 p
ro
d
u
c
t 
g
ro
w
th
),
 B
Z
S
 (
b
a
n
k
 z
-s
c
o
re
),
 I
N
F
 (
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
),
 C
R
C
 (
c
ri
s
is
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
).
  
 S
o
u
rc
e
: 
O
w
n
 c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
. 
NSFR
REST
RBP
CAPR
ERQ
PRM
OWN
LTA
LLRGL
ROAA
DIV
BASA
SYS
CON
BMC
BGDP
GDPC
GGDP
BZS
INF
CRC
P
O
L
M
e
a
n
0
.9
5
.3
8
.8
2
.5
7
.4
8
.0
0
.2
9
.1
5
.7
1
.3
0
.4
6
.9
0
.2
0
.2
0
.4
4
1
.0
1
0
 0
9
5
4
.1
1
1
.3
3
.0
0
.0
S
D
0
.2
3
.4
0
.8
0
.9
0
.5
0
.0
0
.4
1
.0
4
.4
1
.5
0
.5
5
.8
0
.4
0
.4
0
.1
4
.6
3
 0
4
9
1
.7
1
.5
1
.3
0
.0
P
R
T
M
e
a
n
0
.8
6
.8
1
1
.9
3
.3
7
.0
6
.5
0
.2
8
.7
3
.1
0
.9
0
.5
4
.2
0
.1
1
.0
2
.3
9
5
.7
1
8
 4
9
9
0
.5
1
6
.5
2
.6
1
.0
S
D
0
.3
1
.8
0
.3
0
.9
0
.0
0
.5
0
.4
1
.8
3
.7
1
.6
0
.5
6
.3
0
.3
0
.0
0
.3
1
5
.6
3
 8
4
5
1
.5
4
.5
1
.3
0
.0
R
U
S
M
e
a
n
1
.0
3
.7
7
.4
3
.3
7
.7
8
.5
0
.3
7
.5
6
.4
1
.8
0
.4
1
.4
0
.0
0
.8
0
.6
2
6
.6
7
 6
5
0
4
.7
8
.0
1
1
.6
1
.0
S
D
0
.4
0
.5
1
.1
1
.0
0
.5
0
.6
0
.4
1
.7
5
.1
4
.7
0
.5
4
.9
0
.2
0
.4
0
.1
7
.6
3
 5
3
3
4
.6
1
.4
3
.5
0
.0
S
G
P
M
e
a
n
1
.4
6
.2
1
0
.5
2
.9
8
.0
1
0
.3
0
.1
7
.9
5
.1
2
.3
0
.7
6
.2
0
.3
1
.0
3
.7
1
0
4
.3
2
8
 8
7
8
4
.6
2
0
.7
1
.5
0
.0
S
D
0
.7
1
.0
1
.3
0
.3
0
.0
0
.7
0
.3
2
.5
1
4
.0
3
.9
0
.4
9
.8
0
.5
0
.0
0
.5
8
.3
5
 7
0
7
4
.0
5
.8
1
.9
0
.0
S
V
K
M
e
a
n
1
.1
7
.5
1
1
.1
2
.6
8
.0
6
.4
0
.2
7
.9
5
.3
1
.2
0
.4
1
1
.3
0
.4
1
.0
1
.7
5
2
.4
1
2
 7
7
0
4
.5
8
.0
4
.3
0
.0
S
D
0
.3
1
.2
0
.8
0
.5
0
.0
0
.8
0
.4
1
.3
4
.6
2
.3
0
.5
1
0
.7
0
.5
0
.0
0
.2
2
.9
4
 1
7
8
3
.8
1
.0
2
.4
0
.0
S
V
N
M
e
a
n
0
.8
6
.2
1
2
.3
4
.7
7
.7
7
.9
0
.6
7
.6
5
.5
0
.5
0
.4
9
.2
0
.2
1
.0
5
.8
5
2
.2
1
9
 9
7
3
2
.3
1
3
.7
3
.7
1
.0
S
D
0
.3
1
.2
0
.5
0
.5
0
.5
0
.3
0
.5
1
.2
4
.0
1
.2
0
.5
1
2
.2
0
.4
0
.0
0
.8
3
.3
5
 1
7
6
4
.0
1
.7
2
.3
0
.0
S
W
E
M
e
a
n
1
.0
4
.6
6
.9
2
.1
6
.9
7
.0
0
.0
8
.9
1
.1
0
.9
0
.4
3
.6
0
.1
1
.0
3
.1
4
6
.9
4
3
 5
6
1
1
.9
1
9
.6
1
.3
1
.0
S
D
0
.5
1
.5
1
.0
1
.0
1
.0
0
.0
0
.0
2
.3
3
.5
2
.1
0
.5
7
.3
0
.4
0
.0
0
.3
5
.5
5
 6
5
3
3
.0
2
.0
1
.2
0
.0
T
U
R
M
e
a
n
1
.1
4
.3
1
2
.3
4
.7
7
.2
8
.6
0
.3
7
.7
5
.6
1
.3
0
.3
3
.3
0
.1
0
.0
0
.5
3
4
.3
5
 9
4
9
5
.9
9
.4
2
3
.0
0
.0
S
D
0
.4
2
.0
1
.1
0
.7
0
.4
1
.0
0
.5
2
.1
6
.9
5
.0
0
.4
4
.7
0
.4
0
.0
0
.1
5
.7
2
 4
4
9
4
.7
8
.9
1
7
.4
0
.0
U
S
A
M
e
a
n
1
.0
7
.4
1
1
.7
2
.9
7
.9
8
.1
0
.1
6
.9
1
.5
0
.8
0
.7
0
.1
0
.0
0
.0
6
.6
7
1
.0
4
2
 1
0
8
1
.9
2
3
.4
2
.5
1
.0
S
D
2
.5
0
.7
0
.4
0
.9
0
.3
0
.3
0
.3
1
.7
1
.2
2
.3
0
.4
0
.4
0
.0
0
.0
2
.2
5
.9
4
 0
3
9
1
.8
1
.4
1
.0
0
.0
M
e
a
n
1
.1
6
.0
1
0
.7
2
.9
7
.7
8
.2
0
.2
7
.8
2
.1
0
.9
0
.6
1
.3
0
.0
0
.2
5
.1
8
5
.4
3
7
 5
2
5
1
.9
1
9
.0
2
.6
0
.8
S
D
4
.8
2
.4
1
.7
1
.1
0
.8
0
.8
0
.4
2
.2
5
.2
3
.4
0
.5
4
.6
0
.2
0
.4
4
.1
4
4
.0
1
2
 0
5
2
2
.5
7
.0
2
.8
0
.4
T
o
ta
l
Descriptive Statistics  167 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
Table VII.4: Significance of mean NSFR differences between countries  
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An analysis of the change that occurs in important variables during the 
observation horizon shows that the highest NSFR average across all 
banks was 1.4 in 2007; i.e. just before/during the financial crisis (tables 
not displayed). This is significantly (at least at the 10% level) higher than 
the average for the years 2001 to 2004 and for 2008 (indicating that the 
NSFRs dropped during the financial crisis). Furthermore, the average for 
2011 is significantly higher than the one for 2001 and 2003. The mean 
of the six various regulatory variables (tables not displayed) is 
significantly120 higher in 2011 than in 2001, 2003 and 2008; the only 
exception is the mean for the Regulatory Body Power index, which is 
higher in 2003 than in 2011. This supports the obvious assumption that 
the regulation became more severe after the financial crisis. The 
significant mean differences for the various years confirm that it makes 
sense to include time dummies in the regressions.121  
Considering these observations, the next section, section VII.5, aims to 
give explanations for the significant differences in the NSFRs.
                                            
120  At least at the 10% level.  
121  A regression with just the time dummies on the NSFR results in a significant F-test value 
and additionally supports this statement.   
170 Regression Results 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
VII.5. Regression Results 
Table VII.5 reveals the result of the basis regression. The diagnostics 
obtained, which are discussed in section VII.3.3, do not contradict the 
model. There is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
regarding the second-order serial correlation Arellano-Bond test, 
indicating that there is no second-order serial correlation. Further, there 
is insufficient evidence to reject the Hansen test for over-identification, 
implying that the instruments used are valid. Analogously, there is not 
enough evidence for rejecting the null hypotheses related to the 
difference-in-Hansen test.122 The coefficient obtained on the lagged 
dependent variable (0.44) is higher than the coefficient resulting from a 
fixed effect estimation (0.30) and lower than the one from an OLS 
estimation (0.59). These results assume that there are no endogeneity 
issues and suggest that the system GMM method is preferable to the 
difference GMM method,123 since the steady state assumption seems to 
be satisfied. There is a low number of instruments (71) relative to the 
number of various individual banks (8 182) and observations (32 855), 
which supplements the evidence that the regression is not weakened by 
too many instruments. In view of these supporting test diagnostics, the 
following passage discusses the results of the regression.       
  
                                            
122  The figures listed in my regression tables show the test statistics of the two default 
difference-in-Hansen tests of XTABOND2 in STATA. The default separately calculates 
a statistic for every instrument subset: one for the exogeneity of the lagged differences of 
endogenous/predetermined variables in the level equation and one for the exogeneity of 
the non-endogenous or non-predetermined instrumental variables. Yet, XTABOND2 
offers the possibility to perform further distinctions of the difference-in-Hansen test. As 
Roodman (2009a, p. 148) states “[…] researchers should consider applying a difference-
in-Hansen test to all the system GMM instruments for the levels equation […]” As in 
Lucadamo (2016), performing a separate difference-in-Hansen test for all instruments 
separately does not reveal problems in the regression.  
123  Nevertheless, the content of the results does not change when using the difference GMM 
instead of the system GMM.     
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Table VII.5: Basis Regression 
One-step system GMM regression with robust standard errors. Dummy control variables and 
constant not displayed.  
 
NSFR (net stable funding ratio) is the dependent variable.  
L.NSFR (lagged NSFR) is an endogenous explanatory variable with instrument lags 2 to 4.  
REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital regulation), ERQ (entry 
requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log of total assets), LLRGL 
(ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (Return on average assets), DIV (dividend 
dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets of a country), SYS 
(dummy for system relevance) are predetermined explanatory variables with instrument lags 
1 to 3.  
CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross 
domestic product), GDPC (gross domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross 
domestic product growth), BZS (bank Z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) are 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables.  
 
*** shows a significance at the 1% level for the various variables and test diagnostics, ** at 
the 5% level and * at the 10% level. df are the degrees of freedom for the test diagnostics.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Explanatory variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-value
L.NSFR + 0.4368 *** (2.75)
REST + 0.0589 (1.21)
RBP + -0.0362 (-1.11)
CAPR + -0.1256 ** (-2.16)
ERQ + -0.3971 (-1.45)
PRM +/- -0.5847 * (-1.69)
OWN + -0.5865 (-1.46)
LTA - -0.1958 (-1.02)
LLRGL + -0.0036 (-0.70)
ROAA +/- 0.0048 (1.06)
DIV +/- -0.1469 (-0.59)
BASA +/- 0.0014 (0.03)
SYS +/- -0.1497 (-0.52)
CON +/- -0.0034 (-0.04)
BMC +/- -0.0233 * (-1.86)
BGDP +/- 0.0030 ** (2.26)
GDPC +/- 0.0000 (0.88)
GGDP +/- 0.0556 ** (2.15)
BZS +/- -0.0105 (-1.02)
INF +/- 0.0041 (0.26)
CRC +/- -0.1780 (-0.64)
Observations: 32 885
Groups: 5 182
Instruments 71
0.31
32.58
13.22
11.55
Dependent variable: NSFR
Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (df = 36)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM 
style instrument subset (df = 13)
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of IV 
style instrument subset (df = 19)
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As noted above, the coefficient on the lagged NSFR (1 – λ) has a positive 
sign and is below unity; the significance is at the 1% level. This result is 
the only one that is robust for all the mentioned key robustness checks 
(refer to the overview of the results of the checks in Table VII.6). It 
therefore seems that a substantial part of the current NSFR is influenced 
by the past ratio and that the lagged NSFR is one of the fundamental 
variables to explain the current NSFR. However, the relatively low 
coefficient implies a high speed of adjustment λ of 0.56, compared to the 
low speed of 0.06 obtained for the capital ratio by Lucadamo (2016). 
This indicates that banks rapidly close the gap between the past NSFR 
and the target NSFR every year (in contrast to the past capital ratio and 
its target value) and they adapt flexibly to changing circumstances.  
With respect to the regulatory variables, the basis regression shows 
significant coefficients on two variables: the index for private monitoring 
(PRM) and the one for capital regulation (CAPR). The significance level 
is 10% and 5% respectively and the sign is negative for both coefficients. 
The negative sign related to the private monitoring variable implies that 
a greater dependence on private monitoring and, in turn, a lower 
dependence on direct regulation seem to lead to lower bank NSFRs; this 
result also occurred for the capital ratio in Lucadamo (2016). However, 
stricter capital regulation also seems to decrease the NSFRs. A possible 
explanation could be that banks – when setting their priorities – 
negatively disregard their liquidity structure and try to fulfil the 
regulations regarding the capital ratios (even though Lucadamo, 2016 
has not found the severity of the capital regulation on the capital ratios 
to have a significant impact). This somehow disagrees with theories that 
state that “higher equity requirements benefit rather than interfere with 
liquidity provision” (Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig & Pfleiderer, 2013,  
p. 37). Note that both coefficients are not completely robust;124 when 
considering the regression results without the USA in particular, it seems 
that the two variables are of interest primarily for US banks and not for 
banks outside the USA. 
                                            
124  They lose their significance in the regression without lag limits and collapse option, in the 
regression without US banks, in the regression with interpolated data (only PRM) and in 
the regression with an alternative NSFR calculation. 
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Table VII.6: Overview of various robustness check results  
Results of the various regressions. “+” means that the coefficient on the corresponding 
variable is positive and significant at least at the 10% level.  “-” means the same for negative 
coefficients. Figures in parentheses “( )” mean that there are changes in the significance 
compared to the basis regression. Figures in exclamation points “! !” mean that there are 
changes in the signs of significant coefficients compared to the basis regression.  
 
If just one of the test diagnostics discussed is not within the expected result, this is indicated 
as “not ok” in the lowermost line.  
 
The variables are: NSFR (net stable funding ratio), L.NSFR (lag of NSFR), TCR (total capital 
ratio), L.TCR (lag of TCR), REST (restriction), RBP (regulatory body power), CAPR (capital 
regulation), ERQ (entry requirements), PRM (private monitoring), OWN (ownership), LTA (log 
of total assets), LLRGL (ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans), ROAA (return on average 
assets), DIV (dividend dummy), BASA (bank’s total assets to sum of all banks’ total assets 
of a country), SYS (dummy for system relevance), CON (bank concentration), BMC (banks 
per million capita), BGDP (bank deposits per gross domestic product), GDPC (gross 
domestic product per capita in USD), GGDP (annual gross domestic product growth), BZS 
(bank Z-score), INF (inflation), CRC (crisis country) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Predicted 
 sign
Basis 
GMM 
regression. 
 Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
GMM 
regression 
without lag 
limits and 
collapse 
option.
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
GMM 
regression 
with further 
restricted 
lags.
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
GMM 
regression 
without 
USA.
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
GMM 
regression 
without 
outliers. 
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
Basis GMM 
regression 
with 
intrapolated 
data. 
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
Basis GMM 
regression 
without 
regulatory 
variables. 
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
Basis GMM 
regression 
with 
alternative 
NSFR 
calculation. 
Dep. 
variable: 
NSFR.
Explanatory 
variable
L.NSFR + + + + + + + + +
L.LTD + n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
REST + n/a
RBP + (-) n/a
CAPR + - ( ) - ( ) - - n/a ( )
ERQ + n/a
PRM +/- - ( ) - ( ) ( ) ( ) n/a ( )
OWN + (-) n/a
LTA -
LLRGL +
ROAA +/-
DIV +/-
BASA +/-
SYS +/-
CON +/-
BMC +/- - ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) - ( ) ( )
BGDP +/- + ( ) ( ) + + + + ( )
GDPC +/-
GGDP +/- + + + ( ) + + ( ) +
BZS +/- (-)
INF +/-
CRC -
Test 
diagnostics:
ok not ok ok ok not ok ok ok ok
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The other regulatory variables (including the restriction variable, which 
was relevant with respect to the capital ratios in Lucadamo, 2016) seem 
not to have any significant influence in regard to the banks’ NSFRs. In 
other words, although the liquidity structure of banks has received 
increasing attention by the regulators in recent years, the impact of the 
regulatory severity on the NSFR during my observation period is limited. 
It will be interesting to see whether this result will change with the 
introduction of binding NSFR thresholds in Basel III.    
Based on the results of the other country-specific and bank-specific 
variables in Lucadamo (2016), the banks’ riskiness seems to somehow 
be implemented in the banks’ capital ratios. I find a similar, although less 
strong, indication regarding the liquidity structure NSFR: the riskiness 
does not appear to be important with respect to a single bank (since the 
related – and also all other – bank-specific variables are not significant) 
but does seem to be important with regard to the whole banking sector in 
a country. This interpretation follows from the significant coefficients on 
the variables bank deposits per gross domestic product (BGDP) and 
banks per million capita (BMC). The coefficient for the bank deposits 
per gross domestic product is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
This implies that the more important the banking sector of a country is 
relative to its economy in a specific year, the higher will be the NSFRs 
of the banks of this country. As mentioned, this could be explained by 
the assumption that a more important banking sector is also a riskier 
banking sector and therefore leads to stronger liquidity structures, that 
is, higher NSFRs. Although the result for the bank deposits per gross 
domestic product is not robust in all checks,125 it also applies to banks 
outside the USA, implying that non-US banks also hold higher NSFRs 
in the case of more important banking sectors.  
The coefficient on banks per million capita (BMC) is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. This means that the more banks a country 
has in a specific year relative to its population, the lower the NSFRs of 
these banks appear to be. Given the result of the variable discussed 
previously, a possible interpretation of this negative significance could 
be that a greater number of banks in a country results in a better risk 
                                            
125  The coefficient loses its significance in the regression without lag limits and the collapse 
option, in the regression with further restricted lags and in the regression with an 
alternative NSFR calculation. 
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distribution between these banks and therefore the NSFRs tend to be 
lower. However, in contrast to the variable discussed above, the 
coefficient on banks per million capita loses its significance in almost all 
robustness checks and also in the regression without US banks.126 
Although the isolated variable should therefore not be over-interpreted, 
it nevertheless emphasises the result of the variable bank deposits per 
gross domestic product (BGDP).  
The last significant coefficient in the basis regression is the one on the 
annual gross domestic product growth (GGDP). The sign is positive and 
is significant at the 5% level. Again, the result is not robust for 
regressions without US banks (although it is quite robust with respect to 
the other robustness checks127). Therefore, the interpretation is that 
positive growth in the annual gross domestic product leads to higher 
NSFRs for US banks (note that the absolute value of the gross domestic 
product per capita itself seems not to matter). This might be because 
strong growth phases resulted in US banks being more profitable and 
using the profits to build up strong liquidity structures (and not e.g. to 
use the profits to pay out higher dividends, as the non-significant 
coefficient on the dividend dummy variable [DIV] confirms).   
To summarise, the basis regression shows some expected results, but the 
robustness checks imply that the NSFR setting process is much more 
unpredictable in nature than the capital ratio setting process. The various 
explanatory variables seem to matter mainly for US banks, whereas there 
is limited evidence for factors influencing the liquidity structure of non-
US banks. Nevertheless, note that the various results do not give 
evidence that casts doubt on the accuracy of the correct disclosure of the 
dependent variable NSFR (as Lucadamo, 2016 finds regarding the capital 
ratios).  
The next section, section VII.6, summarises these results and concludes 
the paper. 
                                            
126  It is only robust in the regression with interpolated data.  
127  Apart from the regression without US banks, it loses its significance only in the regression 
without regulatory variables.  
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VII.6. Conclusion and Outlook 
Many studies have tried to find explanatory factors for the capital ratios 
of banks and the influence of regulation on the capital ratios (i.e. a ratio 
of a bank’s equity figure to its asset figure). In contrast, researchers have 
so far neglected studies on the liquidity structure of banks (i.e. a ratio of 
a bank’s available funding to its required funding).   
Prompted by this lack of empirical evidence, I examine explanatory 
factors for the liquidity structure ratios – using the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) – of banks following a study by Lucadamo (2016), which 
inspected the same with regard to the capital ratios. I focus on banks from 
43 developed countries in the time period between 2000 and 2011 and 
apply various regulatory, bank-specific and country-specific explanatory 
variables. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an additional 
explanatory factor forms a partial adjustment model, which I calculate 
using the GMM method.   
An analysis of the data reveals that there are significant differences in 
the average NSFRs between most countries. One could therefore expect 
to find significant regulatory and other country-specific explanatory 
variables. During the observation horizon, the average NSFRs increased 
until the financial crisis and then dropped significantly during the crisis, 
before they once again started to build up after the crisis. Likewise, it 
seems that bank regulation all over the world became stricter after the 
crisis, illustrated by higher average mean regulatory variables at the end 
of the observation horizon.  One could therefore expect that the (more 
severe) regulation influences the liquidity structure ratios.  
Indeed, my results find evidence for opposite effects that seem to be 
particularly relevant for US banks: greater private monitoring such as 
external audits and credit ratings results in banks having lower liquidity 
structure ratios. This is consistent with the effect on capital ratios in 
Lucadamo (2016), revealing that – in general – greater indirect 
regulation (in the sense of increased private monitoring) and therefore 
lower direct regulation seem to lead to weaker bank balance figures. 
Furthermore, I find evidence that greater capital regulation also leads to 
lower liquidity structure ratios. A possible explanation for this 
observation might be that banks prioritise compliance with the capital 
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ratio standards and not the liquidity structure ratios, because binding 
standards have not yet been implemented for the latter.  
I do not find any significant bank-specific explanatory factors and the 
highly significant and robust coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is relatively low (compared with the coefficient on the lagged 
capital ratio in Lucadamo, 2016). This gives evidence that banks alter 
their NSFRs relatively quickly to their desired ratio, but this desired ratio 
is idiosyncratic for every single bank.  
Nevertheless, interpreting the other country-specific variables, I find 
evidence that the importance – and therefore the risk – of a country’s 
banking sector as a whole influences the liquidity structures of the banks 
of these countries: higher importance seems to lead to higher NSFRs. 
This result is consistent with the result for capital ratios in Lucadamo 
(2016). Additionally, I find that higher growth in the annual domestic 
product leads to higher NSFRs, indicating that banks do not pay out all 
of their profits in times of economic growth. As for the regulatory 
variables discussed above, this result also seem to be highly influenced 
by US banks, that is, the growth rate in the annual domestic product does 
not seem to be relevant for banks outside the USA.  
What are the implications for the future of bank regulation? Obviously, 
past regulation has had a limited impact on banks’ liquidity structure in 
the various countries – as would also seem to be the case with regard to 
the capital structure in Lucadamo (2016). The latter may be somewhat 
surprising, taking into account that bank regulation often focused on the 
capital structure. As far as the former is concerned, however, it might be 
understandable, since bank regulators are just starting to implement 
binding rules for the liquidity structure. The fact that no substantial 
connection between bank regulation and liquidity structure was found in 
the past does not mean that regulation of the liquidity structure could not 
be an effective regulatory instrument in future. Especially in light of the 
frequent accusation that the capital ratio (alone) might be too imprecise 
an instrument (as e.g. supposed by Lucadamo, 2016), binding rules on 
the more easily calculable, and therefore the more easily controllable 
NSFR, could become a meaningful supplementary instrument. 
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VII.8. Appendices 
VII.8.1. Detailed Explanations of Variables 
Name of variable Explanation Source 
Net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) 
Measure of (regulatory) liquidity 
structure, calculating the available 
amount of stable funding as a percentage 
of the required amount of stable funding.  
Own calculation 
based on 
Bankscope128 
and on 
classification 
made by Vazquez 
and Federico 
(2012).  
Restriction (REST) Measure for regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 14 
and is composed as following: It adds 0 
each, if the answer to the following 
questions129 
 4.1 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
securities activities?” 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001).  
                                            
128  Analogous to Lucadamo (2016), observations in Bankscope that only had the value N (i.e. 
no value) for “common positions” were eliminated if they could not be manually 
calculated from other available positions. Common positions are those that are expected 
for every bank (such as total assets). Non-common variables (such as e.g. loan loss 
reserves, i.e. positions that could have no value because the bank does not have any) were 
considered with value 0.  
129  Lucadamo’s (2016) explanations regarding the calculation of the regulatory variables are 
based on the question verbalisation and question numbering from the latest update of the 
survey in 2011, as introduced by Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Peria and Mohseni-Cheraghlou 
(2012). The variables include questions only, which – with regard to contents – also agree 
to the other three surveys. Questions not answered in one of the surveys were considered 
to be “no” if not otherwise derivable.  
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 4.2 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
insurance activities?” 
 4.3 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in real 
estate activities?” 
 4.4 “What are the conditions under 
which banks can engage in 
nonfinancial businesses except 
those businesses that are auxiliary to 
banking business (e.g. IT company, 
debt collection company etc.)?” 
is “A full range of these activities can be 
conducted directly in banks.” 
It adds 1 point each if the answer to the 
above questions is “A full range of these 
activities are offered but all or some of 
these activities must be conducted in 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a 
common holding company or parent.” 
It adds 2 points each if the answer to the 
above questions is “Less than the full 
range of activities can be conducted in 
banks, or subsidiaries, or in another part 
of a common holding company or 
parent.” 
It adds 3 points each if the answer to the 
above questions is “None of these 
activities can be done in either banks or 
subsidiaries, or in another part of a 
common holding company or parent.” 
Moreover, it adds 1 if the answer to 
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
 question 7.2 “Are there any 
regulatory rules or supervisory 
guidelines regarding asset 
diversification?” is yes,  
 question 7.2.2 “Are banks 
prohibited from making loans 
abroad?” is yes.  
Regulatory body 
power (RBP)  
Measure for the direct power of the 
regulatory body following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 13 
and is composed as follows: It adds 1 if 
the answer to 
 question 5.9 “Are auditors required 
to communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or 
senior managers in illicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse?” is yes,  
 question 5.10 “Does the banking 
supervisor have the right to meet 
with the external auditors and 
discuss their report without the 
approval of the bank?” is not no, 
 question 5.12b “In cases where the 
supervisor identifies that the bank 
has received an inadequate audit, 
does the supervisor have the powers 
to take actions against the auditor?” 
is yes, 
 question 5.7.a “Do supervisors 
receive a copy of the following: The 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001).  
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Name of variable Explanation Source 
auditor's report on the financial 
statements” is yes, 
 question 10.5.b “Do banks disclose 
to the supervisors off-balance sheet 
items?” is yes, 
 question 12.3.2 “Can the 
supervisory authority force a bank 
to change its internal organizational 
structure?” is yes, 
 question 11.1.f “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to constitute provisions to cover 
actual or potential losses?” is yes, 
 question 11.1.j “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to reduce or suspend dividends to 
shareholders?” is yes,  
 question 11.1.k “Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the 
supervisory agency: Require banks 
to reduce or suspend bonuses and 
other remuneration to bank directors 
and managers?” is yes, 
 question 11.5.a “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
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activities: Declare insolvency?” is 
“Bank Supervisor”, 
 question 11.5.b “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
activities: Supersede shareholders' 
rights” is “Bank Supervisor”, 
 question 11.5.b “Which authority 
has the powers to perform the 
following problem bank resolution 
activities: Remove and replace bank 
senior management and directors” is 
“Bank Supervisor”, 
 question 12.20 “How frequently are 
onsite inspections conducted in 
large and medium size banks?” is 
more than yearly.  
Capital regulation 
(CAPR) 
Measure for the regulatory oversight of 
bank capital following the survey 
explained in Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable can take a maximum value of 5 
and is composed as follows: It adds 1, if 
the answer to 
 question 1.4.2 “Are the sources of 
funds to be used as capital verified 
by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities?” is yes, 
 question 1.4.3 “Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent 
injections of capital be done with 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001). 
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assets other than cash or government 
securities?” is no, 
 question 1.5 “Can initial capital 
contributions by prospective 
shareholders be in the form of 
borrowed funds?” is no, 
 question 3.2.a “Which risks are 
covered by the current regulatory 
minimum capital requirements in 
your jurisdiction: Credit risk?” is 
yes, 
 question 3.2.a “Which risks are 
covered by the current regulatory 
minimum capital requirements in 
your jurisdiction: Market risk?” is 
yes. 
Entry requirements 
(ERQ) 
Measure for the difficulty of operating as 
a bank in a specific country following the 
survey explained in Barth et al. (2001). 
The variable can take a maximal value of 
8 and is composed as following: It adds 
1, if the answer to 
 question 1.6.a “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Draft bylaws?” is 
yes, 
 question 1.6.b “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Intended 
organizational chart?” is yes, 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001). 
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 question 1.6.d “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Market / business 
strategy?” is yes,  
 question 1.6.e “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Financial 
projections for first three years?” is 
yes, 
 question 1.6.f “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: Financial 
information on main potential 
shareholders?” is yes, 
 question 1.6.g “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: 
Background/experience of future 
Board directors?” is yes, 
 question 1.6.h “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
banking license: 
Background/experience of future 
senior managers?” is yes, 
 question 1.6.i “Which of the 
following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the 
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banking license: Source of funds to 
be used as capital?” is yes. 
Private monitoring 
(PRM) 
Measure for the degree to which the 
private sector is empowered, facilitated 
and encouraged to monitor banks 
following the survey explained in Barth 
et al. (2001). The variable can take a 
maximal value of 12 and is composed as 
following: It adds 1, if the answer to 
 question 5.1 “Is an audit by a 
professional external auditor 
required for all commercial banks in 
your jurisdiction?” is yes, 
 question 5.1.1.a “Does the external 
auditor have to obtain a professional 
certification or pass a specific exam 
to qualify as such?” is yes, 
 question 5.1.2 “Are specific 
requirements for the extent or nature 
of the audit spelled out?” is yes, 
 question 8.1 “Is there an explicit 
deposit insurance protection system 
for commercial banks?” is no, 
 question 9.3 “Does accrued, though 
unpaid, interest/principal enter the 
bank's income statement while the 
loan is classified as non-
performing?” is no, 
 question 9.5 “If a customer has 
multiple loans and advances and one 
of them is classified as non-
performing, are all the other 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001). 
Appendices 191 
 
 
Part VII -- Paper 3: Worldwide Bank Regulation and Bank Liquidity Structure 
Name of variable Explanation Source 
exposures automatically classified 
as non-performing as well?” is yes, 
 question 10.1 “Are banks required 
to prepare consolidated accounts for 
accounting purposes?” is yes, 
 question 10.5.1.b “Do banks 
disclose to the public: Off-balance 
sheet items” is yes, 
 question 10.5.1.c “Do banks 
disclose to the public: Governance 
and risk management framework” is 
yes, 
 question 10.5.2 “Are bank directors 
legally liable if information 
disclosed is erroneous or 
misleading?” is yes, 
 question 10.7 “Are commercial 
banks required by supervisors to 
have external credit ratings?” is yes,  
 question 10.8 “How many of the top 
ten banks (in terms of total domestic 
assets) are rated by international 
credit rating agencies (e.g., 
Moody's, Standard and Poor)?” is 
10. 
Ownership (OWN) Measure for the degree to which 
regulations control for ownership in 
banks following the survey explained in 
Barth et al. (2001). The variable can take 
a maximum value of 3 and is composed 
as following: It adds 1, if the answer to 
Variable taken 
from Lucadamo 
(2016) based on 
Barth et al. 
(2001). 
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 question 2.3 “Is there a maximum 
percentage of a bank's equity that 
can be owned by a single owner?” is 
yes, 
 question 2.5.1 “Can related parties 
own capital in a bank?” is yes, 
 question 2.6.d “2.6 Can 
nonfinancial firms own voting 
shares in commercial banks: 
Nonfinancial firms cannot own any 
equity investment in a commercial 
bank?” is yes.  
Log of total assets 
(LTA) 
Natural logarithm of the sum of all assets 
of a bank.   
Based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross 
loans (LLRGL) 
This is the ratio of the part of the loans 
for which the bank expects losses (but 
does not charge off) to the total loan 
portfolio.  
Bankscope. 
Return on average 
assets (ROAA) 
This is the ratio of the net income to the 
total assets (calculated as an average of 
the previous and the subsequent year-
end) of a bank.  
Bankscope. 
Dividend dummy 
(DIV) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in the case 
that the bank has paid out a dividend in 
the specific year and 0 otherwise.  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Bank’s total assets 
to sum of all banks’ 
Ratio of a bank’s total assets to the sum 
of all banks’ total assets of the country for 
a specific year.  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
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total assets of a 
country (BASA) 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Dummy for system 
relevance (SYS) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in the case 
that the bank’s total assets to the sum of 
all banks’ total assets of the country for a 
specific year is higher than 10% and 0 
otherwise.  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Bank concentration 
(CON) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 in the case 
that the total assets of the three biggest 
banks is more than 50% of all a country’s 
banks’ total assets for a specific year, 0 
otherwise.  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
based on data 
from Bankscope. 
Banks per million 
capita (BMC) 
Number of banks per country for a 
specific year divided by the total 
population of this country in millions.  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
based on data 
from world 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Bank deposits per 
GDP (BGDP) 
Demand, time and savings deposits in 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP. 
Financial 
development and 
structure dataset 
(as explained in 
Beck et al., 2000) 
Gross domestic 
product per capita 
in USD (GDPC) 
Explained by the variable’s name.  World 
development 
indicators (The 
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World Bank, 
2012). 
Annual gross 
domestic product 
growth (GGDP) 
Explained by the variable’s name. World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Bank Z-score 
(BZS) 
Measures the probability of default of a 
country's banking system. BZS is the 
weighted average of the z-scores of a 
country's individual banks (the weights 
are based on the individual banks' total 
assets). The individual Z-score divides a 
bank’s buffers (capitalisation and 
returns) by the volatility of those returns 
(refer to formula (VII.7)). A lower  
z-score indicates a higher probability of 
default.  
ROA +
Equity
Total Assets
Standard deviation of ROA
 (VII.7) 
 
Financial 
development and 
structure dataset 
(as explained in 
Beck et al., 2000) 
Inflation (INF) Explained by the variable’s name. World 
development 
indicators (The 
World Bank, 
2012). 
Crisis country 
(CRC) 
Dummy variable, which is 1 if the 
country suffered a bank crisis during the 
financial crisis, 0 otherwise. Bank crisis 
countries are the ones named as systemic 
cases according to Laeven and Valencia 
(2010).  
Own calculation 
following 
Lucadamo (2016) 
based on 
classification 
made by Laeven 
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and Valencia 
(2010).  
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VII.8.2. Table of 
Abbreviations 
AR(2) Autoregressive process 
of order 2 
ARE United Arab Emirates 
AUS Australia 
AUT Austria 
BEL Belgium 
BGR Bulgaria 
CAN Canada 
CHE Switzerland 
CHL Chile 
CHN China, People's Rep. 
of 
CYP Cyprus 
CZE Czech Republic 
DEU Germany 
Dep. Dependent 
df Degrees of freedom 
DNK Denmark 
DPD Dynamic panel data 
e.g. Exempli gratia (for 
example) 
ESP Spain 
EST Estonia 
et al. Et alii (and others) 
 
 
 
EU European Union 
FE Fixed effects 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
GBR United Kingdom 
GMM Generalised method of 
moments 
GRC Greece 
HKG Hong Kong 
HUN Hungary 
i.e. Id est (that is) 
i.i.d Independently, 
identically distributed 
IRL Ireland 
ISL Iceland 
ISR Israel 
ITA Italy 
iv Instrumental variable 
JEL Journal of Economic 
Literature 
JPN Japan 
KOR Republic of Korea 
LCR Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio 
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LSDVC Least square dummy 
variable correction  
LTU Lithuania 
LUX Luxembourg 
LVA Latvia 
MEX Mexico 
MLT Malta 
n/a Not applicable  
NLD Netherlands 
No. Number 
NOR Norway 
NSFR Net stable funding 
ratio 
NZL New Zealand 
OECD Organization for 
Economic Co-
operation and 
Development 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
POL Poland 
pp. Pages 
PRT Portugal 
ROU Romania 
RUS Russian Federation 
sd Standard deviation 
SGP Singapore 
SVK Slovakia 
SVN Slovenia 
SWE Sweden 
TUR Turkey 
USA United States 
USD United States dollar 
Vol.  Volume 
vs Versus  
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VII.8.3. Table of Symbols 
& and 
A Total number of categories for liabilities 
Ab Asset category (ranging from 1 to B) 
B Total number of categories for assets 
β Coefficient to be estimated 
C1 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with no unconsolidated companion   
C2 Consolidation code according to Bankscope: statement of a 
mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled 
subsidiaries or branches with an unconsolidated companion 
C* Consolidation code according to Bankscope: additional 
consolidated statement 
D Explanatory variable 
εi,t Remainder disturbance for individual bank i at time t;  
εi,t = ui,t - μi 
i Numbering for individual bank (ranging from 1 to N) 
j Numbering for country (ranging from 1 to J) 
J Total number of countries 
k Numbering for explanatory variables (ranging from 0 to K) 
K Total number of explanatory variables 
L. Lagged 
La Liability category (ranging from 1 to A) 
λ Speed of adjustment 
μi Unobservable specific effect for individual i; μ i = ui,t - εi,t.  
νt Unobservable time effect 
N Total population of individual banks 
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® Registered trademark 
t Numbering for time (ranging from 1 to T) 
t-test Student’s test 
T Total time periods 
ui,t Regression disturbance term for individual i at time t;  
λvi,t = ui,t = μi + εi,t 
vi,t Disturbance term in estimation of target NSFR for individual 
bank i at time t 
wfa Weighting factor for liability category a 
wfb Weighting factor for asset category b 
% Percentage 
* Target
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VIII. Conclusion of the Thesis 
VIII.1. Conclusion of Paper 1 
In my first paper, I apply a partial adjustment model using the generalised 
method of moments regression technique in order to find explanatory 
variables for the capital ratios of banks around the world. These variables 
include various regulatory factors, which cover different aspects of 
regulation severity. However, only for activity restrictions, I find strong 
evidence that there is an impact on the capital ratios of banks; greater 
restrictions seem to educate banks on the need to have higher capital 
ratios. On the other hand, I find no evidence that countries’ power over 
the regulatory body, ownership restrictions, entry requirements or capital 
requirements influence banks’ capital ratios. On the contrary, there are 
indicators related to the USA that stronger private monitoring such as 
external audits or credit ratings may even lead banks to have lower 
capital ratios.  
While the impact of the regulation on capital ratios therefore seems to be 
limited, I find strong evidence that the previous year’s capital ratio has a 
persistent impact on the present capital ratio. The yearly adjustment of 
the target capital ratio is only approximately 6%; that is, the adjustment 
seems to be considerably slower than some former studies have 
estimated. 
Apart from the variables above, I also find support for a couple of 
significant explanatory bank-specific and other country-specific factors. 
There is evidence that banks paying dividends have higher capital ratios. 
A possible reason for this could be that a bank being able to pay out a 
dividend is a bank in good financial condition, which leads to a higher 
capital ratio. Further, larger banks seem to have smaller capital ratios. 
One could therefore at first glance agree to the regulatory argument that 
splitting larger banks into several smaller banks leads to higher capital 
ratios, since it reduces the “too big to fail” issue. However, my results 
imply that larger banks have lower capital ratios precisely because they 
are less risky than smaller ones. A bank having a higher (systemic) risk 
does indeed seem to have a higher capital ratio. This could be an 
indicator that such banks face greater (e.g. political) pressure to have 
larger capital cushions. Applied to the country-specific factors, this 
observation also holds for the banking sector as a whole: the more 
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important the banking sector of a country relative to the rest of the 
economy, the higher the capital ratios of its banks appear to be. 
Additionally, the capital ratios seem to fall when the bank risk in an 
economy is shared among more banks. Overall, the results suggest that 
the riskiness of banks appears to have already been somehow 
implemented in the bank capital ratios. 
What do these results mean in relation to the future of bank regulation? 
Evidently, the past regulations across the various countries were not 
sufficiently accurate to have a direct impact on the capital adequacy of 
banks; bank-specific and other country-specific factors seem to be more 
important. It could be interesting for further research to examine whether 
the availability of more post-crisis data in future years will alter these 
results. However, merely increasing the regulatory severity as requested 
by the US camp might also remain ineffective in future. Prospective 
changes in bank regulation should concentrate on the effective variables 
such as the activity restrictions or the “risk” topic. Additionally, changes 
should cause the ineffective variables to become more powerful. 
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VIII.2. Conclusion of Paper 2 
The bank regulation framework Basel II, which was published in 2004, 
aimed to strengthen the banking system around the world. However, 
already at the time of publication, critical votes erupted and it became 
apparent that not all important countries planned to introduce the new 
rules at the speed and the magnitude stipulated by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision. One of the most intensively discussed questions 
was, among others, whether the new rules would change the capital ratios 
of banks (the originators of the framework had intended an increase in 
the ratios).   
In the second paper, I attempt to ascertain whether there is a measurable 
change in the capital ratios that was caused by the new framework. I 
perform a DiD approach by comparing early-comprehensive introducers 
(the treatment group) of Basel II with late-partial adopters (the control 
group), using 2004 as the treatment date. I also include a couple of 
control variables in the calculations. To ensure similarity between 
treatment banks and control banks, I use propensity score matching 
strategies and construct comparable groups, before applying the DiD 
computations. 
The results regarding the control variables are similar to other work 
performed on the subject of banks’ capital ratios: I find very strong 
evidence that bigger banks have lower capital ratios than smaller banks. 
There is also strong support for the finding that the ratio increases with 
a bank’s profitability and the economic health of its environment. 
Further, I find some evidence that banks’ ratios decrease as the banks’ 
riskiness increases. For a few regressions only, I find that dividend 
payers seem to have lower capital ratios, that capital ratios appears to be 
lower in the case of higher growth rates of the gross domestic product 
and that ratios seem to be higher in the case of higher inflation rates and 
the greater importance of the banking sector in a country.  
The results regarding the treatment effect are of far more interest for my 
study. I find evidence of such an effect in the amount of roughly 100 
basis points. This result is highly robust in terms of variations in both the 
matching strategy and the DiD strategy. That is, it seems that the 
announced comprehensive introduction of Basel II in 2004 led the 
affected banks to hold higher capital ratios in this amount compared to 
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banks from countries with no introduction. However, it turns out that the 
regulation change is not necessarily the only factor that led to the 
treatment effect. There is evidence that simultaneous changes in bank 
reporting standards – mainly from cost-based local regulatory standards 
to fair-value-based IFRS – led to higher capital ratios as well. In other 
words, book values changed and therefore the capital ratios went up 
because of a change in the measurement method. The “real” effect might 
have been much smaller than it appears at first, although the evidence 
regarding the reporting standards change is not entirely robust. 
Considering the results of other studies relating to the influence of the 
regulation, it is nevertheless apparent that the introduction of Basel II 
had at best only a partial positive effect on the capital ratios of banks.  
This result is of interest with regard to future changes in bank regulation, 
especially the introduction of Basel III. The increase in capital ratios 
alone does not necessarily mean that banks or the banking system have 
become more stable with the introduction of Basel II. The financial crisis 
that occurred after my observation horizon revealed that several banks 
ran into existential problems despite the application of the Basel II rules. 
Accordingly, a topic for further research could be whether the 
introduction of Basel III or other future framework developments have a 
positive effect on the capital ratios of banks; future crises will show 
whether this effect has the power to prevent such problems from 
occurring in the banking sector in the future.
Conclusion of Paper 3 205 
 
Part VIII -- Conclusion of the Thesis 
VIII.3. Conclusion of Paper 3 
Many studies, including the first two papers of my thesis, have tried to 
find explanatory factors for the capital ratios of banks and the influence 
of regulation on the capital ratios. In contrast, researchers have so far 
neglected studies on the liquidity structure of banks (i.e. a ratio of a 
bank’s available funding to its required funding).   
Prompted by this lack of empirical evidence, I examine explanatory 
factors for the liquidity structure ratios – using the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) – of banks. I apply various regulatory, bank-specific and 
country-specific explanatory variables and the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable as an additional explanatory factor forms a partial 
adjustment model, which I calculate using the generalised method of 
moments technique.   
I find evidence that greater capital regulation leads to lower liquidity 
structure ratios. A possible explanation for this observation might be that 
banks prioritise compliance with the capital ratio standards and not the 
liquidity structure ratios, because binding standards have not yet been 
implemented for the latter. Furthermore, I find that greater private 
monitoring such as external audits and credit ratings results in banks 
having lower net stable funding ratios. 
I do not find any significant bank-specific explanatory factors and the 
highly significant and robust coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is relatively low. This gives evidence that banks alter their 
NSFRs relatively quickly to their desired ratio, but this desired ratio is 
idiosyncratic for every single bank.  
Nevertheless, interpreting the other country-specific variables, I find 
evidence that the importance – and therefore the risk – of a country’s 
banking sector as a whole influences the liquidity structures of the banks 
of these countries: higher importance seems to lead to higher NSFRs.  
Additionally, I find that higher growth in the annual domestic product 
leads to higher NSFRs, indicating that banks do not pay out all of their 
profits in times of economic growth. As for the regulatory variables 
discussed above, this result also seem to be highly influenced by US 
banks.  
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What are the implications for the future of bank regulation? Obviously, 
past regulation has had a limited impact on banks’ liquidity structure in 
the various countries. However, this result might be understandable, 
since bank regulators are just starting to implement binding rules for the 
liquidity structure. The fact that no substantial connection between bank 
regulation and liquidity structure was found in the past does not mean 
that regulation of the liquidity structure by the new Basel II framework 
could not be an effective regulatory instrument in future. 
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VIII.4. Overall Conclusion of the Thesis 
Overall, the thesis shows that the influence of regulation on the capital 
and financing structure of banks appeared to be limited in the past. I do 
not find a measurable effect on the financing structure and only minor 
evidence of an effect on the capital structure. To conclude, bank 
regulations aiming for stronger capital and liquidity structures have not 
achieved the desired results with the old regulatory frameworks. The 
current discussion regarding the new Basel III framework shows that the 
topic is still controversial and it will be interesting to see if this new 
framework alters the results of my thesis. 
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